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Abstract  
 
An electricity market is very complex and different in its nature, when compared to 
other commodity markets. The introduction of competition and restructuring in global 
electricity markets brought more complexity and major changes in terms of governance, 
ownership and technical and market operations. 
In a liberalized electricity market, all market participants are responsible for their own 
decisions; therefore, all the participants are trying to make profit by participating in 
electricity trading. There are different types of electricity market, and in this research a 
bilateral electricity market has been specifically considered. 
This thesis not only contributes with regard to the reviewing UK electricity market as an 
example of a bilateral electricity market with more than 97% of long-term bilateral 
trading, but also proposes a dual aspect point of view with regard to the bilateral 
electricity market by splitting the generation and supply sides of the wholesale market. 
This research aims at maximizing the market participants’ profits and finds the 
equilibrium point of the bilateral market; hence, various methods such as equilibrium 
models have been reviewed with regard to management of the risks (e.g. technical and 
financial risks) of participating in the electricity market.  
This research proposes a novel Conjectural Variation Equilibrium (CVE) model for 
bilateral electricity markets, to reduce the market participants’ exposure to risks and 
maximize the profits. Hence, generation companies’ behaviors and strategies in an 
imperfect bilateral market environment, oligopoly, have been investigated by applying 
the CVE method. By looking at the bilateral market from an alternative aspect, the 
supply companies’ behaviors in an oligopsony environment have also been taken into 
consideration. 
At the final stage of this research, the ‘matching’ of both quantity and price between 
oligopolistic and oligopsonistic markets has been obtained through a novel-coordinating 
algorithm that includes CVE model iterations of both markets. Such matching can be 
achieved by adopting a hierarchical optimization approach, using the Matlab 
 iii 
Patternsearch optimization algorithm, which acts as a virtual broker to find the 
equilibrium point of both markets. 
 
Index Terms-- Bilateral electricity market, Oligopolistic market, Oligopsonistic 
market, Conjectural Variation Equilibrium method, Patternsearch optimization, 
Game theory, Hierarchical optimization method 
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1.1 Introduction 
 
Electricity utility systems around the world continue to evolve from vertically integrated 
monopoly structure to a competitive environment market, which provides all the 
customers with the choice of services. The electricity markets liberalization combines 
the unbundling vertically integrated utilities, introduction of competition in the market 
and the limitation of central and governmental control. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: Liberalized Electricity Market Components 
 
For instance, the electricity market in UK has seen major changes since the Electricity 
Act in 1989, which introduced a competitive environment and began the privatization in 
all sections of the market [1] in order to bring transparency and liquidity into electricity 
trading. These changes resulted in the electricity Pool; afterwards the New Electricity 
Trading Arrangement (NETA) appeared in 2001, which included England and Wales 
and was a bilateral electricity market. In 2005 NETA reformed into British Electricity 
Trading and Transmission Arrangement (BETTA) covering England, Wales and 
Scotland [2]. In such a market structure, as it will be investigated in details in Chapter 3, 
most of the energy trading are long-term bilateral contracts (Figure 1.2) and the general 
principles of these changes have been the unbundling of the market into separate areas 
of generation, transmission, distribution and supply. 
 Competition 
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Figure 1.2: Bilateral Long-Term Trading Share 
 
In bilateral electricity markets, each market participant has its own and unique business, 
aims, strategy, and technical and financial risks. Decentralizing decision-makers is one 
of the significant goals of restructured bilateral markets. The change from centralized to 
self-dispatched market created a wide range of challenges for all market participants to 
optimize their strategies in order to maintain or increase their profits and decreases their 
exposures to the risk, because of the time duration of the price volatility in spot and 
balancing markets; which seems challenging for all market participants. 
The volatility exhibited by markets restructuring (e.g. UK electricity market evolutions), 
several market failures (e.g. California electricity market crisis) and different behaviors 
of restructured markets (e.g. various electricity market structures in different countries) 
have highlighted the need for a better understanding of market structure and its 
complexity. 
Bilateral Electricity 
Market 
Other 
Spot and 
Balancing 
Markets 
Long-term 
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Advance modeling approaches are needed to demonstrate the complication of this kind 
of market structure and model the behaviors of market participants over a period of time 
and show how they react to the economic, financial and technical changes in the power 
system. One of these approaches is Conjectural Variation Equilibrium (CVE) method, 
which brings robustness to the market modeling comparing to other applied approaches. 
This research investigates imperfect bilateral electricity market modeling based on 
equilibrium method for profit maximization on both sides of the market and finding 
equilibrium point of the market. 
 
1.2 Significance of this Research 
 
Electricity, and more generally the energy, has become a significant and key issue in 
developed and even developing countries around the world and plays an important role 
in forming their medium and long-term macro economical and financial strategies. 
Electricity has also an impact on economic environment. Restructuring can bring 
different policies in the electricity markets and change the objectives of market 
participants. Far from the advantages that these deregulations can bring to the electricity 
market and power system, there will also be some challenging environment and 
conditions for participants. 
One of the key impacts of deregulation is increasing exposure to the risks. By the nature 
of power system and electricity market, certain risks exist, such as: operational and 
technical failures, demand variations, volatilities in price of fuel based on international 
policies (e.g. recent Middle East crisis). However, in a monopoly industry, which is 
regulated and vertically integrated, carrying different strategies like excessing capacity 
can easily cover all these risks. On the other hand deregulation do not only accentuate 
the inherent market risks but also brings additional risk sources like the complexity of 
market structure, lack of time, complex pricing procedure and etc. These risk resources 
can cause imperfect competition in the market. 
Therefore, it is essential to consider both sides of the bilateral electricity market and 
consider the reactions and behaviors of market participants on both sides of the market 
in order to monitor the market power. 
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1.3 Scope of this Research 
 
The current research covers bilateral electricity market modeling considering the 
impacts of long-term contracts on the equilibrium point of the market. According to 
Figure 1.3 the majority of electricity trading in the bilateral electricity markets are long-
term contracts [2]; therefore their influences on the decision makers in the market 
should be taken into consideration. Figure 1.3 provides an overview about different 
functions of electricity market within the time period. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.3:  Electricity Market Functionalities 
According to the figure above, long-term electricity market can bring profit 
maximization and also risk management. However, by considering only generation side 
of the market, achieving to a competitive and stable bilateral electricity market is 
impossible, since the impacts of demand side behaviors have not been considered. In 
such a market structure both generation and demand sides of the market should be 
considered and the impacts of each firm’s strategic decision on the equilibrium of the 
market need to be studied. The market participants should be modeled as decision 
makers that consider their rivals’ strategies base on any changes in their decisions. In 
this method all the firms can learn from their decisions and other market participants 
behaviors, simultaneously. 
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After reviewing several approaches, equilibrium model will be applied in this research, 
and among different equilibrium models, Conjectural Variation Equilibrium method [2] 
has been selected based on its investigated specifications in Chapter 4.  
According to Figure 1.4, both sides of the market have been considered in this research 
and since it is a double-sided environment, it is essential to consider the link between 
generation and supply sides and influences of these two edges on each other in an 
imperfect environment. Therefore two market terms have been introduced: oligopolistic 
electricity market and oligopsonistic electricity market. This research is observing these 
two types of market individually and furthermore, by building and developing a novel 
algorithm, which looks at the common aspects of these two types of market, the 
equilibrium point of the whole bilateral market can be investigated. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.4:  Scope of this Research 
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equilibrium point of the market, while all market participants are making profit. Hence, 
the followings would be the objectives of this research: 
 Detailed investigations on BETTA structure as a bilateral electricity market 
example, in order to understand the market participants’ behaviors and clarify 
the necessity of considering both sides of the market. 
 Identifying different types of risks and uncertainties in bilateral electricity 
market. 
 Detailed investigations on different electricity market modeling techniques. This 
covers the following aspects: 
 Why is it required to model bilateral electricity markets? 
 Why has equilibrium modeling been chosen? 
 Why has the Conjectural Variation Equilibrium method been selected? 
 Considering imperfect competitions in generation side of the market, looking at 
oligopolistic electricity market modeling. 
 Considering imperfect competitions in supply side of the market, looking at 
oligopsonistic electricity market modeling. 
 Investigating the impacts of generation companies (GenCos) and supply 
companies (SupplyCos) strategies on both sides of the market. 
 Calculating equilibrium point of the market considering both sub-markets, while 
all market participants are making profit by taking part in electricity trading. 
 
1.5 Outline of this Research 
 
This section provided an overview of this research. The following chapters provide a 
more exhaustive picture of the relevant applications of the research. 
Chapter 2 provides different concepts of electricity market and demonstrates how 
electricity market has been evolved from vertically integrated structure to a competitive 
and transparent environment. In order to clarify market revolutions toward 
deregulations, market structures in several countries have been investigated. One of 
these reviewed markets is UK electricity market. The appearance of electricity Pool 
structure has been reviewed and the reasons of transforming into bilateral electricity 
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market have been highlighted. Furthermore, different types of market modeling 
techniques have been investigated and Equilibrium method has been selected as a 
modeling approach based on its specifications. 
In Chapter 3, the UK electricity market, BETTA, structure has been investigated in 
details as an example of bilateral market in order to clarify the importance of modeling 
bilateral electricity market. The reasons behind bilateral market modeling will be 
explained based on different facts such as price volatility in Balancing Mechanism (BM) 
and spot market; hence, the impacts of such a market structure on market participants’ 
behaviors and strategies will be presented.  
Exercising market power in bilateral electricity market will be reviewed in Chapter 4, by 
investigating some concepts such as perfect competition and monopoly. It will be 
explained that in order to model bilateral electricity market, it is essential to split it into 
generation and supply sides. In Chapter 4, the imperfect competition in generation side 
will be studied and GenCos’ strategies in oligopolistic electricity market will be 
highlighted. In order to monitor market power, different techniques will be reviewed and 
equilibrium method, particularly Conjectural Variation Equilibrium (CVE) approach 
will be selected. A presented case study in this chapter, illustrates that the inverse 
demand curves parameters such as slope and intercept and also GenCo’s conjectures 
about their rivals’ have strong impacts on the market. 
SupplyCos’ behaviors will be taken into consideration in chapter 5 by investigating and 
modeling oligopsonistic electricity market. In this chapter the boundaries of GenCos’ 
and SupplyCos’ conjectures will be studied and the impacts of inverse generation curve 
parameters and the retail price on SupplyCos’ strategies will be highlighted. 
Chapter 6 looks at the bilateral electricity market at a higher level in order to find the 
equilibrium point of the market. The co-ordination between oligopolistic and 
oligopsonistic electricity markets will be highlighted and a novel hierarchical 
optimization algorithm will introduced By performing this algorithm the equilibrium 
point of the market can be calculated, in which all market participants are making profits 
and the proposed case study in this chapter can validate this algorithm. 
Finally Chapter 7 provides various concluding remarks about this research. 
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2.1 Introduction 
 
Electricity market deregulation has changed the power industry from a centralized 
structure into a competitive market environment. Over the past two decades many 
changes have been made in the power industry in order to make a new economical 
structure. There are several commodity markets around the world, which almost have 
the same structure and mechanism. In all of them, supply should meet the demand and 
market equilibrium should be found; however, there are several factors that make the 
electricity market different and more complex compared to others such as: 
 Method of delivery (Generated electricity from one generator cannot be directed 
to a specific costumer). 
 Date of delivery (Electricity demand should be met on real time basis). 
 Complex regulations (The existence of several governance regulations make the 
market structure complex). 
 Transactions conditions (Complex market structure brings complication into 
transaction conditions e.g. forward, future and option contracts). 
 Limitations on storage (Electricity can not be stored like other comedies in large 
scale) 
 Governmental obligations (existence of several governmental and renewable 
obligation bring complexity into the market). 
 Demand prediction (Unlike other comedies the demand profile predictions is 
challenging). 
 Fast market operations (e.g. in the UK electricity market the System Operator 
has got only 1 hour in order to match the generation and demand for each 
settlement period). 
Liberalization, climate policy and promotion of renewable energy are challenges to 
players in the electricity sector in many countries. Policy makers have to consider issues 
like market power, bounded rationality of players and appearance of fluctuating energy 
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sources in order to provide adequate legislation. Furthermore, interactions between 
markets and environmental policy instrument become an issue of increasing importance. 
A viable approach for the scientific analysis of these developments is equilibrium 
methods, the goals of this chapter is to provide an overview on the market concept and 
its evolution towards a competitive environment, this evolution of the power market 
leads to a new electricity market that is an ‘electricity pool’. Yet the pool concept 
suffered from a number of disadvantages. Those problems led the UK government to 
announce New Electricity Trading Arrangement (NETA) as a new power market in 
2001 and developed into British Electricity Trading and Transmission Arrangement 
(BETTA) in 2005 that covers England, Wales and Scotland. BETTA specification leads 
us toward understanding the concepts of oligopoly and oligopsony market conditions 
and investigations of this market structure. 
In order to achieve a clear understanding of the UK electricity market operation, as a 
bilateral electricity market, and to find out how this market can be modeled in a way to 
create an environment to help all market participants make profit, an overview of 
electricity market revolutions from vertically integrated utilities to a competitive market 
environment in the UK and other countries is presented in this chapter. Pool structure 
electricity markets will be described and a brief introduction about the appearance of 
NETA and BETTA will be discussed. However, a more detailed review of BETTA and 
the risks of participating in such a market will be provided in Chapter 3. Considering 
deregulated electricity markets’ risks, this chapter correspondingly evaluates different 
market study methods, which have been studied. Further details with respect to the 
proposed modeling method will be discussed comprehensively in Chapter 4. 
 
2.2 Concept of Electricity Market 
 
Several governance structures and market designs have been proposed to reflect regional 
and national requirements. Like other competitive markets, numerous evolutions have 
occurred and still there are some ongoing revolution processes; however unlike other 
markets the governance, regulations and pricing arrangements for this kind of market 
are very complicated. It took years for policy makers to find out that markets for 
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transmission and energy cannot be introduced without any linkage between them and 
after several trial investigations some appropriate and established structures have been 
introduced [2].  
Several years ago, when customers wanted to buy and use electricity they had no choice 
since the structure of the electrical industry was a monopoly. Thus, they had to buy 
electricity from the utilities, which was vertically integrated and held the monopoly [1]. 
Those utilities managed generation, transmission, distribution, infrastructure 
supervisions and electric services to the individual large or small customers. They also 
coped with the maintenance and future developments of their own assets to meet the 
future demand level and also maintained both high voltage transmission lines and low 
voltage distribution network. Therefore, the security of supply, which is one of the most 
important pillars in national strategies, could not be met properly since it was shared 
among all these vertically integrated utilities.  Some of these utilities were government 
agencies, while others were regulated private companies. Figure 2.1 demonstrates the 
monopoly model of electricity market [1]. In (a) the utility is completely vertically 
integrated; however in (b) the distribution handled by two or more companies.  
        
(a)                            (b)                                                                                                                                           
Energy sale  
Energy flow within a company 
Figure 2.1: Monopoly of Electricity Market [1]  
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In the 1980’s engineers, customers and economists realized that this kind of structure 
could remove the incentives to operate, participate and make investment efficiently in 
the electrical industry. The public utilities were so close to the government and these 
policies could interfere with the power market [2]. Besides, the regulated private utilities 
passed on the cost of their mistakes to the customers and that made the price of the 
electricity unreasonably high. 
In order to introduce more incentives to the market participants and make the quality of 
supply higher and the electricity price low, the existence of competition in the market 
and among the participants of the electricity industry is an essential issue to consider. In 
most cases the introduction of competition leads into privatization. In the privatization 
process some public utilities are sold to the private sector by the government [1]. 
Figure 2.2 shows the double dimension of the restructuring process. The vertical axis 
shows the reforms related to the ownership and the horizontal axis displays the market 
structure [3]. By moving towards left, the level of completion increases. 
  
Figure 2.2: Restructuring Dimensions and Possibilities [3] 
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2.3 Models for Electricity Sector 
 
According to the Figure 2.2, four electricity models combining the types from Hunt and 
Schuttleworth (1996) and Tenenbaum, Lock and Barker (1992) can be considered. The 
level of competition at each stage has distinguished these models, presented as below. 
 
     2.3.1 Monopoly 
 
Generation, transmission and distribution in this model are vertically integrated, 
although in the distribution section there may be different distribution companies, which 
have local monopoly conditions (Figure 2.1). This can happen commonly in the 
wholesale market even for bilateral trading [4,5]. 
 
     2.3.2 Purchasing Agency 
 
This is a first step around a competitive environment in the electricity market. In this 
model the utility no longer owns all the generations. Here the Independent Power 
Producers (IPP) plays an important role and sells their electricity as purchasing agents 
[1]. Figure 2.3 illustrates the purchasing model, in which IPPs are also participating in 
the electricity trading and have brought competition into the generation side. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: Purchasing Agency Model of Electricity Market [3] 
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One of the advantages of this model is introducing some competitive environments in 
the generation side. However, this model cannot be an appropriate one especially for a 
bilateral market since there are still some monopoly and monopsony powers among the 
participants. 
 
     2.3.3 Wholesale Competition Model 
 
There is no central organization in this kind of model. All the Distribution Companies 
(DisCos) purchase the electricity directly from the Generation Companies (GenCos) and 
distribute among their customers. As shown in Figure 2.4, large customers are allowed 
to buy the electricity directly from the wholesale market [1,2,5-7]. At the wholesale 
level, only the operation of the transmission network and the Spot market remain 
centralized [1]. On the other hand, at the retail level the system is still centralized, since 
each DisCo purchases electricity on behalf of customers that are located in that area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
Figure 2.4:  Wholesale Competition Model [3]  
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It is noticeable that the wholesale market can take the form of Pool or bilateral 
transactions [2]. This model creates a more competitive environment at the generation 
level because the wholesale price can be determined by the bidding strategies of the 
GenCos. On the other side, the retail price of electricity should be regulated based on the 
fact that there is no chance for small customers to select their suppliers if the prices are 
too high. This is even challenging for DisCos since they cannot reduce their exposures 
to the risk of increases in the wholesale price. 
 
     2.3.4 Retail Competition 
 
In this model customers have been given the chance to choose their suppliers in full 
retail competition [7-9]; therefore there is no need for the retail price to be regulated any 
more. In this model, because of transaction charges some large customers can purchase 
electricity directly from the wholesale market. Figure 2.5 demonstrates the structure of 
this model. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Retail Competition Model [3] 
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It is also noticeable that Distribution Companies’ physical activities are totally separate 
from their retail activities to avoid any local monopoly for supplying the electricity to 
the end users [2]. The only concern that remains is the monopoly in operation of 
transmission and distribution networks, so it is expected that the charges for using these 
networks would be shared among all the market participants. Hence, differences in these 
models are whether there is competition among generation companies, supply 
companies and also whether the final consumers can choose whom to buy their power 
from, e.g. comparing to wholesale model, in retail completion the end-users have been 
provided the chance of choosing their suppliers. 
 
2.4 Global Movements towards Market Restructuring 
 
In the late 1970s, one of the earliest introductions to the privatizations in the market 
structure took place in Chile. Argentina also tried to build a market and privatize 
existing generation companied and provide capital investments for reintegration of 
assets and for transmission expansions. Other Latin countries like Brazil, Peru and 
Colombia were among those followers who tried to establish a competitive market in 
1990s [2].  
Economic crisis forced other countries around the world to restructure their market into 
a completive one in order to bring transparency and remove market power from 
wholesale trading. Nordic countries, Continental Europe, New Zealand, North America, 
Australia and Great Britain were among those pioneers [2]. Brief summary of these 
market revolutions are described below. 
 
     2.4.1 Nordic Countries 
 
Nordic countries consist of Norway, Sweden, Finland and Denmark. Norway was the 
first country that introduced market restructuring by the Energy Act of 1990. Following 
Norway, Sweden tried to establish a competitive market in 1995, which resulted in 
establishing Norwegian-Swedish Exchange (Nord Pool) in 1996. Later on Finland 
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joined this market in 1998, West Denmark in 1999 and East Denmark in 2000. There are 
five System Operators (SO) in this market, one for each country except Denmark with 
two SOs; therefore the Nord Pool can be considered as the only existing international 
market [10]. 
 
     2.4.2 Continental Europe 
 
Since electricity markets in each European Union (EU) states have weak points in terms 
of cross-border electricity exchanges the idea of single Internal Electricity Market (IEM) 
was introduced in 1996 [11-13].  
The majority of trading would be bilateral contacts including forward and future 
arrangements; only a small fraction of trading would take place in daily and hourly 
contracts in the spot markets in order to help all participants to fine-tune their positions. 
The IEM would be divided into submarkets in order to help Transmission System 
Operators (TSOs) monitoring and controlling each zone. In 1999, European 
Transmission System Operator (ETSO) was established in order to implement IEM. 
Also in 2009, European Network of Transmission Systems Operators for Electricity 
(ENTSO-E) was founded to insure co-operation among European TSOs and implement 
regulations and rules in line with European Union legislation [12].  
However, it is obvious that further investigations required establishing a single IEM for 
all EU states, with the purpose to fulfill all three European Union pillars, which are as 
follow: 
 Security of supply 
 Sustainability and environment 
 Competition 
European Council (EC) has set a target as 2014 to achievement of the Internal 
Electricity Market. By this time electricity would be traded freely in Europe [11]. 
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     2.4.3 New Zealand 
 
New Zealand used to have a monopoly electricity market until 1994. Since then several 
deregulations took place in both generation and retail sides to bring competition into the 
market. The wholesale electricity market, called NZEM, brought transparency and 
regulated prices by using pool and spot markets. NZEM in considered as the first 
international market based on nodal pricing, which brings Local Marginal Pricing 
(LMP) in the market. M-co is a company who administrates the market on behalf of 
government and a state-owned company is the owner of transmission networks and 
plays the role of TSO [14]. 
 
     2.4.4 Australia 
 
Altered commercial solutions and restructures were introduced in the early 1990s to 
eliminate the monopoly from wholesale and retail markets and bring functionality into 
transmission and distribution network operations. In 1998 the major reform took place 
in southern and eastern Australia where the National Electricity Market (NEM) was 
established. The market operator for this market is called National Electricity Market 
Management Company (NEMMCO).  
The NEM involves pool structure where all the electricity sold at wholesale level is 
traded in this market. NEM covers one of the longest interconnected power systems 
since there are six zones in this market and constraints on interconnectors can cause 
distinct marginal spot prices among these regions [2,15]. 
 
     2.4.5 United States 
 
The emerge of Independent System Operators (ISOs) in United States happened in 1996 
after launching the Energy Policy Act of 1992. The Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) introduced ISOs including Pennsylvania-New Jersey-Maryland 
(PJM), ISO New England (ISO-NE), New York ISO (NYISO), California ISO 
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(CalISO), Midwest ISO (MISO), Southwest Power Pool (SPP) and Electric Reliability 
Council of Texas (ERCOT) [2]. 
Each ISO covers one or more than one area and is responsible for reliability and security 
of supply for those areas. The procedure of this market is based on two elements: 
Available Transfer Capabilities (ATC), provided by ISOs, and Open Access Same-time 
Information System (OASIS).  These ATCs would be published on OASIS and based on 
bilateral trading; transmission requests can be addressed within those specified areas 
[16].  
However diversity in a number of ISOs in United States caused divergence problems. 
Some ISOs had pool market background, which resulted in creation of several voluntary 
spot markets like 1997 PJM and 1999 ISO-NE markets [17,18]. In order to establish a 
top-level organization to ensure the reliability of all transmission networks and security 
of supply, FERC founded Regional Transmission Organizations (RTO) in 2000, which 
was responsible for market operations and regulations and supervising the ISOs. Finally, 
this complex structure of electricity market and partial deregulations caused market 
manipulation and in 2000 California Market had several crises, which resulted in 
multiple blackouts and economic fall out [19].  
The California electricity market crisis was a good case that demonstrated the 
importance of considering market reliability in designing electricity market structure. 
 
2.5 Great Britain 
 
As discussed earlier, one of the main reasons of market deregulation was to make 
electricity, as a commodity in such a market, analyzable in economical and financial 
frameworks. UK electricity industry has seen major changes since Electricity Act in 
1989 [5] in order to make it one of the most advanced electricity market in Europe. The 
following sections represent these evolutions. 
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     2.5.1 Electricity Pool in UK 
 
The UK introduced a new electricity market that started on April 1
st
 1990. The 
electricity was sold through the Electricity Pool, which had become the wholesale 
market for trading electricity.  In 1990 before the privatization, there were three major 
companies in England and Wales and National Power, Powergen and Nuclear Electric 
supplied approximately 75% of the UK’s power generation [5].  
 
     2.5.1.1 Competition at Generation Level 
 
In the 1990s, the competition on the generation side created an environment in which 
there were nearly 40 major generation companies selling electricity into the Pool in 
England and Wales. However, the Pool was still dominated by the 5 largest companies – 
British Energy, PowerGen, National Power, BNFL Magnox Generation and Eastern 
Merchant Generation – that produced 50% of the generated electricity from October 
1999 to September 2000.  2% of the generated electricity was provided by the France-
England and Scotland-England interconnections and the remaining 48% from other 
medium and small size generation companies [20]. Also there were four large 
generation companies in Northern Ireland owned by Premier Power, Nigen and 
Coolkeeragh Power. In contrast to England and Wales and Northern Ireland, Scotland 
had a monopoly market dominated by ScottishPower and Hydro-Electric. Later 
Privatizations and deregulations covered National Power, PowerGen and Scottish Power 
in 1991, National Grid in 1995 and finally British Energy in 1996 [20]. 
 
     2.5.1.2 Competition at Transmission Level 
 
Before BETTA, there are four transmission operators in the UK. National Grid 
Company (NGC) is operating in England and Wales, which is the largest transmission 
network. Northern Ireland Electricity is operating the transmission network in Northern 
Ireland and similarly there are two transmission operators in Scotland: ScottishPower 
and Hydro – Electric. All these transmission networks are connected through several 
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interconnections. However, after 1990 in order to bring flexibility and competition in to 
the market these transmission networks are open to licensed suppliers based on a Grid 
Code [5,20]. 
 
     2.5.1.3 Competition at Distribution Level 
 
There were 15 privatized Regional Electricity Companies (RECs) in the UK from 1990 
to 2001. Each distribution grid operated by one REC. RECs were responsible for both 
distribution and supply the electricity before the privatization however, after market 
deregulation these two tasks unbundled. 12 RECs covered England and Wales and 
distribution grid in Scotland was operated by 2 RECs alongside generation and 
transmission companies and Northern Ireland was vertically integrated with only one 
company [20]. 
 
     2.5.1.4 Competition among Suppliers 
 
Before privatization, distribution companies were responsible for supplying the 
customers in their regions. However, after Pool establishment the supply market became 
open for competition and RECs could participate in trading. There were two types of 
RECs in the market described as follow [5,20]: 
 First Tier RECs: These were the local responsible companies for distributing 
electricity in their designated area. Alongside their responsibilities for 
connecting end-users to the grid, they were constrained to supply electricity to 
any small customers within their licensed area as well. They were regulated by 
public electricity supply (PES) license. Since they were providing physical 
connections and playing the role of supplier they can easily dominate the market 
and their market share for each area would be high. 
 Second Tier RECs: Other supply companies were considered as Second Tier 
RECs. They were regulated by a private license. These supplier provided 
electricity for the customers, which were outside their regions.  
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Table 2.1 demonstrates the market share for each REC in each region. It can be found 
that the First Tier RECs were dominating the supply market. 
 
Table 2.1: Domestic Market Share of Local REC (June 2000) [20] 
Region 
REC (owner of supply 
business) 
Market share by number 
of customers (%) 
Market share by volume 
(%) 
Eastern Eastern Energy (TXU) 81 82 
South Southern Electric (SSE) 83 85 
East Midlands 
East Midlands Electricity 
(PowerGen) 
79 79 
Midlands 
Midlands Electricity 
(Innogy) 
82 85 
Northwest Norweb (TXU) 83 81 
South Scotland Scottish Power 84 86 
Yorkshire 
Yorkshire Electricity 
(Innogy) 
84 85 
Southeast Seeboard 83 84 
London London Electricity (EdF) 84 85 
Merseyside Manweb (Scottish power) 81 86 
Northeast Northern Electric 78 75 
Southwest Sweb (EdF) 89 91 
South Wales Swalec (SSE) 84 88 
North Scotland Hydro-Electric (SSE) 89 93 
 
Correspondingly, Figure 2.6 has been provided in order to achieve to a comprehensive 
understanding of UK electricity Pool structure. 
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Figure 2.6: Privatized UK Electricity Industry Structure [5]  
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     2.5.1.5 Electricity Pool General Structure 
  
The Pool was a centralized market and designed to allow National Grid (NG), as the 
System Operator (SO), to be responsible for making sure that there is enough generation 
capacity in the system to meet the end-users’ demand. Figure 2.7 demonstrates an 
overview of Pool’s procedures.  
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generators and suppliers 
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and purchasing 
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Figure 2.7: Overview of Pool’s Procedures 
Based on above discussion, the Pool does not buy or sell electricity. It just provides a 
framework, within which all sales and purchases of the electricity made between 
producers, and consumers took place. Bids submitted by the generation companies are 
ranked by the market operator in order of increasing price. This is called ‘‘merit order’’. 
Figure 2.8 below illustrates the merit order ranking. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: Electricity Pool Market Merit Order Ranking   
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The SO carries out a centralized dispatch, which decides which generation company run 
in order to meet the demand. Marginal generator is the last generator that is scheduled to 
meet the demand from either demand cost curve or demand forecast and System 
Marginal Price (SMP) is based on marginal cost of marginal generator [21,22]. 
Generators selling price into the Pool was based on the price of marginal generation in 
each half – hour.  
Under this scheme generation companies have an incentive to offer a price which is 
equal to their marginal costs which implies: 
 Individual generators cannot increase the market price by raising their own offer 
prices unless they know that their power plant is at the margin. 
 
 There is insufficient competition and some players would practice market power 
because: 
 If they offer a price that is too high, they may not be dispatched at the times 
when the spot price is above their real costs according to the merit order 
ranking and SMP. 
 If they offer a price that is too low, they may be dispatched at times when 
the spot market price is below their real costs. 
 For some generation companies, the priority is to get their units running, so 
market manipulation would happen and they may submit zero bids, but still 
get paid at SMP, which is not fair [22]. 
Since the beginning of the Pool until 1998 only the 50,000 largest customers had been 
given the opportunity to switch between the suppliers; however, from September 1998 
all end-users were given this permission to make the demand side more active [21]. 
However the Pool was not able to make the demand side fully active in the market 
trading.  
Although this restructuring brought some competition in the market that caused 30% 
reduction in electricity bills [21,23] in the first few years, after a while the Pool started 
to be suffering from some problems and discriminations.  
 
 28 
 
Accordingly, the Pool suffered from number of key problems, such as: 
 
 Complexity of bids, since no-load price and average marginal cost should be 
taken into account for submitting merit order price 
 Pool capacity payment, since all customers were paying for capacity payment, 
which was not reasonable 
 One sided market, since the demand side did not have an active role 
 Market power, since some GenCos could submit zero bids to get paid at SMP 
 Marginal pricing 
 Lack of transparency in submitting bids 
 Lack of competition 
These began a process to make fundamental changes in the market and led to NETA 
appearance. 
 
     2.5.2 Appearance of NETA and BETTA 
 
The New Electricity Trading Arrangement (NETA) appeared in March 2001. NETA 
took four years to develop from its beginning of 1997, to implementation in 2001. This 
new arrangement covered England and Wales and reformed into British Electricity 
Trading and Transmission (BETTA) in 2005, which besides England and Wales, covers 
Scotland [24-30]. One of the most significant principles of BETTA is that the market 
should provide a free environment to bring the capability of meeting all electricity 
demand in the system. To achieve this goal BETTA abolished the electricity Pool as a 
centralized market in which the National Grid Company (NGC) as the system operator 
according to the bids and offer of the market participants and the security issues of the 
system, determines which units of the GenCos should generate electricity and which 
generators and suppliers are permitted to sell and buy electricity in the Pool.  
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On the opposite side, BETTA has created a market framework in which all units of 
GenCos are free to self-dispatch and decide to generate electricity according to their 
objectives. They can enter bilateral contracts with suppliers. The key point of BETTA is 
based on a series of bilateral contract traded ahead of real time. These contracts can be 
in the form of forward and future trading several months or even one year ahead of real 
time. According to the main specifications of BETTA, unlike the electricity Pool that 
was centralized-dispatched, here all generators are self-dispatched. It means that each 
generation company according to its maintenance schedule, marginal cost, cost of fuel, 
etc., decides to generate the electricity or buy from the market. Therefore, all units of a 
power plant can generate within a wide range, they can generate at their full rated level 
or nothing. Also demand side plays an active role through the retail market (Figure 2.9). 
More about this new trading arrangement will be discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
 
Figure 2.9: Including Wholesale and Retail Markets 
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These significant specifications can lead us to find that all electricity market participants 
have various specifications as follow: 
 Heterogeneous; they are have various specifications 
 Autonomous; they are acting independently 
 Have their own objectives and their own strategies to reach them 
 They interact among themselves in a dynamic changing environment 
Therefore, all these factors direct us to an investigation into a proper model in order to 
develop an algorithm that acts as a tool to support decisions and obtain knowledge about 
market behaviors to model this environment and maximize all market participants’ 
profits. 
 
2.6 Concerns and Consequences of Market Deregulation 
 
The electricity sector in both UK and Europe is experiencing considerable changes. The 
privatization of electricity market, climate policy, proposed Renewable Obligations 
(ROs), CO2 emissions and renewable targets are some factors to be addressed now and 
near future.  
According to these issues new question arises:  
 How to simplify the structure of deregulated markets and the process of bidding?  
 How to model each market component to find out its objectives and strategies?  
 How can liberalized markets be developed without endangering the security of 
supply? 
 How to implement a method in a way that all market participants would make 
profit? 
 How to hedge the risk of market participations and reduce the exposures to the 
risks? 
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 How to make a competitive market environment reducing market power? 
Considering the above questions and concern, the following are various impacts and 
consequences of deregulation, specifically BETTA appearance: 
1. Electricity prices: pricing mechanism is one of the most important and key 
issues in the power market. Keeping the price of electricity at the lowest level is 
the main goal of a restructured market. To achieve this goal, existence of a 
competitive environment is necessary. In such an environment all generators try 
to monitor their competitors’ prices and based on their historical data close their 
prices to their marginal costs. 
 
2. Reasonable costs: In a regulated market the capital cost of assets is to be 
reflected in the electricity prices. So, there is a chance for private utilities to 
recover the cost of their facilities. 
 
3. Risks: There are some inherent risks in electricity markets like demand 
variation, variation of fuel price based on international policies equipment 
failure, input prices, etc. However, in a monopoly vertically integrated utilities 
by excessing capacity or choosing different kinds of strategies these risks can be 
covered easily. On the other hand, deregulated market not only contains these 
inherent risks but also introduces additional risk sources such as the structure 
complexity, complex pricing structure and significantly in BETTA lack of time 
to balance the demand and generation and keeping the security of supply at a 
reasonable level. 
 
4. Investment: Enough investment in the power system will bring a high level 
of reliability to the system. In a public utility the government will take this 
responsibility to make more investment. But in the deregulated market, private 
companies do not have any obligation to make more investments, however lack 
of investment will decrease the reliability and increase the prices. This 
investment issue and lack of incentives for market participants can cause 
situations that electricity market is dominated by small amount of market 
participants.  
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In order to deal with questions above and impacts of a deregulated market, several 
scientific research have been carried out followed by various approaches and tools have 
been suggested and developed.  
 
2.7 Electricity Market Modeling Trends 
 
This section attempts to introduce and classify main approaches of modeling and 
compare them based on their properties and practice. This classification would reveal 
their advantages, disadvantages, properties and clarify the reasons for choosing 
Conjectural Variation Equilibrium (CVE) model as a promising approach to model 
bilateral electricity market i.e. BETTA. Accordingly, Figure 2.10 below demonstrates a 
proper overview of all these approaches examined in this research including their sub-
methods.  
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Figure 2.10:  Overview of Different Electricity Market Modeling Approaches Investigated in this 
Research 
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     2.7.1 Top – Down Analysis 
 
      2.7.1.1 Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) 
 
Top – down analysis includes Computable General Equilibrium (CGE) models or other 
macroeconomic modeling [31-34]. They apply a high level of aggregation that lacks the 
detail level necessary to analyze the short-term changes in the power market, which 
result from participants’ strategies and technical issues [31]. One of the main problems 
of this approach is to make an adaption between the classical pure financial modeling 
techniques and a complex novel market like BETTA, because many principles and 
assumptions used in this approach are not valid in electricity market and ignore the 
realistic side of the market [32]. In order to model bilateral electricity market, it is 
significantly vital to take into consideration all market participants’ behaviors and try to 
model them based on their own and rivals’ properties; however in such an environment 
macroeconomic approaches which focus on cross-country and national level modeling 
cannot be an appropriate approach [33,34]. Furthermore, CGE models are based on 
perfect competition information, therefore, it would be unrealistic to use this model 
since there is no perfect competition in bilateral electricity market and most markets 
suffer from market power. 
 
     2.7.2 Bottom – Up Analysis 
 
Bottom – up analysis is a combination of power system limitations and technical 
characteristics with a realistic modeling of market participants’ behaviors. This analysis 
consists of three major approaches as follow [31,32]: 
 Simulation Methods (for multi firms); 
 Optimization Methods (for a single firm); 
 Equilibrium Methods (for multi firms) 
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The detailed classifications of this analysis have been provided in the following 
sections. 
 
     2.7.2.1 Simulation Methods 
 
This model has experienced an increasing popularity to model a range of applications 
including electricity markets. Since these methods do not consider fundamental issues 
such as market equilibrium point and perform the analysis based on iterative 
simulations, most of them can suffer from lack of convergence [35, 36]. On the contrary, 
simulation methods have some advantages over optimization methods in terms of 
mathematical structure since simulation methods provide a platform where the profit 
maximization would be performed for all market participants instantaneously. 
 
     2.7.2.1.1 Multi Agent Based Systems (MABS) 
 
Agent – Based Model (ABM) is one the main types of simulation methods. This model 
has experienced an increasing popularity in order to model different environments such 
as electricity markets [31, 37-45]. In this method market participants can be modeled as 
agents. Wooldridge and Jennings (1995) defined an appropriate and the most popular 
definition of a system agent as:  
 “An agent is a computer system that is situated in some environment, and that is 
capable of autonomous action in this environment in order to meet its design 
objectives.” 
Selection of several agents can create a Multi Agent System (MAS) in which those 
agents are interacting with each other in order to fulfill their goals. However, there are 
several disadvantages about Multi Agent Based Systems (MABS) that should be 
considered. 
In order to implement MABS within electricity market some general issues require to be 
considered [37, 40, 43, 44]: 
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1. Platforms: The platform should be established based on a standard to provide a 
flexible, extensible and open architecture environment, however the 
conjunction of different platforms is required. The Foundation for Intelligent 
Physical Agents (FIPA) defined a range of standard open architectures. The 
platform provides a message transport system that enables agents to 
communicate. Message Transport System is equipped with standard protocols 
like HTTP and IIOP. One of the first Agent Communication Languages (ACL) 
was Knowledge Query and Manipulation Language or KQML. The language 
(KQML) was introduced in 1990’s; in recent years it is replaced by FIPA – 
ACL. 
2. Agent communication languages and ontology: Social ability of the agents 
requires them to have communication languages. FIPA has introduced four 
different content languages: FIPA – Semantic Language (FIPA – SL); 
Knowledge Interchange Format (KIF); Resource Definition Framework (RDF); 
Constraint Choice Language (CCL). The content language can shape the 
ontology that describes the concept of the domain and the predicates and agent 
actions. 
3. Security: If agents want to communicate with each other, there should be an 
appropriate level of trust between them and the security of messaging. 
Therefore, these issues bring complexity into the market in two aspects: 
 Computational analysis 
 Communication resources 
Since MABS is an appropriate approach to model large systems with large amount of 
market participants, this model would reflect several weaknesses in modeling bilateral 
electricity market considering market power. [40] attempts to model NETA and manage 
the risks involved in this market using MABS. This study can be considered in among 
of those few research that effort to model NETA as a bilateral market; however, multi 
agent based simulation covers consequences of market interactions among large number 
of market participants, therefore it would not be possible to consider market power and 
oligopolistic and oligopsonistic markets. Moreover, the learning process in this paper is 
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based on merely historical data, which ignores the flexibility and aliveness of market 
participants. 
In addition, the majority of MABS deployed to model electricity markets are modeling 
Pool structure rather than bilateral electricity markets. For instance, agents in [42] are 
modeling the electricity Pool market.  
As mentioned above, building an agent is a complex task since it consists of several 
layers. Figure 2.11 demonstrates the layered structure of an agent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                      
Figure 2.11: Layered Structure of an Agent 
 
In recent years, many implementation tools have been developed. Java Agent 
DEvelopment framework (JADE) has become a firm favorite. JADE supports FIPA 
standards and is a suitable platform for implementing layered – architecture agents. 
However, deploying Java might need further requirements and knowledge and would 
bring complexity to the mode; therefore, several software packages have been developed 
and several researches have been carried out based on these software [39]. [41] and [46] 
are using Electricity Market Complex Adaptive Systems (EMCAS) tool to model 
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wholesale markets and like other previous researches, they are modeling Pool structure 
and do not fully cover bilateral electricity trading. Also a weakness of this tool is that it 
does not provide a predictive capability for market participants. In [38] another multi 
agent tool has been deployed; PowerWeb, however this tool does not consider any long 
term trading which is in contradiction to bilateral contracts. 
 
     2.7.2.1.2 Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCM) 
 
Fuzzy Cognitive Maps (FCMs) were introduced by Kosko in 1986 [47]. FCM is a 
combination of Neural Network and Fuzzy logic [48].  FCMs present the knowledge and 
behavior of a system by using several nodes interacting in a network and also weighted 
edges. These nodes describe main characteristics of the system and represent the 
concepts used to describe the market participants’ behaviors and weighted edges 
represent the causal-effect relations among concepts. [49].  
FCMs have been deployed in some research to model electricity markets [49-51]. 
However, as a simulation approach, it suffers from lack of convergence. [49] has 
deployed FCM to model and  monitor a deregulated electricity market; however it is not 
clear how these weighted edge factors which play significant roles in modeling can be 
set. Without any distinguished algorithm to identify these weighed edges, FCM cannot 
represent the causal relation between the nodes.  
[50] and [51] are using this method to model electricity markets however there are 
several weaknesses regarding this approach. Firstly, FCM does not consider long-term 
planning and only focus on causal relations. Secondly, since bilateral electricity market 
is a dynamic environment, so it is essential for participants to take into consideration 
their rivals’ behaviors iteration by iteration; however FCM does not provide any robust 
dynamic mechanism so it restricts its applications. Thirdly, and more importantly is that, 
this method does not follow Nash equilibrium method characteristics, so market 
participants might change their behaviors in order to make more profit and play market 
power. Another flaw is that the concepts in fuzzy cognitive maps are usually binary. 
Based on binary concepts, a fuzzy cognitive map is unable to model the strength of 
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cause and degree of effect. Therefore this method cannot fulfill the requirements to 
model oligopoly and oligopsony electricity markets. 
 
     2.7.2.2 Optimization Methods 
  
Optimization methods constitute concepts of a problem in real world and the challenge 
is finding the concepts, which constitute appropriate representations of problems 
considering associated constraints. In contrast to the simulation methods, optimization 
methods are solving an optimization problem for a single firm in the electricity market, 
however in both simulation and equilibrium methods the objective functions of all 
market participants, which are normally profit maximization problems, would be 
considered. This method can be classified in two categories as follow [32]: 
     
     2.7.2.2.1 Exogenous Price 
 
In this approach the System Marginal Price (SMP) is an input for the optimization 
method, which means the market clearing process is an exogenous procedure for this 
method. In this case the revenue of generation companies (GenCo),      , would be a 
linear function of GenCo’s output: 
                                                                                                                 (2.1) 
Where the        is the system marginal price and       is the output of GenCo .   
Therefore: 
                                                                                                                        (2.2) 
According to Equation 2.2, it is apparent that the behavior of other generation 
companies in the market, as rivals for GenCo  , is not considered. Therefore this method 
cannot be an appropriate approach to model electricity markets. 
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Consequently this approach can be only applicable for a quasi-perfect competition [32], 
which is not the case for electricity markets since it neglects the market power of each 
market participant, specifically in bilateral markets. 
 
     2.7.2.2.2 Demand-Price Function 
 
In the previous method the system marginal price was calculated exogenously, therefore 
the quantity of each generation company does not have any influence on this 
calculation; however in this approach the price is based on the output of generation 
companies [32].  
This approach, which is based on microeconomic theory is called leader-in-price model 
[52], (cited in [32]). Here, each generation company is given the demand function and 
also the supply function of its rivals, which is called residual demand function in order 
to maximize its profit. The residual demand function can be calculated by subtracting 
the aggregation of all rivals’ supply functions from the whole demand side bids. 
However, calculating the residual demand function would be a challenging issue for all 
market participants specifically in the case of bilateral market, since all the forward and 
future contracts are not disclosed and market participants do not have any knowledge 
about their rivals’ bilateral trading, therefore in bilateral market generation companies 
can not compute the aggregation of rivals’ selling offers. 
These mathematical optimization methods can be combined with other approaches, 
which can results in better and more robust solutions for solving complex problems. For 
instance in this research one type of equilibrium method has been combined with an 
originally proposed hierarchical optimization algorithm in order to find the equilibrium 
point of the bilateral market. Further details will be discussed in Chapters 4, 5 and 6. 
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     2.7.2.3 Equilibrium Methods 
 
One of the most appropriate approaches to model electricity market behavior is 
equilibrium method. These methods have several advantages over previously mentioned 
approaches in several different aspects [32]: 
 Market Modeling: Compared to optimization methods where only one firm’s 
objective function is minimized, equilibrium methods consider all market 
participants behaviors simultaneously therefore by employing this approach 
more robust overview of the market environment will be provided and 
furthermore it will provide market monitoring features which act a significant 
role in market power analysis. 
 Mathematical Assembly: Figure 2.12 demonstrates the fundamental difference 
between optimization methods and equilibrium methods. Equilibrium methods 
consist of several profits maximization problems optimized in parallel 
considering relative economical and technical constraints. 
 
Figure 2.12: Differences between Optimization Model and Equilibrium Model [32] 
 
 Computational Exploration: Optimization methods can deal with heavy 
mathematical problems therefore considering these methods can be combined 
with other existing methods in order to bring more flexibility into the modeling. 
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Comparing to equilibrium methods, simulation approaches are appropriate for 
large-scale systems; however, for considering the imperfect conditions in 
bilateral trading in an electricity market, equilibrium methods can be an excellent 
choice. 
 
 Major Usage: In contrast to simulation and optimization approaches, 
equilibrium methods are appropriate for modeling long term decisions, like 
forward and future contracts which can be made years ahead of delivery time in 
bilateral markets. Also, they can analyze market power since they consider all 
market participants. 
Based on these four aspects, it can be concluded that equilibrium methods are desirable 
for both regulators and market participants [35]. It helps regulators to monitor market 
power and assists market participants to get knowledge about their rivals’ strategies and 
behaviors in case of any changes in strategies of each market participants; furthermore it 
supports market players in long-term planning and participation in bilateral electricity 
market, which is within the scope of this research. 
 
     2.7.2.3.1 Game Theory and Equilibrium Methods 
 
Game theory is a branch of applied mathematics, which has been employed in several 
fields like economics, engineering, science, etc. This theory assists us to have an 
adequate understanding about decision makers in the market and their interactions in a 
competitive environment [53].  Game theory tries to model the behavior of market 
participants mathematically in order to illustrate that each decision maker’s success in 
the market, e.g. profit maximization, is based on the decisions of other market 
participants.  
Game theory, which can be considered as a decision theory, was developed in 1920s by 
Emil Borel and John von Neumann [2]. It has been widely applied in economic fields 
[54] specifically modeling competitive energy markets [55-58]. In 1950s John F. Nash 
developed a significant concept in the game theory by introducing Nash Equilibrium 
(NE) [2].  
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Game theory predicts how a game will be played and these predications will be 
solutions for each decision maker in order to provide it with adapting appropriate 
strategies. Consequently, strategies constitute the interaction behaviors of each market 
participants and each player decides to perform a specific action by choosing a specific 
strategy. In a non-cooperative market, a condition that usually happen specially in 
bilateral electricity markets, if a decision maker chooses a dominant strategy it would 
get the best possible payoff, which is normally profit maximization, irrespective of other 
rivals’ actions [59]. It is possible that all market participants have dominant strategies, 
also it can happen that none of them have any dominant strategies; therefore reaching to 
dominant equilibria is not guaranteed in every game. However, Nash equilibria are 
wider concept comparing to dominant equilibria. It is assumed that as all market 
participant are rational and interactive, therefore it can be a set of strategies for each 
player that help to achieve the best possible payoff by considering other rivals’ 
strategies [59]. The Nash equilibrium point is stable since by approaching to that point 
no party will deviate from its strategies since it will not make any further profit. 
Consequently, the primary feature of game theory is to calculate the Nash equilibrium 
point of the market. 
Game theory includes three decision variables, which can result in different equilibrium 
methods. These variables are: 
 Price 
 Quantity 
 Combination of price and quantity 
According to these variables and also considering the reactions among market 
participants and their abilities to response to these reactions, several market equilibrium 
conditions can be proposed as follow: 
 Pure Competition 
 Collusion 
 Bertrand Model (Game in prices) 
 Cournot Model (Game in quantities) 
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 Stackelberg Model (Leader – follower games) 
 Supply Function Equilibrium Model (SFE) 
 Conjectural Variation Equilibrium Model (CVE) 
In Chapter 4, detailed discussion concerning these models including their advantages, 
disadvantages and applications will be presented, considering various research that have 
been carried out on this topic. It will be shown why Conjectural Variation Equilibrium 
(CVE) model has been preferred as a promising approach to model bilateral electricity 
market in this research. 
 
2.8 Summary 
This chapter is divided into two main sections. In the first section the concept of 
electricity market has been discussed, and different types of competitive electricity 
market models have been reviewed. According to these studies, various electricity 
market structures in different countries introduced. Importantly, this research aims to 
focus on bilateral electricity market, such as UK electricity market, the background of 
UK electricity market since 1990, where electricity Pool structure appeared, and its 
revolutions towards NETA and BETTA have been investigated. 
In the second section, effects of market deregulation process have been examined, and 
according to those consequences the need for electricity market modeling has been 
discovered. Various methods of electricity market modeling examined and Equilibrium 
method as a promising approach was selected to model imperfect bilateral electricity 
market based on its indicated specifications. 
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3.1 Introduction 
 
Energy is produced in a technically complex industry; therefore facing large 
uncertainties while participating in electricity market will be inevitable since there is 
always a chance of gaining balanced position in the market with a chance of loss as 
well. Risks in the electricity market reflect not only the losses but also the volatility 
of revenue, which can fragile market participants’ positions in the market. 
Participating in such a market successfully requires that firstly the structure of this 
market should be considered in detail; secondly all risk resources should be 
identified and properly managed since there is a relationship between risk 
management effectiveness and company performance.  
Chapter 2 described the concept of an electricity market and its evolutions from 
vertically integrated structure to a competitive environment. It was demonstrated 
briefly how UK alongside other countries moved towards restructuring electricity 
market. A brief overview of British Electricity Trading and Transmission 
Arrangement (BETTA) was covered in Chapter 2, however in this chapter more 
detailed study will be provided and the purpose of market modeling especially in 
bilateral electricity markets like BETTA will be demonstrated. Furthermore, the 
impacts of these deregulations on market participants’ behaviors and various aspects 
of risk resources, which may be caused and affect market participants strategies, will 
be investigated. 
 
3.2 Motivations for Transformation from Pool to Bilateral 
Market 
 
Since the electricity physically flows from the generation side to the end users in a 
pool structure, firstly it was thought that in order to model the market, the same type 
of structure could be employed. Therefore Pool is a centralized market, which 
constitutes centralized transactions in the market and also centralized transmission 
network operation. Considering these two factors makes the Pool structure more 
complex in which it is hard to distinguished market responsibilities [2]. Also the 
system operator (National Grid in the UK) within the Pool employs a merit order, 
however in bilateral electricity market the system operator is constrained in 
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arrangements by the provided negotiated contract price and volumes between 
generation companies and supply companies. 
Also in the Pool structure most small and medium size demands do not have any 
willingness to participate in the market and enter into bilateral negotiations since 
they do not have any incentives to play active roles in the market, thus the price 
determination process in the Pool market does not affect the demand. On the 
contrary, price determination process in bilateral market (like BETTA in the UK) 
represents a proper overview of trading process considering the market equilibrium. 
Economist believe that in order to make Pool market more transparent and demand 
side more active bilateral negotiations can help and also will reduce the price of 
electricity where there are no trading administrations needed. 
 
3.3 Stakeholders in Restructured Electricity Markets 
 
A liberalized electricity market has been divided into several individuals as follow 
[2]: 
 Generation Companies (GenCos):  These units are responsible for 
maintaining and supplying electricity into the grids. GenCos participate in the 
market by entering into bilateral contracts or they may sell electricity to an 
organized electricity market. Compared to Pool structure these units are not 
price regulated. 
 Transmission Companies (TransCos): These companies are responsible for 
building, maintaining and operating the transmission network within their 
region. They own the transmission network and in some cases like UK, 
National Grid (NG) as the Transmission System Operator (TSO) and network 
owner is the Independent System Operator (ISO) as well. 
 Distribution Companies (DisCos): These companies are the asset owners in 
the distribution level. They dispatch the transferred electricity to the end 
users within their authorized area and control power quality.  
 Supply Companies (SupplyCos): These individual are responsible for 
purchasing electricity from wholesale market and sell to the customers. These 
market participants play an important role in the bilateral electricity market, 
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e.g. BETTA, where they are active in both wholesale and retail markets. Like 
GenCos they can play market power; therefore it is essential to model the 
behavior of these strategic entities in the market. 
 Independent System Operator (ISO):  Ensuring the security of supply in 
the electricity grid is one of the significant roles of ISO. NG as the system 
operator in UK tries to balance the generation and demand for each 
settlement period by performing Economic Dispatch (ED). Congestion 
management is another responsibility of ISO. In some countries the system 
operator also acts as a Market Operator (MO) playing as a nonprofit 
company to function the market. 
According to the discussion above, GenCos and SupplyCos play significant roles in 
the electricity market. They can bring competiveness to the market or on the other 
hand they can play market power that causes imperfect competition in electricity 
market.  Thus, modeling these market players is essential. Chapter 4 and 5 
demonstrate how to model these market participants in order to model imperfect 
market. Figure 3.1 illustrated a competitive electricity market structure containing 
several stakeholders. 
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Figure 3.1: A Competitive Electricity Market Structure [2] 
 
3.4 Operation of BETTA 
 
BETTA implemented in 2005 [2], affected transformation of the wholesale 
electricity market. The basic premise of BETTA is that the free environment should 
cover the market; therefore BETTA established a free market in which parties may 
contract for selling or buying electricity in a way they prefer. The philosophy of 
BETTA is not to dictate how energy should be bought and sold, nevertheless to 
provide mechanisms for almost real time clearing and settlement of imbalances 
between contractual and actual positions for different parties. 
Unlike electricity Pool, BETTA has some main objectives: 
 Focusing on firm forward and future contracts; 
 Increasing the transparency of the market; 
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 Providing more incentive for System Operator (SO); 
 Making electricity like other commodities; and 
 Keeping the price lower. 
According to its goals and objectives, BETTA is based and designed around bilateral 
contracts and trading between generation companies (GenCos), supply companies 
(SupplyCos), traders and consumers. So, all the market participants can choose the 
way they want to play. 
BETTA incorporates the following features: 
 Forward and future contracts 
 Short term power exchange (PX) 
 Balancing Mechanism (BM) 
 Imbalanced Settlement (IS) 
More details about these features have been discussed in the following sections. 
Figure 3.2 demonstrates the time line of BETTA operation and structure. 
 
Figure 3.2: Time Line of BETTA Operations 
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     3.4.1 Long-term Bilateral Contracts 
 
The intention of BETTA is that the majority of electricity should be traded through 
several long-term bilateral contracts. Bilateral contracts involve two parties: a buyer 
and a seller. In such a market there is no official price since the price of traded 
electricity is set independently by the seller and buyer [2]; therefore the traded price 
and quantity will be private in these types of contracts. However general information 
about the Over The Counter (OTC) contracts, which constitute less trading volume 
and price in order to help market participants to fine tune their positions close to 
delivery time, normally published by reporting organizations. Considering this fact, 
modeling bilateral electricity market is much more complex compared to the Pool 
structure. 
These long-term bilateral contracts can be in the following forms [1,20]: 
 Long-term negotiated contracts: A significant proportion of generation and 
consumption are traded through these kinds of contracts. Terms of the 
contracts are usually opaque and the volume of the traded energy is very 
large. These contracts are usually about 1-5 years ahead of real time. 
 Forward trading: Although these contracts are standardized, but the counter 
parties may agree with additional conditions like delivery point, duration, 
volume and other issues. They operate from a year ahead of real time (Figure 
3.2). These contracts provide an opportunity for all generation companies to 
choose the quantity, price and date of delivery with specified supply 
companies, so forward contracts are differentiator between BETTA and the 
electricity Pool. 
 Future trading: future contracts are so similar to forward contracts, because 
they enable parties to trade electricity in the future at a price agreed now. On 
the other hand future contracts are more financial rather than physical 
settlement and can be traded in PX. 
According to the above bilateral contracts all market participants are free to 
determine how they prefer to participate in the market. They may participate in the 
long term bilateral contract or they may even decide to only participate in Power 
Exchange (PX) or Balancing Mechanism (BM); however by joining only in PX or 
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BM they will face more risks therefore both GenCos and SupplyCos desire to enter 
bilateral contracts for much more of their capacity. 
 
     3.4.2 Power Exchange (PX) 
 
The main concept of BETTA is the establishment of Power Exchange (PX) as a 
short time market close to the real time, to bring liquidity and transparency to the 
market by giving a last chance to generation companies and supply companies as 
market participants to fine tune their actual positions to their contractual positions.  
BETTA is very much related to the long term bilateral contracts, therefore it is 
essential to have a short term market very close to the delivery time in order to 
secure the GenCos and SupplyCos positions in the market and assist the standardized 
trading. It can be one or several PXs in the electricity market. 
Actually PX has two main features [20]: 
 Self balancing: Because of the nature of the BETTA which is based on long 
term bilateral contracts to reduce the price risk in the spot market, market 
participants face another kind of risk which is related to their ability to fine 
tune their contractual position close to the real time. Demand variations for 
SupplyCos, changes in supply capacity for GenCos, unanticipated technical 
problems and etc. put market participants more in the composure of the risk 
very close to the real time. PX helps participants to recover this type of risk. 
 
 Assisting trading: BETTA intends to make a wide ranging electricity 
trading market, and PX brings high liquidity to the market and help 
participants to become closer to their position without changing the price of 
the electricity very seriously, unlike a normal spot market. This happens 
because of the fact that the volume of the electricity traded in the PX is not so 
huge and is just for fine-tuning. Figure 3.3 shows the exchange clearing 
process in the PX. 
PX can involve future contracts as a form of Over The Counter (OTC) or it can be in 
form of a spot market to delivery electricity on the day. Spot market is a short-term 
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market close to the delivery period. In BETTA it is 24-48 hours to the Gate Closure, 
which is 1 hour before the delivery time. Although this spot market helps market 
participants to fine-tune their positions against any possible imbalances, still by 
participating in this market they may face price volatility and this will increase the 
exposures to the financial risks. Furthermore, the PX participants will remain 
anonymous. 
 
     3.4.2.1 Power Exchange Charges 
 
Besides the price volatility issue in the PX, there are several relative charges and 
costs for participating in the PX, such as [20]: 
 Membership charges: These are the charges of using PX market, which can 
be debited monthly for each market participant. 
 Transaction fees: PX charges a specific rate according to each transaction 
happened on PX. 
 Connection charges: These charges are related to costs of 
telecommunication links and Internet, etc. 
 Support service charge: These include the charges of maintaining and 
hiring trading hardware and software. 
 Credit margins: These are related to the costs of covering risk of 
counterparty. 
 Contract notification fees: These fees include the cost of using third party 
contract notification services. 
Considering the above charges, market participants try to position themselves in a 
balanced position as much as possible; thus they use long-term bilateral contracts to 
avoid these further charges, which reduce their profits. Consequently the 
requirement of employing a proper modeling approach to exemplary the market 
participants’ behaviors has been revealed. 
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Bid-Offer Matching                                                                                                       
  
 
 
Figure 3.3: Exchange Clearing [20] 
 
According to the Figure 3.3, offers and bids can be posted based on their contractual 
information; PX matches these bids and offers. PX usually performs about 24 – 48 
hours before the real time and contributes just around 1-2 % of electricity trading 
[20]. 
 
     3.4.3 Balancing Mechanism (BM) 
  
Balancing Mechanism (BM) is the heart of the BETTA. It provides a key role in 
maintaining security of supply on the transmission grid. In BETA, parties who 
generate electricity are expected to enter into direct sale contracts with the 
consumers and perform self-dispatching market clearing procedure. Similarly, 
supply companies are required to enter into electricity supply contracts with the 
generation companies to meet their own demand and provide a secure and 
continuous supply. Bilateral contracts, Over The Counter (OTC) and PX markets can 
assist in matching buyers and sellers close to real time. Although these bilateral 
contracts should assist parties to balance their positions in the market and find the 
market equilibrium point between the consumption and generation, in reality it is 
unlikely to be assured because bilateral trading do not continue up to real time, 
which can cause imbalances on the electricity grid. In order to ensure the security of 
supply, as one of the 3 main European pillars for future Electricity Highway Systems 
(EHS), the existence of BM is essential. 
Contractual Link 
Supported by Margin 
and Cleaning Agreement 
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     3.4.3.1 Operation of Balancing Mechanism 
 
BETTA as a bilateral market abolished the Pool as a centralized electricity market 
and introduced a new structure in which all market participants are self-dispatched 
and the majority of traded electricity is long-term bilateral contracts, more than 97% 
[20,60].  A BM Unit (BMU) is designed to inform National Grid Company (NGC) 
about the services of particular flexible party. Generation and supply companies who 
wish to participate in Balancing Mechanism are required to register as a BMU. Each 
BMU has a half-hourly metering capability in order to measuring the unit’s 
participation in the Balancing Mechanism. Also they are provided by a special 
communication links to NGC, which allow the NGC as a System Operator (SO) 
manage the contribution of each unit in the BM.  
In the generation side, each generation company is considered as a BMU, also on the 
other side of the market each supply company, as a BMU, is expected to enter supply 
bilateral contracts in order to provide electricity for its end users. Consequently this 
kind of market is a double-sided market where demand side plays an active role in 
the market decisions. 
As discussed later, electricity is not like other commodities and cannot be stored on a 
large scale; therefore real time balancing will be a challenging issue for both market 
participants and also System Operator. In theory it is expected that both GenCos and 
SupplyCos can meet their bilateral contracts completely however in reality it is 
highly unlikely to happen owing to two unpredictabilities in two sides of the market: 
 Generation side of the bilateral market: GenCos may face several 
uncertainties that cause them not to be able to balance themselves before the 
gate closure and face penalties. These uncertainties can include: 
 
 Fuel supply issues, like fuel supply interruptions, fuel price surge, etc. 
 Human error in terms of technical and market operations 
 Equipment failure  
 Inappropriate money-making decisions made by a GenCo 
 Etc. 
  
56 
 
 Supply side of the bilateral market: SupplyCos also may face several 
uncertainties, which cause losses in their profits. These uncertainties are 
based on: 
 
 Sudden changes in their end-users consumptions pattern as a consequence 
of several issues like popular TV show, etc. 
 Weather conditions  
 Inappropriate money-making decisions made by a SupplyCo   
 Etc. 
According to the above discussion it can be realized that it is essential to model both 
sides of the market especially in bilateral electricity market, e.g. BETTA. In Chapter 
4 and 5 it will be discussed that one the main contributions of this research is that the 
supply side of the market has been taken into consideration and modeled in order to 
calculate an accurate market equilibrium point while both sides of the market are 
making profit. 
 
     3.4.3.1.1 Gate Closure 
 
According to the previous section it can be realized that BETTA has created two 
kinds of markets: 
1. Free market: Most electricity trading occurs in free market. Over 97% of 
trading that includes long-term bilateral contracts; OTC and PX can be done 
before the real time. This research focuses on this market and tried to assist 
market participants to fine-tune their positions in this market to avoid any 
penalties and imbalanced positions in Balancing Mechanism and Imbalanced 
Settlement (IS) period. 
2. Balancing Mechanism: This market can help the SO to meet the demand in 
the real time and most importantly maintain security of supply. 
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Gate closure, which is 1 hour ahead of the half-hour settlement period [30], is a 
boundary between these two markets. By the gate closure all parties should submit 
their contractual data in terms of the volume of the electricity, which is going to be 
generated or consumed to the central settlement of BETTA. Further to the gate 
closure, no physical trading is permitted for sellers and buyer outside the BM and 
their contractual positions will be compared to their actual positions, which can be 
determined by the assistance of metering facilities, afterwards the volume of 
imbalanced energy can be recognized. Next, NGC as the SO of the market takes the 
responsibility of balancing the generation and demand for a specific period of time 
[60].  
All BM Units who are greater than 50MW are required to notify the SO about their 
levels of operation. BMUs for any settlement units must submit Initial Physical 
Notifications (IPNs) to the SO by 11:00 a day before the delivery, also submit their 
Final Physical Notifications (FPNs) at the gate closure [20,60]. FPNs show the 
production or consumption of each generator and supplier during each settlement 
period. FPNs for generators are positive and demand’s FPNs are negative. Figure 3.4 
illustrates an example of FPNs values for both sides of the market. 
 
Figure 3.4: Typical GenCo’ and Demand’ FPNs, Left FPN for a GenCo, Right FPN for a Demand [20] 
 
     3.4.3.1.2 BM Bids and Offers 
 
Circumstances may arise which lead BM Units to vary their actual generation or 
consumption from the level mentioned in their FPNs by submitting bids and offers to 
the SO. 
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Biding in BM means, parties want to operate below the level of FPN, generation 
companies will reduce their generation and supply companies will increase their 
consumptions. Offering in BM means, parties want to operate above the level of 
FPN, generation companies will increase their generation and supply companies will 
decrease their consumptions. Bids and offers should be submitted in pairs and once 
accepted by the SO they become firm and cannot be cancelled. Bid-offer pairs above 
the FPN are numbered positive and bid-offer pairs below the FPN are numbered 
negative. Figure 3.5 demonstrates a typical bid-offer pair for a GenCo. 
 
                             MW 
                                         Offers 
 
                                           Bids                   Time 
 Time 
 
Figure 3.5: A Typical Bid – Offer Pair for a GenCo 
      
     3.4.3.1.3 Real Time Balancing 
 
NGC as the SO, at gate closure takes the responsibility to monitor the generation, 
consumption and the electricity transmission network, and make sure there is a 
balance environment in the real time. During the BM and each settlement period the 
SO efforts to communicate market participants to provide ancillary services such as, 
frequency response, voltage response, black start and etc.  
When the SO decides to accept the bid-offer pair of a BMU, it will send the 
acceptance to that BMU’s control centre. Figure 3.6 illustrates the acceptance of 
different bids and offers for a generation unit. 
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Figure 3.6:  Acceptance of Bid – Offer Pair of a Generator Unit [20] 
 
Furthermore, Figure 3.7 illustrates a simple example that how NGC as the SO 
performs real-time balancing in the system. This figure demonstrates that how the 
imbalances in both sides of the market make the SO react to equalize the market. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.7:  SO’s Real Time Balancing 
      
     3.4.3.1.4 Bid and Offer Payment 
 
When the system operator accepts BMU’s bids and offers, they make or receive a 
payment in £/MWh. Normally, BMUs receive payment for accepted offers and 
should make payment for their accepted bids. In reality the BM bids and offers may 
be accepted at excessive prices. At these cases the BM is making money from 
 
 
 
 
 GenCo 
110 MWh 
100 MWh 
     Bilateral Contract 
  Balancing Mechanism 
SupplyCo 
120 MWh 
10 MWh       SO         20MWh 
Other Traders:  10 MWh 
  
60 
flexible large GenCos or SupplyCos and increase small companies’ exposure to the 
risks. In this case the importance of modeling bilateral electricity market considering 
both sides of the market can be revealed in order to encourage market participants to 
fine tune their position before the gate closure and reduce the market power. 
 
     3.4.3.1.5 Importance of Balancing Mechanism 
 
As mentioned, the electricity market system operator requires to be informed of the 
capacity of generation to adjust the level of production and consumption, taking into 
account the transmission network capacity in order to maintain the security of 
supply. If the system is short, SO will select the BMUs’ offers to increase the 
generation, whereas if the system is long, SO decides to accept BMUs’ bids to 
increase the consumption in order to deal with that surplus generation. 
Therefore NGC plays a significant role in BM, which is maintaining local balances 
in the real time. Despite of SO’s key role, duration of Balancing Mechanism is just 1 
hour [61], which is too short, and its contribution in the BETTA structure is about 
2% [20]. Figure 3.8 demonstrates the BETTA market structure by its volume. 
     
Figure 3.8: BETTA Structure by Volume 
 
     3.4.4 Imbalanced Settlement (IS) 
 
One of the key specification of BETTA as a bilateral market is that it companies BM 
and Imbalanced Settlement (IS) [61] in order to reward those market participants that 
assist the SO to balance the system and penalize those ones that cause imbalanced 
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conditions. In order to assure the link between BM and IS, Balancing and Settlement 
Codes (BSCs) are required [20]. BSCs are in from of legal frameworks that all 
licensed market participants, e.g. GenCos and SupplyCos, who want to trade 
electricity, should agree with and sign them up. These frameworks enable the SO to 
apply charges for parties who cause imbalances on the market. 
Therefore, it is crucial to model both sides of the market in order to assist them to 
establish long-term bilateral contracts in order to avoid facing Imbalanced 
Settlement period penalties. These imbalanced charges have three factors in 
common: 
 IS in the BETTA is based on net imbalances rather than the whole system 
flow. This feature will make the central settlement much more smaller 
compare to the Pool however increase the market participants’ exposures to 
the risks. 
 
 Since BETTA is a bilateral market, imbalances of generation side and 
demand side of the market are divided. According to this feature those 
market participants who are active in both sides of the market (they are more 
electricity producers and suppliers) will be at risk since they need to have a 
balanced position in the market and this will avoid them to play market 
power. 
 
 IS chargers must reflect the cost of balancing the system 
One of the fundamental issues in the BETTA structure is how to refer payments of 
the electricity generation and consumption to different parties. Imbalanced 
Settlement (IS) has three key principles as follows [20,30]: 
1. Net imbalances: Imbalanced settlement is based on the differentiation between 
the contractual volume of electricity and players’ actual metered consumption or 
production. This method makes the settlement part much smaller compare to the 
Pool. 
2. Double accounting: In BETTA structure the production or consumption 
accounts are separated. Therefore parties interested in both generation and supply 
will be provided by separate accounts. 
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     3. Cost trading: If there are any net imbalances in the system the SO should take 
balancing actions to make a balanced condition, which is costly. This can be done 
through dual-cash out pricing system by creating incentives to some parties in 
order to reducing the cost of balancing by penalizing the parties who cause these 
imbalances. Parties that spill electricity to the system will be paid a price and 
parties that have a power deficit will be penalized. 
Once imbalance volumes determined, the Settlement Administration Agent (SAA) 
calculates the cash-out [60]. It is noticeable that by the gate closure all market 
participants are required to notify the SO of their contractual volume of electricity 
and the trading prices can remain confidential. 
Any surpluses are cashed out at System Sell Price (SSP) which is a payment made to 
parties in return to the excess electricity. SSP is based on the price of accepted bids 
on the BM. On the other hand, differences should be cashed out at System Buying 
Price (SBP) [30]. Parties will be charged based on the deficit energy that the system 
has bought on behalf of them. SBP is based on the accepted BM offers. Figure 3.9 
shows the imbalanced settlement exposure. 
 
 MW 
                                                                 Contractual position 
Metered position 
      
                         
       Time Time 
       (a)                                                     (b) 
Figure 3.9: Imbalanced Settlement Exposure, (a) Spills are paid at SSP, (b) Shorts must be paid at SBP 
 
Further to imbalanced cash out charges, other charges can also be introduced in the 
IS, such as Non-delivery charges [20]. These charges may be applied to the failure of 
providing BM bid-offer pair and further to the imbalanced charges these kinds of 
penalties may be added. 
These charges are: 
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 For non-delivered offers = Accepted offer price – SBP 
 For non-delivered bids = SSP – accepted bid price 
Figure 3.10 demonstrates an overview of settlement process, which is performed by 
Elexon in the UK. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.10: Overview of Settlement Process 
 
3.5 Comparing BETTA with other Major Electricity Markets 
 
It has been discussed in Chapter 2 that the electricity market in the UK is BETTA 
while in Australia it is called NEMMCO, in Norway, Denmark, Sweden and Finland 
is NordPool and in the USA there are several markets such as PJM. Table 3.1 
(developed and modified based on [62] for purpose of this study) gives consolidated 
overview of these world’s most established power markets and compare them with 
BETTA through some key aspects such as: type of bidding, balancing mechanism, 
risk management, participants, market offerings, Adjustment, Pricing rule, Pricing 
type and Active demand side. 
 
System Operator Charges 
Contract Notification 
Accepted Bids & Offers 
Settlement Process  
Energy Imbalance Cash out 
Meter Reading  
Cashout Prices-
SSP/SBP 
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Offers and PX data 
Spread of Surplus 
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       3.5.1 Operational Comparisons between Competitive 
Electricity Markets 
 
Competitive electricity markets around the world are diverse according to the 
methods of processing Unit Commitment (UC). These electricity markets can be 
considered in three main types [62]: 
 Pure centralized spot market, 
 Combination of spot market and pre-signed bilateral transactions; and 
 Combination of bilateral electricity market and centralized balancing 
mechanism. 
In centralized spot markets, like UK electricity Pool in 1990s, the System Operator 
performs the Unit Commitment. On the contrary, PJM and NYISO [62] as markets 
in which the spot market and pre-signed bilateral transactions are combined, the 
market participants have got this chance to choose whether they prefer the SO to 
perform the UC or they want to be self-committed. Compare to these two types of 
market, bilateral electricity markets combined with BM, e.g. BETTA, all market 
participants are self-dispatched and self-committed and the SO is no longer 
responsible for UC. 
According to the above discussion all the GenCos and SupplyCos in BETTA are 
responsible for their decisions therefore, these market participants’ behaviors should 
be modeled in order to make their profits maximized and reduce their exposures to 
the risks. 
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Table 3.1: Overview of World’s Most Established Power Markets Compared With BETTA 
 
 
 BETTA NEMMCO NordPool PJM 
Participation 
Voluntary for PX & 
Balancing Mechanism 
Compulsory for day 
ahead spot 
Voluntary for day 
ahead and adjustment 
market 
Compulsory day 
ahead market 
Market offerings 
Long-term bilateral 
contracts, PX, 
Balancing market 
Day ahead spot 
Day ahead spot, hour 
ahead, Forwards, 
Futures 
Day ahead spot, real 
time spot, capacity 
credit market 
Type of bidding 
Double sided 
Including Retail 
market 
Double sided Double sided Double sided 
Adjustment market 
Bids and offers called 
for adjustments 
payment 
 
- 
Intra – day auction 
market 
Bid quantities can be 
changed till gate 
closure 
Real time/ 
Balancing 
Mechanism 
Penalty for deviation 
from schedule 
Through purchase of 
ancillary services 
Counter trade for real 
time – participants are 
given MCP 
Deviations are traded 
in real time 
Pricing rule 
Confidential prices for 
bilateral contracts, 
Single price for 
Balancing market 
Zonal pricing Zonal pricing 
Locational Marginal 
Pricing – Nodal 
pricing 
Pricing type Ex - post Ex - post Ex - post Ex - post 
Risk management UKPX, Bilateral OTC 
OTC, Derivatives on 
Sydney Future 
exchange 
Forwards, Futures on 
NordPool 
FTRs –Bilateral OTC, 
Multi – settlement 
market, virtual 
bidding, financial 
trading  at NYMEX 
Congestion 
management 
Locational signals for 
transmission tariff 
Locational signals for 
transmission tariff 
Area splitting and 
zonal pricing 
Security constrained 
economic dispatch 
Transmission 
Losses 
To be purchased by 
the consumers 
To be purchased by 
generators 
Included in zonal 
price 
Included in LMP 
Time frame 
Gate closure before 
one hour of real time 
operation 
Half – hourly; time 
weighted average 
price of six five 
minute blocks 
One hour time blocks Hourly blocks 
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Figure 3.11 demonstrates an overview of a general framework of electricity market 
consisting of wide-range of different electricity sub-markets: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.11: General Framework of Electricity Market [62] 
In addition, California, PJM and NordPool electricity markets are based on single 
cash-out settlement price; on the other hand, UK electricity market is based on dual 
cash-out settlement pricing. This dual cash-out pricing method incentivizes market 
participants in both sides of the market to be active in long-term contracts, since 
these prices will be volatile and can increase the exposure to the risks. More details 
have been discussed in the following sections. Figure 3.12 illustrates categorized 
comparisons between different market structures: 
 
Figure 3.12: `Categorized Comparisons between Different Market Structures 
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3.6 Risk Management 
 
Trading energy is usually a risky business with a chance of gaining balanced position 
or a chance of making loss. There are different types of risks. Most of the risks can 
be categorized into two main types:  
 Technical risks 
 Financial risks 
Technical risks are related to the structure of the market and the system conditions. 
They are usually referred to the technical abilities of the market participants in order 
to reach their tasks and objectives.  
Financial risks are related to the losses, which can be caused by any changes in the 
values of the financial assets in the market. These kinds of risks are so significant 
especially in the market environment where parties are competing with each other in 
order to make more profit. Generally there are five different types of financial risks 
in any types of market [63]:  
 Market risk related to the price variation; 
 Credit risk related to contractual conditions; 
 Liquidity risk related to the lack of competition and activity in the market; 
 Legal risk related to losses based on failures of a company because of law or 
regulatory changes; 
 Operational risk related to the financial losses on technical problems. 
The first three types of risks are associated with the liquidity and efficiency of the 
market. A liquid market provides an environment that allows additional parties to 
enter the market without any changes to the price of the electricity. In a liquid 
market players will not have a chance to play market power. Furthermore, an 
efficient market will not suffer from the lack of predictions about the future 
conditions of the market, including uncertainties and price volatility in BM and spot 
market. 
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     3.6.1 Why Risk? 
 
As a commodity, electricity can be traded in the market. The development of the 
electricity market has arisen so many issues. Risks in this market have become a 
major concept because of the nature of the market and the specifications of the 
electricity. 
There are some important and significant differences between electrical energy and 
other commodities in different markets. These differences can lead us to find why 
electricity market is totally different from other markets and recognize its probable 
risks.  
Some of these differences are as follows: 
 Electricity as a commodity in the electricity market has a strong link to the 
physical system. The power system is one of the most complex systems and 
covers a huge geographical area including millions of participants with 
different strategies, objectives and risks. 
 In the power system electricity generation and consumption should be 
balanced second by second; therefore, the time duration of balancing process 
and meeting the demand is too short. 
 Storing the electricity as a commodity in power market is a complex and 
expensive process. Electricity is not like other commodities, which can be 
easily stored and used. As soon as the electricity generated, it should be 
transferred and consumed; therefore, the generation and consumption of the 
electricity should be balanced in the real-time.  
 The electricity demand profile is so volatile and difficult to predict it. As 
mentioned, this can be so challenging to parties and increase their exposure 
to the risks. 
 The energy produced by a GenCo cannot be transferred to a specific 
customer. 
The above dissimilarities between electricity and other commodities in other markets 
bring some kinds of risks into the electricity market. Figure 3.13 illustrates a BSC’s 
actions in the BETTA, as a bilateral electricity market. According to this figure a 
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BSC unit should have a trade off between various movements while participating in 
the electricity market. 
 
              
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.13: BSC’s Actions in BETTA 
 
     3.6.1.1 Impact of Restructuring on the Market Participation Risks 
 
One of the main purposes of electricity market deregulation is to reduce the risks in 
the market; nevertheless, these deregulations have even brought different types of 
risks into the market. 
In the previous case, vertical integrated systems were providing an insured electricity 
supply chain through a non-privatized, centrally regulated market; however, vertical 
integration buffered price volatility, which was a main risk in a monopoly system for 
parties.  
Restructuring results in redistribution of risks and brings different challenges to the 
market: 
 Utilities become a financial broker, using long-term contracts and financial 
instruments (like BETTA structure). 
 Existing system obligations need to be restructured. 
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 Development of price-responsive demand so that some risks can be shifted to 
retail customers, especially this occurred when the electricity Pool reformed 
into BETTA and the demand side becomes more active. 
Figure 3.14 demonstrates the condition of a SupplyCo in a restructured market. 
 
 
 
                   
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.14: SupplyCo in a Restructured Market 
According to the Figure 3.14, restructuring causes utility’s cost and risks to rise 
because: 
 The structure of deregulated market dictates that the utility is vulnerable to 
lose its position by a wrong load shape forecasting. 
 Large base-load customers find bilateral contracts more attractive and by 
entering into these types of contracts; they will take some risks for fine-
tuning their positions. This is an important issue in the BETTA structure. 
 The cost of service will rise. 
Consequently, the above issues will result in: 
 Increasing business risk and put market participants in loss positions 
 Increasing the cost of capital 
 Increasing effects on utilities obligation like: 
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Wholesale 
Customer 
Retail 
Customer 
SupplyCo 
GenCo 
Service Obligations 
Long-term Contracts 
  
71 
 Inability in meeting service quality standards 
 Inability in making investments in transmission network in future planning 
 Inability in following regulatory price procedures made by the watchdog  
 Inability in providing equal services to all customers 
 Inability in operating efficiency on both technical and market operations 
 
     3.6.1.2 Impact of BETTA on the Market Participation’s Risks 
 
BETTA has created a market in which the responsibility of balancing the generation 
and consumption has been switched from the centralized Pool to the market 
participants. 
One of the significant concerns of the BETTA refers to the long-term bilateral 
contracts. Because of the price volatility in the spot market, economists suggest to 
establish a market in which about 97% consists of long-term bilateral contracts. 
According to the economists’ points of view energy financial derivatives like future, 
forward and option contracts can be used to manage the energy market risks. 
On the other hand because bilateral contracts are a long time ahead of real time, it 
can be hard for both GenCos and SupplyCos to fine-tune their positions and they 
may face risks especially close to real time. GenCos may become faulty due to 
different reasons during this long period and need to be off for essential 
maintenance. Also it is so challenging for SupplyCos to be sure how much electricity 
they need in order to meet their demands. 
Therefore the market designers have given a last chance to parties to fine-tune their 
positions by trading in the PX, 24-48 hours ahead of real time and recover the risks 
caused by bilateral contracts. 
In theory, those bilateral contracts and PX should make a perfect balance between 
generation and consumption but in reality there is always an imbalance on the 
electricity grid. Balancing Mechanism is a real time market, which can help the SO 
to balance the market. In BM parties try to reduce their exposures to the risks by not 
participating in it as far as possible and fine-tune their positions before the BM in 
  
72 
order to avoid experiencing the price volatility. These instabilities can have impacts 
especially on SupplyCos, since they undoubtedly cannot predict their demand profile 
accurately. 
BM contribution in the market is not so much, at about 2%; however, it is a key 
stage from the power engineers’ point of view since its duration is just one hour. It is 
very challenging for NGC to not only balance the system but also ensure the security 
of supply. In Figure 3.15 the temporal sequence of the BETTA structure and the 
price volatility in the existing market has been presented. 
 
Figure 3.15:  Price Volatility in BETTA 
 
In BETTA structure, the SO has various and significant responsibilities as follow: 
 Balancing the demand and generation: the SO should cover differences 
between the GenCos ‘and SupplyCos’ contractual and actual positions. 
These imbalances are because of the uncertainties of demand profile and 
also generation variations. 
 Correcting net errors. 
 Providing resource for the system. 
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 Providing ancillary services, such as frequency response and reactive 
power (voltage support)  
Performing these tasks by the SO in the short duration of BM sounds challenging 
and introduces new kinds of risks. 
One of the main risk sources in the electricity market, which is related to Balancing 
Mechanism offers and bids, is the imbalance cashing-out process. There are two 
imbalance cash-out prices, SBP is the price that is paid by parties whose positions 
are short, and SSP is the price received by parties whose positions are long. Both of 
these cash-out prices are based on Balancing Mechanism participants and the bids 
and offers that are accepted. Usually SBP exceeds SSP [20, 60]. 
The outcome is a set of imbalance prices which are quite volatile and give incentive 
to market participants to balance their positions before Gate closure and reduce their 
exposures to the risks. These prices can be very variable, and the demand or 
generation may face some unpredictable failure close to the real time, such as an 
unexpected surge in the demand side or loss of main generation on the system. 
Figures 3.16 and 3.17 demonstrate how the imbalances arise near real time [30]. 
 
Figure 3.16: Imbalance arising from variable generation [30] 
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Figure 3.16 illustrates an appropriate view about the imbalances that each generation 
in the power system may experience. As mentioned these shortfalls and surpluses 
that cause imbalance cash-out prices, will bring some risks to the market.  
On the other hand, the effect of unexpected failure on the generation side has been 
demonstrated in Figure 3.17. A 25 MW genset failure has causes a forced outage and 
makes a significant imbalance in the system and increases parties’ exposures to the 
risks. These generation shortfalls are based on any outages occurring close to the 
Gate closure, a time at which all parties are prohibited to enter into new bilateral 
contracts. 
 
Figure 3.17: Imbalance arising from unexpected generation failure on 25MW capacity [30] 
 
     3.6.2 Other Aspects of Risks in Electricity Markets 
 
According to the description of BETTA and its impact on the market risks there are 
various types of risks that must be managed under BETTA [20]: 
 Price: The demand of the electricity cannot be predicted very accurately. 
It has a variable nature and this causes the electricity to be volatile. The 
demand profile is always changing due to different reasons like weather, 
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national events and technical issues; on the other hand, there should be a 
second by second balance in the power system.  
 Volume: One of the main stages in BETTA is Imbalance Settlement 
which brings significant volume risk to market participants. Generation 
and supply companies should try to make a balance between their actual 
and contractual positions, or they be penalized by imbalance cash-out 
prices. In addition the BM offers and bids reflect the cost of imbalance 
charges. 
 Credit: BETTA is a free market and unlike the Pool all parties are self-
dispatched; thus, credit and counterparty risks are important. All parties 
should have the ability to deliver and meet their contracts’ terms and be 
able to pay for it. The existence of power exchange can help to remove 
the risks. 
 
         3.6.2.1 Electricity Market Risks Associated with Renewable 
Obligations (ROs) 
 
Currently, UK alongside European countries have set up several legislations and 
Renewable Obligations (ROs) in order to increase the proportion of renewable 
energy sources in short and long term futures and reduce the dependency on 
conventional energy sources such as oil, natural gas and coal.  
The Climate Change Act 2008 established an ambitious binding target for the UK to 
reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 80% compare to the 1990 level by the year 
2050 [64]. Furthermore, in order to make it feasible to achieve to this target, UK 
should gradually reduce its greenhouse gas emissions by 37% by 2020 and 60% by 
2030 [64].  
Additionally, all the European Union (EU) member states have agreed on a target 
that 20% of all EU energy should come from renewable sources by 2020. In order to 
achieve to this target each member state has set a national legal target, e.g. the UK’s 
target is 15%. However, presently, only 3% of UK energy is coming from renewable 
sources [65]. 
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On the other hand, in order to meet this 15% target, three main UK sectors – 
electricity, heat and transport – should be involved in the process. The largest 
contribution is likely to come from the electricity sector, about 30% of the generated 
electricity should come from renewable sources and only about 12% of heat and 
10% of transport energy will be provided by renewable sources [64]. 
According to above, three main pillars should be considered for future electricity 
markets regulations, structures and modeling:  
 
Figure 3.18: Three Main Future Electricity Markets Pillars 
 
In order to have a low carbon economy and consider the climate change targets, 
electricity markets, especially bilateral markets, need to consider the other two main 
pillars: 
 Affordability: To keep electricity bills down. 
 Security of Supply (SoS): To keep lights on. 
To the purpose of achieving to these three pillars, electricity market modeling is 
essential since the establishment of electricity market will have some impact on 
sustainable generation and will introduce some new risks into the renewable energy 
field. Market regulations and legislations can reduce the profitability of GenCos and 
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SupplyCos, since most of the renewable resources are unpredictable such as wind 
and solar energy. For instance, GenCos having wind farms are able to predict their 
output with 60-70% accuracy. This results in a 30-40% imbalance [20] and they will 
face severe differences between their contractual and actual positions and their 
exposures to the risks will increase. Consequently, it is necessary to model electricity 
markets to reduce these kinds of risks and also avoid market participants from 
playing market power owing to lack of market players in both sides of the market. 
More detailed discussion has been provided in Chapters 4 and 5. 
Europe is currently in the process of designing and developing a top-down 
methodology to support the planning of a future pan-European transmission system 
that potentially includes prioritized corridors or electricity highways that have the 
capability to address pan-European electricity transmission and market requirements 
from 2020 and up to 2050 [66]. The proposed top-down methodology supports the 
planning of a pan-European Electricity Highways System (EHS) [67] by providing a 
modular and robust expansion plan that will be in line with the previously mentioned 
three pillars. This means that more interconnections between EU members will be 
constructed and in purpose of trading electricity in such a network, bilateral 
electricity market will play a significant role. 
 
3.7 Summary 
 
This chapter investigated operation of UK electricity market structure, BETTA, as a 
bilateral electricity market in details and concluded that by participating in bilateral 
electricity markets, in which major electricity trading are conducted years ahead of 
gate closure bilaterally, the exposure to the risks can increase. Several aspects of 
risks that can be introduced by participating in such a market structure have been 
reviewed. According to these aspects, the need for bilateral electricity market 
modeling exposed. Furthermore, the impacts of other market obligations have been 
examined.  
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4.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 2, it was demonstrated how vertically integrated electricity markets in 
different countries transformed to more competitive structures. For instance, it was 
discussed how electricity market reforms in the UK caused market revolution from a 
vertical structure to the electricity Pool and afterwards to BETTA. In deregulated 
electricity market structures more private companies will be involved in electricity 
trading and all of them are targeting to maximize their profits and reduce their 
exposures to risks. Additionally, Chapter 3 discussed further on BETTA structure in 
detail, as a bilateral electricity market, in which all market participants should fine-
tune their positions before Gate Closure in order to avoid facing any imbalances and 
penalties in the settlement period. In such conditions, market participants on both 
sides of the market may try to abuse the market to the purpose of making their own 
profits maximized and put other market participants in loss positions.  
This chapter will then discover the reasons behind playing market power in 
electricity markets. In addition, several techniques for measuring market power will 
be discussed, hereafter will be explained the reason why Equilibrium methods have 
been selected as a promising approach in this research. 
In the next step, different equilibrium models will be reviewed in detail and 
Conjectural Variation Equilibrium (CVE) approach will be introduced as a proposed 
approach to model imperfect bilateral electricity market in this thesis. 
Furthermore, it will be examined how the generation side of a bilateral electricity 
market, which is suffering from market power, can be modeled. Since bilateral 
electricity markets are double-sided markets, in order to model them it is essential to 
break them up into two sub-markets: 
 Generation side market 
 Demand side market 
Considering the bilateral electricity market and separating the two sides of an 
imperfect bilateral electricity market have been introduced as novel aspects of this 
research.  
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In this chapter, the generation side of an imperfect bilateral electricity market will be 
modeled, formulated and further in Chapter 5 the other side of the market, named 
‘demand side’, will be taken into consideration. 
 
4.2 Perfect Competition 
 
In a perfect electricity market all market participants will act as a price takers and 
both GenCos and SupplyCos co-ordinate against each other in order to find the 
market clearing price. In such an environment the marginal value of the electricity is 
equal to the marginal cost (MC) [68]. Therefore, GenCos generate electricity in 
order to cover their marginal costs and this will be the most efficient solution of the 
market. 
The revenue,     , of GenCo   can be calculated as follow: 
 
                                                                        
 
Where,      is the output of GenCo   and     is the market price, which is fixed in this 
case and equal to the marginal cost of GenCo  ,     : 
 
                                                                        
 
Therefore, in order to maximize the profit, the marginal revenue of GenCo  ,    , 
can be calculated as: 
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There is no economic advantage in participating in a perfect competition, and all 
market participants enter fair trading contracts in order to match the generation and 
demand. In order to have a perfect competition, the existence of a large number of 
market players on both sides of the market (generation and demand sides) is 
essential. In this case, those companies who want to withhold electricity for the 
purpose of making higher profit will be eliminated by other rivals’ actions. In other 
words, GenCos who ask for a higher electricity price and SupplyCos who offer less 
than market price will be ignored in such a market, since there are other players who 
can fill their positions. 
However, in reality these conditions are very far from the existing electricity markets 
and it is almost impossible to have such a market, considering solid system 
constraints. 
 
4.3 Market Power in Electricity Markets 
 
Although decentralized and restructured electricity markets have brought 
transparency, market liquidity, price minimization, competition, etc. to electricity 
trading; however, exercising market power has been always a main challenge for 
these deregulated markets.  
As a result of complex market structure, complicated regulations, financial crisis, 
complex bidding, lack of incentives, etc., less market participants will be involved in 
the electricity markets and this will cause price volatility and the exercising of 
market power. Generally, market power refers to the ability of excluding other 
market participants from trading electricity in the market and control the total output 
of electricity in order to drive electricity price above the competitive level [7]. 
As an example, as discussed in Chapter 3, Balancing Mechanism (BM) is a market 
in BETTA, which allows the System Operator to balance the energy in the market 
and increase the security of supply in the power system. The prices in this market 
will be high and volatile and will sometimes cause market participants to make a 
loss. In such a market structure, some market participants may take advantage and 
cause other market participants to face these high prices in the BM. In such a 
condition, utilities will increase the final price of electricity in order to offset their 
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losses and this will be against the price reduction strategy as one of the market 
restructuring goals. 
Exercising market power is a result of several issues that distinguish electricity 
markets from other markets around the world: 
1. Complex market assembly. 
2. Complex regulations. 
3. Lack of storage (no economically and operationally feasible storage options 
have been introduced as yet). 
4. Continuous and real time balancing. 
5. Renewable energy integration considering their inherent uncertainties. 
As discussed in section 2.4.5 in Chapter 2, the California electricity market failure 
can be listed as one the market power effects on the electricity market [69, 70] as a 
result of demand inelasticity, absence of a bilateral market and inability of market 
participants in balancing their positions. Therefore, market power monitoring is a 
crucial issue for electricity markets in order to bring more transparency to the market 
and avoid large companies to abusing the market. 
In general, market power is exercised when there is lack of market participants in 
both sides of the market and few companies have influence on major proportion of 
traded electricity. These companies, which can be called strategic companies, 
dominate the market aiming to approach a higher profit. 
Although in most cases exercising market power refers to the number of market 
participants, there are some other factors that have impacts on imperfect 
competitions: 
 
 Demand elasticity: In an electricity market with inelastic demand side, all 
generation companies can raise their prices, since they are aware of the fact 
that their generated electricity is absolutely needed. In such a case, GenCos 
can make huge profits. 
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 Market participants’ incentives: In a competitive electricity market there 
are several market participants with different economic backgrounds. 
Therefore, electricity market regulations should incentivize them in order to 
participate in the market. For instance, wind farms may face uncertainties, 
which cause them to end up with imbalanced positions and face penalties in 
the market; consequently, there should be several investment and risk 
management initiatives being applied in the market. 
 
 Existence of potential competitors considering system constraints: 
Availability of adequate market participants considering system constraints 
in a specific region will have impacts on level of imperfect competition. 
 
     4.3.1 Monopolistic Electricity Market 
 
A Monopolistic market has a strong conflict against perfect completion. In such a 
market, which is the extreme case of an oligopolistic market, only one player is 
selling its product to the market. In such a condition the GenCos sells the generated 
electricity to the SupplyCos via the wholesale market at a certain price, which is 
much higher than its marginal cost in order to make a huge profit. In order to avoid 
higher prices in a monopolistic market, the regulator should play a significant role 
since the electricity watchdog should set the market price to the value of marginal 
cost of that GenCo, which is a challenging task since the marginal cost of these types 
of companies are confidential. Transmission and distribution companies in particular 
areas can be examples of monopoly in the market. 
 
     4.3.2 Oligopolistic Electricity Markets 
 
As discussed in section 4.1, one of the novelties of this research is considering 
bilateral electricity markets as structures that will be leading in market trading in 
future competitive electricity markets in different countries and also at the pan-
European level. Furthermore, since these bilateral electricity markets may suffer 
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from imperfect competition, they have been split into two electricity sub-markets in 
this research.  
Several research efforts have been carried out in order to model imperfect electricity 
markets [71,72,73]; however most of them have reviewed electricity Pool structure 
or they have just modeled one side of the electricity market, which is the generation 
side. 
Since in the bilateral electricity market, e.g. BETTA, both sides of the market are 
active and market players’ behaviors will have impacts on market equilibrium point; 
it is essential to consider and model both sides of the market. Since the scope of this 
study, which has been discussed in Chapter 1 Figure 1.1, this chapter will primarily 
consider on oligopolistic electricity market as shown in Figure 4.1.  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1:  Oligopolistic Electricity Market Boundary  
 
In this chapter, the generation side of an imperfect bilateral electricity market has 
been modeled. In realistic bilateral electricity markets, the number of generation 
firms will be limited as a result of capital; regulatory and operational constraints and 
all of these GenCos try to maximize their own profits. Such a market in which 
GenCos are acting in an uncompetitive manner in order to sell their production 
above the market price and have control of a major share of produced electricity is 
called oligopolistic competition [71]. An oligopolistic market is an environment in 
which small numbers of sellers (in this case GenCos) are dominating the market and 
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cause high costs for consumers. It is essential to mention that previously explained 
monopolistic market is different from the oligopolistic market since in monopoly 
conditions only one market player is dominating the market environment.  
Generally, there are three main factors with cause oligopoly in the generation side of 
the bilateral electricity markets: 
 Small number of firms: As explained above, lack of generation firms will 
have major impacts on exercising market power in bilateral electricity 
markets. 
 
 Barriers to entry to the market: These can be categorized into two main 
barriers: 
 Legal barriers: National and European Renewable Obligations (ROs), 
Carbon reduction targets, lack of investment incentives, complex market 
regulations 
 Natural barriers: Renewable energy sources, such as wind power can be 
source of uncertainty due to the unpredictable nature of the energy 
source.  
 
 Dependent behaviors: Generation firms have dependent behaviors in an 
oligopolistic bilateral market, meaning that when one firm decides to raise or 
low its price or quantity, the other firm is going to change its decision making 
as well, so they have to consider what and when the other firms have planned 
to do. This characteristic is unique compare to perfect completion and also 
monopolistic electricity markets, since in perfect competition the firms are 
price takers and in monopolistic market there is only one firm whose concern 
is its own amount of generated electricity. This factor will lead us to the 
game theory concept, which was explained in section 2.7.2.3.1, and assist us 
to select an appropriate method to model imperfect bilateral electricity 
market in the next sections. 
In an oligopolistic electricity market GenCos exercise market power in two different 
ways: 
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 Economical withholding 
 Physical withholding 
Economical withholding means GenCos will take advantage of their positions in 
order to increase the prices in the market. Moreover, they can dominate the market 
by withholding their production in order to make deficiency of electricity. In this 
case SupplyCos will be forced to participate in Balancing Mechanism and spot 
markets in order to purchase electricity to fulfill their demand; thus they will face 
price volatility. Generally, in an oligopolistic electricity market, those GenCos who 
exercise market power try to monitor the impacts of their decisions on the market 
conditions and other participants’ behaviors in order to follow their strategy or 
switch to another one. Furthermore, in oligopoly those large generation companies 
may coalesce together and share the profits among themselves to eliminate small-
scale companies who generate electricity from renewable sources. Further 
explanations will be provided in the following sections. 
 
     4.3.3 Market Power Measurement Techniques 
 
The existence of strategic generation companies in the imperfect bilateral electricity 
markets can have destructive impacts on the competitiveness of the market; 
therefore, it is crucial to identify and measure the market power in electricity 
markets. Several market power techniques have been introduced in order to measure 
the imperfectness of the electricity market, such as [74]: 
 Price-Cost Margin Index 
 Herfindhal-Hirschen Index (HHI) 
 Simulation Analysis 
 Equilibrium Methods 
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     4.3.3.1 Price-Cost Margin Index 
 
According to the previous sections, exercising market power in the generation side 
will result in selling electricity to the SupplyCos at much higher than market 
competitive price and marginal cost (MC). This approach, which also called Lerner 
Index, is based on formula below [75]: 
  
       
   
                                                             
 
Where,       is the market competitive price. 
In order to measure the market power using this method, knowledge about marginal 
cost of strategic companies in the electricity market is essential; however, these 
information are confidential and generation companies in oligopolistic market do not 
have any willingness to disclose these information with other market participants, 
therefore applying this method is practically challenging in this research. 
Furthermore, this method is suffering from lack of interaction between market 
participants in the market compare to the CVE method. 
 
     4.3.3.2 Herfindhal-Hirschen Index (HHI) 
 
The Hirschmann-Herfindahl Index can be identified by the following formula:  
 
                        
  
                                                                                                         
 
Where the      is the market share of each strategic market participant in the bilateral 
electricity market [76].  
The reason for squaring the market share in Equation 4.5 is that, the impact of large 
generation companies will be strongly taken into consideration compare to small-
scale companies.  
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According to Federal Energy Regulation Committee (FERC) in the US, if the value 
of HHI is    , it will be prefect competition, and when it is below 1000 the market 
power will be exercised less and higher than 1800 the market power will be 
exercised strongly.  Furthermore, FERC believes that the application of HHI belongs 
to the past and other approaches can bring more accurate analysis of market power in 
the bilateral electricity market [74]. 
However, this method cannot be an appropriate approach for modeling bilateral 
electricity market, since: 
1. The behaviors of other rivals’ reactions to each generation company’s 
strategies cannot be modeled. 
 
2. There is no strong fundamental background behind this method compare to 
other approaches, such as equilibrium methods. 
 
3. Since this approach is unable to consider all market participants’ behaviors in 
the market; therefore, it is incapable of considering demand elasticity in the 
market power measurement. Nevertheless, in order to model bilateral 
electricity market, it is crucial to consider demand side and this can be one of 
the greatest weaknesses of this approach. 
 
4. This index does not consider the structure of a bilateral electricity market. 
 
5. Balancing the generation and demand which is the main goal of a bilateral 
electricity market has not been considered in this approach. 
 
     4.3.3.3 Simulation Analysis 
 
Through simulation analysis the behavior of strategic generation companies will be 
estimated based on a series of studies that gradually measure the market power [74]. 
The traded price and quantity will be compare to estimated perfect competition price 
and quantity in order to have an idea about the level of market power; therefore, this 
analysis will be based on historical data which cannot be reliable since bilateral 
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electricity market is a dynamic environment and it is essential to consider rivals’ 
reactions to any changes in the strategies of each market participants. 
 
     4.3.3.4 Equilibrium Methods 
 
Equilibrium method has been applied into several studies as a promising approach to 
measure market power in electricity markets. As discussed in section 2.7.2.3, the 
equilibrium method has several advantages over other approaches.   
In order to model double-sided bilateral electricity market, it is essential to satisfy 
both sides of the market, which means the equilibrium point of the market should be 
identified while: 
1. Generation meets demand and market is cleared. 
2. All market participants in both sides of the market will maximize their profits 
by satisfying their first-order conditions, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT), for 
raising their own benefits. 
 
                                                              
Subject to:                                              
         
 
While:        is the objective function,                are the inequality 
constraints and                are the equality constraints. 
Therefore, the equilibrium point of the market will be a stable point for both sides of 
the market and all generation companies’ profits, in an oligopolistic market, will be 
maximized and the market cleared price and the output of each generation company 
will be identified. In this case, the Nash Equilibrium (NE) will be formed and none 
of the market participants will have any incentive to unilaterally change their 
strategies in order to make more profit, according to Game Theory specifications, 
since their strategies will be the best response to their rivals’ strategies. Furthermore, 
equilibrium methods are capable of considering long-term strategies; therefore they 
can be appropriate for modeling bilateral electricity markets. 
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Figure 4.2 illustrates an overview of market power measurement tools and the 
unique structure, which has been introduced in this research, in order to model 
imperfect bilateral electricity market. It is demonstrated in Figure 4.2 that the 
bilateral electricity market has been divided into to sub-markets as discussed 
previously. 
 
 
 Figure 4.2:Overview of Market Power Unique Structure Measurement Tools  
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Several equilibrium model conditions can be identified based on strategies of market 
participants as follow: 
 Collusion 
 Bertrand Model (Game in prices) 
 Cournot Model (Game in quantities) 
 Stackelberg Model (Leader – follower games) 
 Supply Function Equilibrium Model (SFE) 
 Conjectural Variation Equilibrium Model (CVE) 
The following sections compare and contrast these models and introduced the best 
approach for modeling both sides of bilateral electricity market in imperfect 
conditions. 
 
     4.3.3.4.1 Collusion 
 
Collusion condition in imperfect bilateral electricity occurs, if GenCo   collude with 
other generation companies in order to sell the electricity to the SupplyCos at higher 
prices or they may decide to withhold their output. In both cases they will maximize 
their joint profits and small-scale generation companies in the market will loss. For 
instance, several large generation companies like coal-fired or nuclear power plants 
may have a combination of agreements and plans in order to make the electricity 
prices in wholesale market very high; these agreements and plans do not necessarily 
have to include any obvious communication between those companies and can take 
into consideration the load profile alongside their rivals reaction to their strategies. In 
collusion condition, the non-cooperative Game theory will be transformed to 
cooperative environment, which avoid new entrees to the bilateral contracts in the 
market. 
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     4.3.3.4.2 Bertrand Model  
 
Bertrand is the model of price competition in the electricity market [1,74]. In this 
model all generation companies will sell their generated electricity to the customers 
through the wholesale market at a price that would be in perfect competition. 
Therefore, under Bertrand model none of the GenCos will sell the electricity under 
their marginal cost (MC) in order to avoid any losses. Compared to collusion, firms 
in this approach are not cooperating with each other in order to maximize their joint 
profits. 
Equation 4.7 demonstrates that the output of GenCo , is a function of its own output 
and other rivals generation: 
 
                                                                       
 
Where,      is the decision variable for firm   and       are the prices offered 
by its rivals. 
Under the Bertrand model, all generation companies set their prices to the market 
and provide the amount of electricity needed by the market; therefore this model has 
a potential to be a perfect competition. Moreover, it is assumed that the whole 
demand can be satisfied through one GenCo, if it is offering the lowest price in the 
wholesale market; however, because of several constraint sources in the electricity 
market applying this approach to imperfect bilateral electricity market is not feasible. 
Generally, this approach has been considered as a less efficient method for modeling 
imperfect double-sided electricity market in this research because of the following 
reasons: 
 All market participants are competing in the market based on price. 
 Several power system and market constraints have been ignored in this 
method. Considering these constraints can result in higher and fluctuated 
prices [77]. 
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 Bertrand is incapable to predict the reaction of all rivals in the market, which 
is one of its key weaknesses. 
 Generation companies’ marginal costs are constant; however if this approach 
considered the reactions of other rivals in the market, it could react to them 
and GenCos’ marginal costs would be dynamic. 
 
     4.3.3.4.3 Cournot Model 
 
Cournot model is the most classic model of equilibrium methods. All the firms in the 
market are producing homogeneous product, as in the electricity market in which all 
GenCos are generating electricity in order to sell it in the wholesale market [76]. 
This method was widely applied in early stages of electricity market equilibrium 
modeling. 
Basically it can be explained that the Cournot model is a game in quantity compare 
to Bertrand model, which was a game in prices. That means each GenCo can be 
selected according to its output, afterwards it accepts the market clearing price 
resulted by end users. Therefore, the revenue of generation companies can be 
calculated as follow: 
 
                                                                       
 
Where,     is output of all GenCo  ’s rivals in the market sold to the supply 
companies and can be formulated as follow: 
 
       
   
                                                           
 
In this model the equilibrium of the bilateral market can be defined when each 
company maximizes its profit, given the quantity produced by the other firms. 
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Economists believe that the outcome of Cournot model is a type, known as Nash 
equilibrium; thus each generation company should decide on its own output so the 
market clearing price will be identified according to interactions between demand 
and generation curves, afterwards none of the firms will have any incentive to 
deviate from its decisions. 
Cournot model has several advantages over Bertrand model since it considers the 
market share of each market participant and also the demand elasticity. Furthermore 
Cournot can be applied in bilateral electricity market in which two parties have an 
agreement on the amount of electricity, which will be traded in future. However, this 
research has considered that Cournot model by itself cannot be an efficient and 
appropriate approach to model imperfect bilateral electricity market since the 
reactions of other rivals based on any changes in strategy of each firm has not been 
considered. Hereafter in this approach, generation companies do not response to any 
changes in the price; therefore the result will be related to the demand elasticity in 
the market. In contrast, the demand elasticity in the imperfect bilateral market is low, 
hence the prices resulted in this approach will be higher. In such a case, the Cournot 
model can be applied for medium-term (i.e. 1 month to 1 year) modeling rather than 
long-term bilateral contracts. 
According to the discussion provided for both Bertrand and Cournot models, it has 
been realized that these two models are suffering from several weaknesses since the 
Bertrand model provides less market equilibrium price than the actual price. 
Additionally, under Cournot model the equilibrium price is much higher than the 
actual price; therefore these two models cannot provide an efficient electricity 
market equilibrium point. However it has been attempted to combine these two 
models in [78] to avoid these weaknesses. 
 
     4.3.3.4.4 Stackelberg Model 
 
In this model a large GenCo is dominating the market and acts as a leader, tries to 
maximize its profit and other firms act as followers [79]. In this case the leader 
estimates the reaction of other rivals correctly and the followers do not even know 
that how their decisions impact the leader’s strategies. Consequently, this approach 
considers sort of monopolistic electricity market.  
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     4.3.3.4.5 Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) Model 
 
As explained in prior section, Cournot and Bertrand models are suffering from 
several drawbacks, the Supply Function Equilibrium (SFE) model was introduced in 
order to deal with complexities of electricity market structure. One of the advantages 
of SFE is that GenCos can submit their quantity and price in the market rather than 
just price or quantity [80]. Accordingly, SFE model is appropriate for electricity 
Pool in which each GenCo submits its bid as a form of supply function and Market 
Operator (MO) calculates the market-clearing price rather than bilateral electricity 
market.  
Furthermore, the SFE model results in multiple equilibria; therefore the outcome of 
this model will cover a wide range of equilibria. This diversity can bring complexity 
to the market. Additionally, the calculation of these equilibria is difficult [71]. 
 
4.4 Conjectural Variation Equilibrium (CVE) Model 
 
According to Chapter 2, economists have identified game theory as a key concept for 
understanding the reactions among market participants in any market environment 
such as the electricity market. Equilibrium methods are in line with specifications of 
Game theory. Two main Game theory features can be defined as follows: 
1.  All market participants are rational. This feature can help decision makers to 
stick with the decisions that lead them to reach to their aims and objectives. 
2. They use strategic decisions aiming to achieve to their goals. This strategic 
decision includes the expectations of other rivals’ actions based on each agent’s 
decisions. 
Conjectural Variation Equilibrium (CVE) is another model in the equilibrium 
methods family, which was introduced around 1930 by Bowley (1924) and Frisch 
(1933) [81]. This method has a strong relation with the two Game theory features 
described above. This is because; in this method each market participant chooses its 
desirable action considering the reactions of other rivals in the market. This approach 
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has been employed in several economic fields in order to model non-cooperative 
environments.  
Comparing to other models, CVE brings robustness into modeling the oligopolistic 
and oligopsonistic electricity markets. In addition, it helps all the decision makers in 
both sides of the bilateral electricity market to take into account the strategies of all 
competitors. Furthermore, compare to SFE model, Conjectural Variation method can 
be an appropriate approach for modeling bilateral electricity markets. 
Game theory plays a significant role in modeling the strategic behavior of all market 
participants. Several research have been carried out in order to model only the 
generation side of the electricity market using Cournot, Stackelberg and SFE models, 
like [82-84]. However, these models only take a snapshot of the market and do not 
consider the interactions between all market participants; therefore in the bilateral 
electricity market in which participants can learn from other competitors’ behavior, 
those methods cannot fulfill the requirements of modeling the system.  
Additionally, considerable amounts of research have been conducted to model 
various market structures, e.g. Pool; however less work has been carried out to 
model bilateral electricity markets such as BETTA. Based on the fact that the share 
of bilateral contracts in BETTA is about 97.1% of the market compared to Balancing 
Mechanism actions, which represent about 2%, and the SO actions which are 
estimated to be around 0.9% [20]. Hence, the significance of bilateral electricity 
market modeling can be exposed, specifically for the BETTA structure with such a 
great portion of bilateral contracts in which SO has the responsibility to maintain the 
security of supply and match the generation and demand within 1 hour, and market 
participants try to set their strategies and their goals in order to maximize profit and 
understand their rivals’ behaviors. 
In [85], it has been suggested that the Conjectural Variation method can improve 
Cournot pricing in the electricity markets. It has been assumed that firms (generation 
companies only) make conjectures about their residual demand elasticity. 
Conjectural Variation equilibrium method has been applied in some studies such as 
[86, 87]; however it has been attempted to model electricity spot markets in those 
studies. Also in [88, 89], CVE has been applied in order to model only the 
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generation side of the electricity market and the supply side has not been taken into 
consideration. 
Conjectural Variation method has been combined with SFE model in some research 
such as  [71], where it is necessary to know the supply function curve; however in 
the algorithm presented in this research and will be introduced in Chapter 6, there is 
no need to identify the curve and the algorithm is interested in the equilibrium point 
of the bilateral market. Furthermore, CV values have been considered in a static 
context and cost functions should estimate the CV values [71], which can come up 
with unrealistic conjectures values and cause loss for all market participants in the 
market. 
 
4.5 Oligopolistic Electricity Market Modeling Using CVE 
 
As one of the novel aspects of this research, the imperfect bilateral electricity market 
has been divided into two sub-markets, oligopolistic and oligopsonistic markets.  
This section clarifies how to model the generation side of an imperfect bilateral 
electricity market. Traditional perfect competition has been replaced by oligopolistic 
market environment and mathematical formulations have been provided to model 
oligopolistic electricity market in order to find out the output of generation 
companies in imperfect bilateral electricity market. 
 
     4.5.1 Generation Companies’ Behaviors in Bilateral 
Electricity Market 
 
The main goal of each generation company (GenCo) in electricity market is to 
maximize its profit in bilateral trading far ahead of Gate Closure, in order to reduce 
the exposure to price volatility risks. 
Generation companies, as sellers, are a group of market participants in the market 
that produce the commodity, which is electricity in this case, and provide several 
services to the buyers or supply companies (SupplyCos). The strategies of the 
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GenCos are very much related to the volume of electricity they are going to generate, 
market price and specifically demand side, SupplyCos, behaviors.  
As described in Chapter 3, in bilateral electricity markets like BETTA, the GenCos 
and SupplyCos will enter into bilateral negotiations in order to establish an 
agreement to trade electricity and fulfill the end-users requirements. 
There are a few factors that determine the behavior of SupplyCos as buyers in the 
market, which affect the demand for electricity. Among the main factors are price 
and quantity. Assuming that other non-price factors are correctly defined, the 
demand behavior is very much dependent on the price of the generated electricity. 
The quantity of electricity purchased by SupplyCos normally increases with the 
decrease in the price and vice versa. This relationship is given by the inverse demand 
function graph as illustrated in Figure 4.3. 
 
Figure 4.3 determines the relationship between the price of electricity and the 
quantity of the demand. According to inverse demand function this relationship can 
be seen from two aspects. The first aspect sees how the electricity price can affect 
the quantity of the demand. As mentioned earlier, the demand decreases as the price 
increases. This is the case when the SupplyCos have alternatives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3:The Relationship between Price of Electricity and the Quantity of Demand 
 
Price  
 MW 
 £ / MW 
Quantity 
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Moreover, the second aspect demonstrates that the SupplyCos are willing to pay to 
have a small additional amount of electricity. It also indicates how much money 
these consumers would want to receive as a compensation for a reduced 
consumption [3]. According to the second aspect, the SupplyCos are willing to pay a 
high price for additional electricity if they have only purchased a small amount of it. 
In contrast, their marginal willingness to pay for this commodity decreases when 
their consumption increases. The change in demand resulted from the change in 
price shows that the demand is elastic. On the other hand, if the relative change in 
demand is smaller than the relative change in price then the demand is inelastic to 
the price. Generally, the inverse demand curve in oligopolistic electricity market is 
inelastic. Therefore, inverse demand function plays an important role in oligopolistic 
electricity markets and generation companies’ behaviors and strategies. 
 
     4.5.2 CVE Applications and Formulations in an 
Oligopolistic Electricity Market 
 
A small number of GenCos dominate the whole industry and these companies try to 
maximize their incomes. 
For each GenCos in the market the main objective is to maximize its profit: 
                                                                                          
 
Where: 
    : Number of GenCos 
     : GenCo   profit 
      : Output of GenCo   
           : Cost function of GenCo   
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It is noticeable that the sub-index     in this research refers to the generation side of 
the bilateral electricity market. 
Also,      is an initial inverse demand function and represents the price that each 
generation company will sell electricity to the supply companies. In this research a 
novel hierarchical algorithm has been introduced and applied in order to find the 
equilibrium point of the bilateral market and in the proposed algorithm, which will 
be introduced in Chapter 6, an initial value can be identified for inverse demand 
function in order to perform the algorithm. More details will be provided in Chapter 
6. 
The purpose of introducing    is that it is not possible to obtain the inverse demand 
function based on historical data in the bilateral electricity market and use it for all 
GenCos, as the amount of traded electricity in bilateral trading is not disclosed. In 
such electricity markets, a GenCo and a SupplyCo participate in a forward contract; 
therefore it is not applicable to use one inverse demand function for each contract.  
 
On the other hand in most research, e.g. [89], it is suggested to use a residual 
demand function (RDC), which can be computed for GenCo : 
 
                                                                                                              
 
Where: 
       : Demand curve  
      : Aggregation of generation functions of all GenCos except GenCo .  
 
In this case, estimating the generation function of all rivals is inevitable which is 
computationally costly; also it requires access to a suitable historical database. 
Furthermore, it would be challenging in terms of investigating the specifications of 
other rivals’ generation functions, since based on the CVE method, rivals’ reactions 
should be considered, whereas in bilateral markets such as BETTA the major share 
of trading is forward and future contracts.  
However, by introducing an initial inverse demand function there is no need to 
estimate the rivals’ supply function and calculate the RDC directly. In this case, an 
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initial inverse demand function is assumed to be a simple linear 45 degree curve to 
have a feasible flat start and via an iterative method, which will be covered in 
Chapter 6, this curve will be updated in terms of intercept and slope to obtain an 
accurate and realistic shape and will result in calculating the output of each GenCo 
in the bilateral electricity market. It is noticeable that this initial value does not have 
any effect on the results [90]. 
To maximize the profit, the optimal solution of Equation 4.10 for   GenCos is: 
 
    
    
                                                                                                         
 
The optimal solution of above equation should meet the following condition: 
 
                                                                                                                    
 
Where: 
        : Marginal revenue of GenCo   
        : Marginal cost of GenCo   
Since    is a function of                and           (the output of other 
GenCos expect GenCo ) is an implicit function of    , therefore the marginal 
revenue will be: 
 
        
        
    
   
   
    
 
   
    
    
    
                                    
 
 
Furthermore, the cost function of GenCos can be defined as follow: 
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Where: 
    : Fixed cost of GenCo   
    : Linear co-efficient of GenCo   cost function 
    : Quadratic co-efficient of GenCo   cost function 
Thus, the marginal cost will be: 
 
        
         
    
                                                                                  
 
Thus, according to Equation 4.13: 
 
   
    
 
   
    
    
    
                                                                           
 
Based on Equation 4.17, the Conjectural Variation (CV) for generation companies in 
oligopolistic market can be defined as follow: 
 
      
    
    
                                                                                     
 
Where: 
     : Output of other generation companies except GenCo   
 
The CV is the belief or any expectation of any market participant in the market about 
other rivals’ reactions according to any changes in the strategy of that firm. The 
value of CV for GenCos in oligopoly models results from hypothesizing how 
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GenCos make its decision in order to maximize their profits. In order to achieve to 
this goal, a significant question should be answered: how does one GenCo simulate 
other GenCos reaction to its decisions? 
CV is such an index to estimate the reactions in which the output of each GenCos is 
used as the decision variable. In this approach, the estimations or conjectures of 
generation companies in an imperfect bilateral electricity market will be changed, in 
terms of the possibility of competitors’ future reactions and that is the reason why 
term     has appeared in CV formulations (Equation 4.18).  
It is notable that diverse strategies, like different CV values, can result in different 
oligopoly models. Further discussion will be provided in Chapter 5. 
Equation 4.17 can be transformed to: 
 
 
   
    
 
   
    
                                                                                 
 
Additionally, as introduced above,    is the initial inverse demand function in the 
novel algorithm, which will be discussed in Chapter 6. Since this research attempts 
to find a cross-over-point of both sides of the market (oligopolistic and 
oligopsonistic markets), and that point is the equilibrium point of the market as well, 
the inverse demand function can be formulated as a linear curve to simplify the 
calculations: 
 
                                                                                                                      
 
Where: 
    : Intercept of inverse demand curve 
    : Slope of inverse demand curve 
Also,     is the total supply and should be equal to total demand,    . 
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Figure 4.4 illustrates the initial inverse demand function. This curve represents the 
changes in price respect to any changes in the output. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.4: Initial Inverse Demand Curve 
 
According to the figure above, the derivative of the inverse demand curve is to be 
negative. 
Assuming all GenCos are playing rationally in oligopolistic electricity market, the 
Equation 4.10 will be transformed to: 
                                
 
       
                                    
Where:                            
In order to optimize the profit of each GenCo the first derivative of Equation 4.22 
will be: 
 
    
    
      
       
    
                                                                       
 
   
£ / MW 
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MW 
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According to Equation 4.21, the above equation will be: 
    
    
      
        
 
   
    
             
                           
 
   
   
             
 
   
   
                    
Thus, the output of each GenCo in oligopolistic market taking into consideration 
other rivals’ reactions can be derived as follows: 
 
    
            
 
   
   
               
 
   
   
                                                                                
 
As discussed earlier, the     is the output of other rivals in the bilateral electricity 
market. In order to simply the above equation the aggregation of other competitors’ 
output can be simplified as follow: 
               
 
   
   
                                                                                         
According to Equation 4.25, in order to calculate the output of each generation 
companies the amount of generated electricity by other rivals in the market 
(    
 
   
   
) alongside the     s should be known; however, it is very difficult for 
GenCo   to estimate those variables without knowing their individual production 
cost functions [86]. By aggregating all rivals into one pseudo-competitor denoted as 
        the new variable        can be defined as follow:  
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Therefore, by using Equations 4.26 and 4.27, Equation 4.25 can be transformed and 
simplified as follow: 
    
            
             
                                                                                           
 
Consequently, the output of GenCo   will be a function of slope and intercept of 
inverse demand function, its own cost function’s coefficients and its estimation 
about other rivals reactions in the market. More details will be provided in Chapters 
5 and 6 in order to demonstrate how GenCos will learn about their rivals behavior 
and how other competitors reactions affect the output of each generation company 
while the hierarchical algorithm considers both sides of the market aiming to cope 
with oligopolistic and oligopsonistic electricity markets to find out the equilibrium 
point of the whole bilateral market. 
 
4.6 Oligopolistic Electricity Market Case Study 
 
In this section, a case study is provided, aiming to present the application of 
Conjectural Variation Equilibrium method in modeling only GenCos’ behaviors in 
the oligopolistic electricity market.  
In this case study, three GenCos with the following parameters have been 
considered: 
 
Table 4.1: Oligopolistic Electricity Market Case Study 
    (£)    (£/MW)    (£/  
 )      
GenCo 1 0 10 0 -0.5 
GenCo 2 0 20 0 -0.5 
GenCo 3 0 30 0 -0.5 
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To simplify the calculations, the quadratic coefficient of each GenCo’s cost function 
has been set to zero. Additionally, at this stage, the      for all GenCos have been 
considered       , which represents the fact that all GenCos react to their rivals’ 
behaviors and reactions similarly. 
As shown in the M-File for oligopolistic electricity market provided in Appendix A, 
the values of slope,   , and intercept,   , of inverse demand curve has been varied in 
each individual steps for the above case study, in order to illustrate the alterations in 
output of each generation company,    , total output provided by all GenCos and the 
selling price,   . 
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4.6.1 Impact of Inverse Demand Curve Slope and Intercept 
on Oligopolistic Electricity Market 
 
Table 4.2 (a-f), presents the impacts of slope and intercept of inverse demand curve 
on the oligopolistic electricity market. According to Table 4.2 (a-f), the intercept has 
been assigned values between          to           and also for each 
intercept value, the slope varies between              or       and         
    or      . Table 4.2 (a-f) illustrates the impact of steepness of the inverse 
demand curve slope on the output of each GenCo and consequently on the market 
power. It can be realized that, when the slope increases the output of each generation 
company will decrease; therefore, the total output offered by all GenCos into the 
wholesale market will reduce.  This will indicate that all GenCos in the electricity 
market are practicing market power and the oligopoly environment is affecting the 
electricity trading. In fact, in a real market environment a steep inverse demand 
curve is expected according to the low demand elasticity.  
 
Table 4.2 (a): Impacts of Inverse Demand Curve intercept and Slope on GenCos in Oligopolistic Market (   =1500) 
 
Figure 4.5 represents the impact of inverse demand curve slope on the output of 
GenCo 1 for intercept               . It is important to note that, further 
results for other GenCos have been attached in Appendix B. 
 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
GenCo1 Output: 
         
GenCo2 Output: 
         
GenCo3 Output: 
         
Total Output: 
       
Price:    
       
1500 0.1763 (10°) 2512 2398.5 2285.1 7195.5 231.4 
1500 0.3639 (20°) 1217 1162 1107.1 3486 231.4 
1500 0.5773 (30°) 767.1179 732.4738 697.8298 2197.4 231.4 
1500 0.839 (40°) 527.8393 504.0014 480.1635 1512 231.4 
1500 1.1917 (50°) 371.618 354.8352 338.0525 1064.5 231.4 
1500 1.732 (60°) 255.6912 244.1438 232.5965 732.4315 231.4 
1500 2.7474 (70°) 161.1914 153.9118 146.6321 461.7353 231.4286 
1500 5.6712 (80°) 78.0888 74.5622 71.0356 223.6866 231.4286 
1500 11.43 (85°) 38.7452 36.9954 35.2456 110.9861 231.4286 
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Figure 4.5: Impact of Inverse Demand Curve Slope on GenCo1 Output (   =1500) 
 
Furthermore, the impact of inverse demand curve slope on the output of GenCo 1 for 
other intercepts has been represented.  
 
Table 4.2 (b): Impacts of Inverse Demand Curve intercept and Slope on GenCos in Oligopolistic Market (   =1000) 
 
Comparing to the Table 4.2 (a) the selling price has been reduced since the intercept 
of inverse demand curve has been decreased. 
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Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
GenCo1 Output: 
         
GenCo2 Output: 
         
GenCo3 Output: 
         
Total Output: 
       
Price:    
       
1000 0.1763 (10°) 1701.6 1588.2 1474.8 4764.6 160 
1000 0.3639 (20°) 824.4023 769.4422 714.482 2038.3 160 
1000 0.5773 (30°) 519.6605 485.0165 450.3724 1455 160 
1000 0.839 (40°) 357.5685 333.7306 309.8927 1001.2 160 
1000 1.1917 (50°) 251.7412 234.9585 218.1757 704.8754 160 
1000 1.732 (60°) 173.2102 161.6628 150.1155 484.9885 160 
1000 2.7474 (70°) 109.1941 101.9145 94.6349 305.7436 160 
1000 5.6712 (80°) 52.8989 49.3723 45.8457 148.1168 160 
1000 11.43 (85°) 26.2467 24.4969 22.7472 73.4908 160 
  
110 
 
Figure 4.6: Impact of Inverse Demand Curve Slope on GenCo1 Output (   =1000) 
 
It can be realized that once the intercept decreases, the impact of slope on the output 
of the GenCo 1 will be more moderate. 
For               the results will be: 
 
Table 4.2 (c): Impacts of Inverse Demand Curve intercept and Slope on GenCos in Oligopolistic Market (   =800) 
 
Since the intercept of inverse demand curve represents the willingness of GenCos to 
sell electricity to the supply companies, it is expected that by reducing the intercept 
the selling price will decrease. 
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Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
GenCo1 Output: 
         
GenCo2 Output: 
         
GenCo3 Output: 
         
Total Output: 
       
Price:    
       
800 0.1763 (10°) 1377.5 1264.1 1150.6 3792.2 131.4 
800 0.3639 (20°) 667.3733 612.4131 557.453 1837.2 131.4 
800 0.5773 (30°) 420.6775 386.0335 351.3895 1158.1 131.4 
800 0.839 (40°) 289.4602 265.6223 241.7844 796.867 131.4286 
800 1.1917 (50°) 203.7905 187.0078 170.225 561.0233 131.4286 
800 1.732 (60°) 140.2177 128.6704 117.1231 386.0112 131.4286 
800 2.7474 (70°) 88.3953 81.1157 73.836 243.347 131.4286 
800 5.6712 (80°) 42.8229 39.2963 35.7697 117.8889 131.4286 
800 11.43 (85°) 21.2473 19.4976 17.7478 58.4927 131.4286 
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Figure 4.7:  Impact of Inverse Demand Curve Slope on GenCo1 Output (   =800) 
 
Furthermore, for               the table can be updated as: 
 
Table 4.2 (d): Impacts of Inverse Demand Curve intercept and Slope on GenCos in Oligopolistic Market (   =600) 
 
Similar to the previous table, since the willingness of selling electricity has been 
reduced the selling price has been dropped. Figure 4.8 illustrates the impact of 
inverse demand curve slope on the GenCo1 output: 
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Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
GenCo1 Output: 
         
GenCo2 Output: 
         
GenCo3 Output: 
         
Total Output: 
       
Price:    
       
600 0.1763 (10°) 1053.4 940 826.5 2819.9 102.9 
600 0.3639 (20°) 510.3443 455.3841 400.424 1366.2 102.9 
600 0.5773 (30°) 321.6946 287.0506 252.4065 861.1517 102.8571 
600 0.839 (40°) 221.3519 197.514 173.6761 592.5421 102.8571 
600 1.1917 (50°) 155.8398 139.057 122.2743 417.1711 102.8571 
600 1.732 (60°) 107.2253 95.678 84.1306 287.034 102.8571 
600 2.7474 (70°) 67.5964 60.3168 53.0372 180.9503 102.8571 
600 5.6712 (80°) 32.7469 29.2203 25.6937 87.661 102.8571 
600 11.43 (85°) 16.248 14.4982 12.7484 43.4946 102.8571 
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Figure 4.8:  Impact of Inverse Demand Curve Slope on GenCo1 Output (   =600) 
 
 
For              , the Table 4.2 (e) has been provided. According to this table 
and Figure 4.9 there is a huge drop in the output of each GenCo and the selling price, 
since the intercept has been reduced and generation companies do not have any 
willingness to participate in the market. Furthermore, these reductions can be 
identified in Table 4.2 (f) and Figure 4.9 for              . 
 
 
Table 4.2 (e): Impacts of Inverse Demand Curve intercept and Slope on GenCos in Oligopolistic Market (   =400) 
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Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
GenCo1 Output: 
         
GenCo2 Output: 
         
GenCo3 Output: 
         
Total Output: 
       
Price:    
       
400 0.1763 (10°) 729.2764 615.8334 502.3904 1847.5 74.3 
400 0.3639 (20°) 353.3153 298.3551 243.395 895.0654 74.2857 
400 0.5773 (30°) 222.7116 188.0676 153.4236 564.2028 74.2857 
400 0.839 (40°) 153.2437 129.4058 105.5679 388.2173 74.2857 
400 1.1917 (50°) 107.8891 91.1063 74.3236 273.319 74.2857 
400 1.732 (60°) 74.2329 62.6856 51.1382 188.0567 74.2857 
400 2.7474 (70°) 46.7975 39.5179 32.2383 118.5536 74.2857 
400 5.6712 (80°) 22.6709 19.1443 15.6178 57.433 74.2857 
400 11.43 (85°) 11.2486 9.4988 7.749 28.4964 74.2857 
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Figure 4.9:  Impact of Inverse Demand Curve Slope on GenCo1 Output (   =400) 
 
Table 4.2 (f): Impacts of Inverse Demand Curve intercept and Slope on GenCos in Oligopolistic Market (   =200) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.10:  Impact of Inverse Demand Curve Slope on GenCo1 Output (   =200) 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
GenCo1 Output: 
         
GenCo2 Output: 
         
GenCo3 Output: 
         
Total Output: 
       
Price:    
       
200 0.1763 (10°) 405.1536 291.7106 178.2676 875.1317 45.7143 
200 0.3639 (20°) 196.2863 141.3261 86.366 423.9783 45.7143 
200 0.5773 (30°) 123.7287 89.0847 54.4406 267.254 45.7143 
200 0.839 (40°) 85.1354 61.2975 37.4596 183.8924 45.7143 
200 1.1917 (50°) 59.9384 43.1556 26.3729 129.4669 45.7143 
200 1.732 (60°) 41.2405 29.6932 18.1458 89.0795 45.7143 
200 2.7474 (70°) 25.9986 18.719 11.4394 56.157 45.7143 
200 5.6712 (80°) 12.595 9.0684 5.5418 27.2051 45.7143 
200 11.43 (85°) 6.2492 4.4994 2.7497 13.4983 45.7143 
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Consequently, the impact of slope on the total output of all GenCos, assuming 
                has been illustrated in Figure 4.11. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.11:  Impact of Inverse Demand Curve Slope on Total Output (   =1500) 
 
 
Additionally, according to Table 4.2 the intercept,   , influences both the selling 
price and the output of each GenCo. The impact of intercept on the output of GenCo 
1 has been illustrated in Figure 4.12 for slope                
        . Based 
on this figure and Equation 4.28, while the intercept decreases the output of each 
GenCo is expected to decrease. 
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Figure 4.12:  Impact of Inverse Demand Curve Intercept on GenCo1 Output (  =70 ) 
 
 
Furthermore, based on Equation 4.20, the impact of intercept on the selling price has 
been represented in Figure 4.13. As discussed earlier, once the intercept of inverse 
demand curve decreases the selling price by generation companies will drop as well 
as the willingness of generation companies decreases. 
 
 
 
Figure 4.13:  Impact of Inverse Demand Curve Intercept on Selling Price (  =70 )
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4.7 Market Power in UK 
 
As stated in Chapter 3, in BETTA more than 97% of energy trading is based on 
bilateral contracts; furthermore, there are not many market participants in the 
electricity market. In such an environment exercising market power is conceivable. 
On the generation side, Office of gas and electricity markets (Ofgem) as the UK 
electricity market regulator has concerns about market power in the UK wholesale 
electricity sector [91]. The generation side of the market is suffering from oligopoly 
conditions. The ‘Big Six’ electricity supply companies (more details will be provided 
in Chapter 5) are also the six largest owners of UK generation companies with 
71.3% of total generation [92]. Moreover, within these years the number of British 
companies has fallen from six in 2006 to three by 2011 and their share was only 
about 25.9% of installed capacity by 2011 [92].  
As mentioned above, the number of dominant generation companies is similar to the 
number of supply companies, thus in such a dominant, oligopoly environment the 
other market participants will have limited access to the electricity wholesale market, 
which causes less liquidity and an imperfect bilateral electricity market. 
Figure 4.14 illustrates the share of six large generation companies: RWE npower, 
EDF, E.ON, Southern ElectriC (SSE), Iberdrola (ScotishPower), Centrica, in UK 
bilateral electricity market in 2011. 
Figure 4.14: The Share of Six Large GenCos in the UK [92] 
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The share of market participation by the Big Six UK generation companies in 
oligopolistic market has remained almost constant between 2006-2011 [92], which 
expresses that these dominant companies are making profit and UK electricity 
market as a bilateral market is suffering from imperfect bilateral trading over recent 
years. Hence, modeling the oligopolistic electricity market is essential. 
Figure 4.15 demonstrates and compares the share of dominant GenCos in UK 
bilateral electricity market in 2006 and 2011 and illustrates that this oligopoly 
environment has existed and even increased.  
(a) 
 
(b) 
 
Figure 4.15: Share of Dominant GenCos in UK: (a) 2006; (b) 2011 [92] 
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4.8 Summary 
 
This chapter has been divided into several sections. Firstly, it has been discussed that 
because of several reasons, such as market structure complexity and lack of 
incentivized schemes, market participants can exercise market power in bilateral 
electricity market. Since bilateral electricity market is a double-sided market, in this 
chapter the role of generation companies has been investigated. Therefore, 
oligopolistic electricity market has been considered and reasons behind the idea of 
modeling such an electricity environment discussed. 
Several techniques reviewed and highlighted in this chapter in order to measure the 
market power; however, Equilibrium model, and particularly Conjectural Variation 
Equilibrium (CVE) method has been selected as a promising approach to model such 
imperfect environments. 
At the final stage of this chapter, the oligopolistic electricity market has been 
formulated and behaviors of generation companies investigated. To clarify those 
formulations and modeling a case study provided, which demonstrates clearly the 
impacts of inverse demand curve parameters on generation companies behaviors. 
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Chapter 5: 
Oligopsonistic 
Electricity Market 
Modeling 
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5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 discussed how to model oligopolistic electricity market using conjectural 
variation equilibrium method in order to assist generation companies maximize their 
profits while they consider their rivals’ reactions in the market. Conforming to 
Equation 4.28, the output of each generation company can be calculated according to 
the inverse demand function properties (slope and intercept) and the estimation of 
other market competitors’ behaviors. 
The majority of previous research simply considers the generation side of the 
bilateral electricity market and models an oligopolistic electricity market. However, 
according to Chapter 3, in bilateral electricity markets such as BETTA, the other side 
of the market is likewise playing a significant role in energy trading. In this chapter 
the supply side of imperfect bilateral electricity market will be modeled and 
formulated. In addition, it will be demonstrated how supply companies in 
oligopsonistic electricity markets can maximize their profits while they consider 
other SupplyCos’ behaviors in the market.  
 
5.2 Oligopsonistic Electricity Market Modeling Using CVE 
 
As mentioned in the previous chapter, bilateral electricity market has been divided 
into two sub markets: oligopolistic and oligopsonistic electricity markets. In order to 
discuss one of the primary novelties of the current study, this section clarifies how to 
model supply companies in imperfect bilateral electricity markets in a way to find 
the role of SupplyCos in electricity trading in imperfect bilateral electricity markets. 
An oligopsonistic market is an environment in which the number of buyers, who are 
supply companies, is small. In this market generation companies, who act as sellers, 
are trading electricity to the small number of large and powerful supply companies. 
Consequently, the oligopsonistic market represents an imperfect market. 
In an oligopsonistic market the SupplyCos can dominate the bilateral market. They 
can put one GenCo against another GenCo so they can lower their costs. They can 
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also push the market towards their preferable quantity and price and transfer some 
sources of risks like demand variation, overproduction, to the generation side. 
Comparing to Figure 4.1 presented in Chapter 4, the main focus of this chapter has 
been laid on oligopsonistic electricity market as shown in Figure 5.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
 
Figure 5.1: Oligopsonistic Electricity Market Boundary 
 
5.2.1 Supply Companies’ Behaviors in a Bilateral 
Electricity Market 
 
Like GenCos the main objective of each SupplyCo in electricity market is to 
maximize its profit in bilateral trading, in order to reduce the exposure to the price 
volatility risks. Unlike centralized electricity market structures, SupplyCos play 
active roles in the electricity market. 
SupplyCos act as buyers in the wholesale market and they express their demand for 
electricity by entering into bilateral trading in order to provide electricity for their 
customers (end-users). There are some factors that define the behavior of SupplyCos 
in the electricity market, which affect the level of demand for electricity. Among 
those factors, price of generated electricity offered by GenCos, required quantity and 
GenCos’ behaviors and strategies play major roles.  
Oligopsonistic  
Electricity 
Market  
The scope of 
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Long term 
Decisions  
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There are several factors determining the behavior of GenCos in a bilateral 
electricity market. Assuming that other non-price factors are correctly defined, the 
generation behavior is strongly dependent on the purchased value by SupplyCos. 
Generation companies will increase their output with increase in the price to make 
more profit.  
The volume of generated electricity in the market will go higher when the market 
price is high enough relative to the production cost. This is because the GenCos will 
find it profitable to increase their production when the market price is high. This 
definitely affects the quantity of electricity that is available to be sold to the 
SupplyCos in the market. 
In order to determine the importance of the inverse generation curve in bilateral 
electricity market modeling, Figure 5.2 refers to inverse generation function, where 
generation companies have been categorized in three groups, including marginal 
producers, infra-marginal producers, and extra-marginal producers [1]. The marginal 
producers are the producers whose production costs equal to market price. Marginal 
producers will find that their productions are not profitable if the market price 
decreases. For infra- producers the cost of generating electricity is below the market 
price these companies set their price more than their costs to make profit. As for 
extra-producers, they will only find that their participation is profitable when the 
market price increases. Consequently, different generation companies with various 
cost functions are competing against each other in the bilateral market, which affect 
SupplyCos decisions and strategies in participating in the future trading.  
 
    Price 
 
 
 
                         Quantity 
 
Figure 5.2: Inverse Generation Curve [1] 
Infra-marginal production 
Extra-marginal 
production 
Market price 
Marginal producer 
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    5.2.2 CVE Applications and Formulations in an 
Oligopsonistic Electricity Market 
 
Bilateral market is a double-sided market, where both GenCos and SupplyCos have 
permission and willingness to participate in the market; therefore unlike a Pool 
structure, SupplyCos can have an active role in the market and try to maximize their 
profits alongside the GenCos. One of the primary novelties of this research is the 
modelling oligopsonistic competition in a bilateral market where a small number of 
SupplyCos dominate the whole market and try to maximize their profits.  
Hence, for    SupplyCos in the market the main objective is to maximize its profit: 
 
                                                                                                     
 
Where: 
   : Number of SupplyCos 
     : SupplyCo   profit 
   : Retail market price 
    
   : Amount of electricity sold to the end-users by SupplyCo   
     : Purchased value by SupplyCo   
      : Fixed cost of SupplyCo   
It is noticeable that the sub-index     in this research refers to the supply side of 
bilateral electricity market. 
Furthermore,      is an initial inverse generation function and represents the price 
that each supply company buys electricity from generation companies.  
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Comparable to oligopoly structure, an initial inverse generation function,   , has 
been introduced since in a bilateral electricity market SupplyCos participate in 
forward contracts and it is not applicable to use one inverse generation function for 
each contract as the amount and price of traded electricity is not disclosed.  
On the other hand using a residual generation function (RGC) can be an option that 
all rivals’ demand functions estimations are required; however, it can be a big 
challenge for all supply companies since accessing to the demand function for each 
supply company is not possible and also requires having an access to suitable 
historical database as well. 
Nevertheless, this initial inverse generation curve can be updated iteratively in terms 
of intercept and slope to get a more accurate and realistic shape to find out the share 
of each supply company in the bilateral electricity market using the proposed 
algorithm in Chapter 6. In this case, the slope of inverse generation curve has been 
assumed 45 degree initially, and through the hierarchical optimization algorithm the 
slope will be changed iteratively. As for the oligopolistic market, the reason of 
defining the slope as 45 degree is to have a feasible flat start and this initial value 
does not have any effect on the final results [90]. 
To carry out the modeling oligopsonistic electricity market, the following 
simplifying assumptions have been made: 
 
Assumption 1:  
The amount of electricity purchased by a SupplyCo from GenCos can be assumed to 
be equal to the amount of electricity, which has been sold to the end-users by that 
SupplyCo [90]: 
 
  
  
                                                                                                                           
 
Therefore, no energy holding is permitted in this model, which prevents participants 
from abusing the market. 
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Assumption 2:  
Since the aim of this chapter is to model SupplyCos’ behaviors in wholesale 
electricity market and also the retail price is based on the contractual price between 
each SupplyCo and end-users, the electricity retail price,  , is assumed to be a fixed 
value. However in Chapter 6, different retail prices will be considered for different 
SupplyCos. 
 
Assumption 3:  
The supply companies’ fixed costs,    , have been assumed not to be a function of 
quantity in order to simplify the calculations. 
The fixed cost, includes  
 Cost of physical assets, such as computers, software, communication assets, 
etc. 
 Cost of renting the location 
 Cost of human resources, such as salaries, etc. 
 Other overhead costs. 
Therefore, considering the above costs, they are not in direct relation with quantity 
of purchased or sold electricity. 
Hence, according to Equation 5.2 and the above assumptions, Equation 5.1 can be 
transformed into: 
                                          
                       
                                                                                                               
 
 
Like    in oligopolistic market, the inverse generation function has been introduced 
as a linear function since the algorithm proposed in Chapter 6 finds the equilibrium 
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point of the whole market looking at the cross-over point between oligopolistic and 
oligopsonistic markets. Thus, to simplify the calculations: 
 
                                                                                                                        
 
Where: 
    : Intercept of inverse generation curve 
    : Slope of inverse generation curve 
Also like oligopoly condition,     is the total supply and should be equal to total 
demand,    . 
Figure 5.3 illustrates the initial inverse generation function. This curve represents the 
changes in the price respect o any changes in the amount of electricity. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5.3: Initial Inverse Generation Curve 
 
According to the figure above and unlike the inverse demand function in 
oligopolistic markets, the derivative of the inverse generation curve is to be positive. 
By substituting Equation 5.4 in 5.3, the profit for SupplyCos playing rationally in the 
oligopsonistic market will be: 
 
                                                                                                 
MW 
Slope:    
    
£ / MW 
  
127 
Since after running the market simulation, one of the main constraints is that the total 
generation should match the total demand, hence: 
                                                                                                                
 
   
 
 
In order to maximize the SupplyCo   profit 
    
    
                                                                                                         
 
Therefore, the optimized solution will be: 
 
    
    
   
       
    
  
        
    
 
            
 
    
    
                                       
 
To simplify the above equation: 
 
    
    
           
 
           
 
   
   
      
    
    
 
   
   
 
 
                           
 
After taking the derivative and based on Equation 5.9, the Conjectural Variation 
(CV) for supply companies in oligopsonistic market can be identified as follow: 
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Where: 
     : Purchased value by other supply companies except SupplyCo   
Like       in the oligopolistic market model, the       is the expectation of 
SupplyCo   about the reactions of its rival, SupplyCo , as a result of any changes in 
its strategies. In this concept, unlike other previous research, the SupplyCos have 
been considered to play an active role in the bilateral electricity market and the 
impacts of their decisions will be taken into consideration in order to find the 
equilibrium point of the market. 
This novel conjectural variation parameter introduced in oligopsonistic electricity 
market reflects how much electricity other rivals will buy in case of any changes in 
purchased value by SupplyCo   from wholesale market. 
Thus, by substituting Equation 5.10 into 5.9: 
 
    
    
           
 
           
 
   
   
           
 
   
   
 
 
                         
 
Hence, the above equation can be transformed into: 
 
    
           
 
   
   
            
 
   
   
                                                                                      
 
It will be challenging for each SupplyCo to estimate the purchased value by other 
rivals and also have knowledge about the      s. In order to simply Equation 5.12, 
the aggregation of other rivals’ purchased value from wholesale electricity market 
can be represented as follows: 
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Also, variable      can be introduced as: 
 
           
 
   
   
                                                                                                         
By substituting Equations 5.13 and 5.14 in Equation 5.12, the purchased value of 
each SupplyCo considering the reactions of other rivals can be calculated as: 
 
    
           
          
                                                                                               
 
Based on the above equation, it can be considered that the purchased value by a 
SupplyCo in the bilateral electricity market depends on the retail price, GenCos’ 
behaviors and the reactions of other market competitors. 
In this case, the preferred purchased value by each SupplyCo, considering their 
rivals’ behaviors, has been identified. On the other hand, the preferred selling 
quantity by each GenCo in wholesale market has been represented previously. 
Chapter 6 will focus on how to identify the equilibrium point of bilateral electricity 
market through applying the proposed novel hierarchical optimization algorithm. 
However, it is essential to consider the specifications of CVs in both oligopolistic 
and oligopsonistic electricity market. 
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       5.3 Conjectural Variations Specifications in Oligopolistic 
and Oligopsonistic Electricity Markets 
 
Based on Conjectural Variation Equilibrium (CVE) concept the behavior of a GenCo 
or a SupplyCo in oligopolistic and oligopsonistic electricity markets, respectively, is 
based on its rivals’ strategies and reactions, which are conjectured functions of its 
own strategy.   
CVE method is practical for: 
 Behavioral models 
 Incomplete information models 
 Implicit cooperation 
Conjectural variations were considered as exogenous parameters [81, 89]. However, 
this property is in contrast to the CVE concept. In fact, according to the Equations 
4.28 and 5.15 the output of each GenCo and purchased value by each SupplyCo are 
both functions of CVs, which demonstrates that the behaviors of market participants 
can be observed in the CVE method. By considering CVs as exogenous parameters 
the values of conjectures can be estimated from the historical data; thus, the results 
are valid and reflect the market participants’ behaviors for short or medium term. 
However, for long term planning, like bilateral electricity markets, this may cause 
the inaccurate simulation results, since the CVs are not very sensitive to any changes 
in the market participants’ behaviors in long term. Therefore, the CVs can be 
considered as endogenous parameters in the equilibrium method.  
The basic idea behind the CVE method for both oligopolistic and oligopsonistic 
bilateral electricity markets is to the answer to this question that if one firm changes 
its output or purchased value, what other rivals will do in response to that change. 
Therefore, through this method it will be examined if one firm changes its output or 
purchased electricity value, how much it should expect others to increase or decrease 
their quantities, in other words, whether they act aggressively or passively. 
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     5.3.1 GenCos’ Conjectural Variations Boundaries 
 
As described in Chapter 4,      is an index that guides GenCos to find out the 
reaction of their rivals in the bilateral market; however one of the significant steps in 
this method is to find out the boundaries and values of the      for each GenCo.  
Compare to     s for SupplyCos, the     s for GenCos are functions of several 
factors, such as [90]: 
 Practical specifications of each generator considering the type of generator 
i.e. nuclear power plant, wind turbines, coal-fired power plants, etc.  
 Technical characteristic like ramp rate, start up and shut down time and also 
whether they deliver base load or they only follow the peak load. 
 Demand elasticity [93].  
Different strategies can result in different values of     . The influence of      on 
market equilibrium point, the output of each GenCo and purchased value by each 
SupplyCo can be formulated. To clarify the      range [86], according to Equation 
4.26, the Equation 4.28 can be transformed to: 
 
 
     
                         
     
  
          
                            
     
          
          
                       
     
 
                 
     
   
          
       
     
                                                                                                
 
According to Equation 5.16, the conjecture value for GenCo  , which is an 
aggregation of all      s, is only dependent on the cost function of that GenCo; 
therefore there is no need to have knowledge about other rivals’ cost functions.  
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As described in Chapter 4 and according to Equation 4.2, in perfect competition 
electricity market the wholesale price and marginal costs are equal; therefore, the 
value of      for the perfect competition will be: 
 
     
       
     
                                                                                        
 
In order to modify the range for     , it can be assumed that in electricity market 
normally the wholesale price should be equal or higher than the marginal cost in 
order to allow GenCos to make profit: 
 
                                                                                                                           
 
Hence, the value of      is equal or bigger than     .  Furthermore, in order to set 
an upper limit for the      the value for the monopoly, which is    
  can be 
considered [73, 94]. Therefore: 
                                                                                                                   
As long as the      value is close to its lower limit, the competition is close to the 
perfect environment, since as one GenCo or SupplyCo decreases the quantity, the 
others will act aggressively and step in the market and fill in the gap caused by that 
reduction in the quantity; thus, the CVs values will be negative.  
On the other side, once the      gets positive values the market’s trend will be 
towards monopoly competition since the difference between wholesale price and 
GenCo’s marginal cost is higher. In this condition, if other rivals increase their 
quantity when GenCo   increases its output the marginal revenue will be further 
lower than price. Hence, it can reflect an accommodating reaction and causing 
collusion in the electricity market. As described in Chapter 4, if market participants 
collude, they can cause cooperative game theory, which is against the Conjectural 
Variation Equilibrium concept and causes imperfect bilateral electricity market. 
 In this research, in order to avoid this condition the boundaries of      can be 
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modified as: 
                                                                                                                     
 
     5.3.2 SupplyCos’ Conjectural Variations Boundaries 
 
According to Section 5.2,      has been introduced in this research in order to 
demonstrate the reactions of all SupplyCos in the oligopsonistic electricity market. 
Like      in oligopolistic market, the boundaries and specifications of      should 
be analyzed. 
Compare to GenCos in oligopolistic electricity market, SupplyCos are companies 
that trade electricity in wholesale market and sell it to the end-users. Consequently, it 
can be considered that their conjectures about their rivals’ actions compare to 
GenCos’ conjectures will have less complexity and volatility. 
Concerning the impact of      on the SupplyCos’ decisions and market equilibrium, 
the SupplyCos’ conjectures in oligopsonistic market can be formulated based on 
Equation 5.15: 
     
                   
     
  
          
                      
     
  
          
                      
     
  
          
              
     
  
          
     
     
                                                                                                         
 
According to the above equation, the CVs value for SupplyCos in oligopsonistic 
electricity market is a function of retail price and also their own purchased quantity 
from the wholesale market; thus, there is no need to have an access to confidential 
information like the purchased value by other SupplyCos. 
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Similar to the prior section, it is expected that the      will be equal to      in 
perfect electricity market. Therefore, the lower extreme of     s has been defined. 
Furthermore, by assuming the fact that, the retail price is normally higher than the 
wholesale market price, SupplyCos will make profit by participating in both 
wholesale and retail markets: 
                                                                                                                                
Hence: 
 
                                                                                                                            
 
Comparable to oligopolistic market, the upper extreme for the      can be defined as 
    . Therefore: 
 
                                                                                                                   
 
However, in this research the positive boundary of     s has been ignored in order 
to avoid collusion and cooperative game in the oligopsonistic electricity market, 
thus: 
 
                                                                                                                     
 
 
5.4 Oligopsonistic Electricity Market Case Study 
 
In this section, similar to Chapter 4, a case study has been examined, seeking to 
explain the application of the Conjectural Variation Equilibrium method in modeling 
specifically SupplyCos’ behaviors and reactions in the oligopsonistic electricity 
market.  
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In the below case study, three SupplyCos with the following characteristics have 
been defined: 
Table 5.1: Oligopsonistic Electricity Market Case Study 
        (£/MW) 
SupplyCo 1 -0.6 250 
SupplyCo 2 -0.5 250 
SupplyCo 3 -0.4 250 
 
According to prior investigation on Assumption 2, the retail price has been 
considered to be equal for all SupplyCos in the oligopsonistic electricity market in 
the current research. However, the impact of retail price on SupplyCos’ behaviors in 
the oligopsonistic electricity market will be represented later in this chapter. 
Furthermore, in order to distinguish between the SupplyCos, the      for each firm 
is different.  
With reference to the M-File for oligopsonistic electricity market provided in 
Appendix C, the values of slope,   , and intercept,   , of inverse generation curve 
has been assumed different in all steps for the case study presented, in order to 
illustrate the variations in purchased value by each supply company,    , total 
purchased value by all SupplyCos and the buying price,   . Table 5.2, presents the 
impacts of slope and intercept of the inverse generation curve on the oligopsonistic 
electricity market. 
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     5.4.1 Impact of Inverse Generation Curve Slope and 
Intercept on Oligopsonistic Electricity Market 
 
According to Table 5.2 (a-f), which is comparable to Table 4.2 (a-f) in the previous 
chapter, the intercept has been assigned values between        to          and 
likewise for each intercept value, the slope varies between              or       
and             or      . With reference to [3], the intercept for the inverse 
generation curve is expected to be less than the inverse demand curve’s intercept. 
Similar to the previous chapter, Table 5.2 (a-f) illustrates the impact of steepness of 
the inverse generation curve slope on the purchased value by each SupplyCo and 
consequently on market power. It has been observed when the slope increases the 
purchased value by each supply company will decrease, the total purchased 
electricity by all SupplyCos in the wholesale market will reduce.  This will indicate 
that market power is being practiced by all SupplyCos in the electricity market and 
introduces an oligopsony environment into the electricity trading. However, 
comparing to the oligopoly environment, the slope of the inverse generation curve is 
not very steep, since in the real electricity market environment the demand side is 
less elastic than the generation side.  
 
Table 5.2 (a) Impacts of Inverse Generation Curve Intercept and Slopes on SupplyCos in Oligopsonistic Market (   =5) 
 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
SupplyCo 1 
Purchased value: 
         
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
Total Purchased 
Value:        
Price:    
       
5 0.1763 (10°) 484.7709 387.8167 323.1806 1195.8 215.8 
5 0.3639 (20°) 234.8588 187.887 156.5725 579.3184 215.814 
5 0.5773 (30°) 148.0428 118.4343 98.6952 365.1723 215.814 
5 0.839 (40°) 101.8655 81.4924 67.9103 251.2681 215.814 
5 1.1917 (50°) 71.717 57.3736 47.8113 176.9019 215.814 
5 1.732 (60°) 49.3448 39.4758 32.8965 121.7171 215.814 
5 2.7474 (70°) 31.1076 24.8861 20.7384 76.7322 215.814 
5 5.6712 (80°) 15.07 12.056 10.0467 37.1727 215.814 
5 11.43 (85°) 7.4773 5.9818 4.9848 18.4439 215.814 
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Figure 5.4 represents the impact of inverse generation curve slope on the purchased 
value by SupplyCo 1 for intercept            . Further results on other 
SupplyCos can be found in Appendix D. 
 
Figure 5.4:  Impact of Inverse Generation Curve Slope on SupplyCo1 Purchased Value (   =5) 
 
According to the Figure 5.4, the purchased value by each SupplyCo will decrease as 
the inverse generation curve becomes inelastic and gets close to the vertical line. 
Furthermore, the impact of the inverse generation curve slope on the SupplyCo 1 for 
other intercepts has been investigated and illustrated.  
 
Table 5.2 (b) Impacts of Inverse Generation Curve Intercept and Slopes on SupplyCos in Oligopsonistic Market (   =10) 
 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
SupplyCo 1 
Purchased value: 
         
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
Total Purchased 
Value:        
Price:    
       
10 0.1763 (10°) 474.8777 379.9021 316.5851 1171.4 216.5 
10 0.3639 (20°) 230.0658 184.0526 153.3772 567.4955 216.5116 
10 0.5773 (30°) 145.0215 116.0172 96.681 357.7198 216.5116 
10 0.839 (40°) 99.7866 79.8293 66.5244 246.1402 216.5116 
10 1.1917 (50°) 70.2534 56.2027 46.8356 173.2916 216.5116 
10 1.732 (60°) 48.3377 38.6702 32.2251 119.233 216.5116 
10 2.7474 (70°) 30.4728 24.3782 20.3152 75.1662 216.5116 
10 5.6712 (80°) 14.7625 11.81 9.8416 36.4141 216.5116 
10 11.43 (85°) 7.3247 5.8597 4.8831 18.0675 216.5116 
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Figure 5.5:  Impact of Inverse Generation Curve Slope on SupplyCo1 Purchased Value (   =10) 
 
According to the Table 5.2 (b), once the intercept of inverse generation curve 
increases the maximum willingness of SupplyCo1 for purchasing electricity 
increases and the buying price will rise as well.  
For             , Table 5.2 (c) has been provided.  
 
Table 5.2 (c) Impacts of Inverse Generation Curve Intercept and Slopes on SupplyCos in Oligopsonistic Market (   =50) 
 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
SupplyCo 1 
Purchased value: 
         
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
Total Purchased 
Value:        
Price:    
       
50 0.1763 (10°) 395.7314 316.5851 263.8209 976.1374 222.093 
50 0.3639 (20°) 191.7215 153.3772 127.8143 472.913 222.093 
50 0.5773 (30°) 120.8513 96.681 80.5675 298.0998 222.093 
50 0.839 (40°) 83.1555 66.5244 55.437 205.1168 222.093 
50 1.1917 (50°) 58.5445 46.8356 39.0296 144.4097 222.093 
50 1.732 (60°) 40.2814 32.2251 26.8543 99.3609 222.093 
50 2.7474 (70°) 25.394 20.3152 16.9293 62.6385 222.093 
50 5.6712 (80°) 12.3021 9.8416 8.2014 30.3451 222.093 
50 11.43 (85°) 6.1039 4.8831 4.0693 15.0563 222.093 
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Figure 5.6: Impact of Inverse Generation Curve Slope on SupplyCo1 Purchased Value (   =50) 
 
According to the Table 5.2 (c), the purchased value by each supply company has 
been reduced since the inverse generation curve becomes inelastic. 
Also for             , the purchasing price has increased up to            
    comparing to previous intercept values. 
 
Table 5.2 (d) Impacts of Inverse Generation Curve Intercept and Slopes on SupplyCos in Oligopsonistic Market (   =80) 
 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
SupplyCo 1 
Purchased value: 
         
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
Total Purchased 
Value:        
Price:    
       
80 0.1763 (10°) 336.3717 269.0973 224.2478 829.7168 226.2791 
80 0.3639 (20°) 162.9632 130.3706 108.6422 401.976 226.2791 
80 0.5773 (30°) 102.7236 82.1789 68.4824 253.3848 226.2791 
80 0.839 (40°) 70.6822 56.5457 47.1214 174.3493 226.2791 
80 1.1917 (50°) 49.7628 39.8102 33.1752 122.7482 226.2791 
80 1.732 (60°) 34.2392 27.3914 22.8261 84.4567 226.2791 
80 2.7474 (70°) 21.5849 17.2679 14.3899 53.2427 226.2791 
80 5.6712 (80°) 10.4568 8.3654 6.9712 25.7933 226.2791 
80 11.43 (85°) 5.1883 4.1506 3.4589 12.7978 226.2791 
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Figure 5.7:  Impact of Inverse Generation Curve Slope on SupplyCo1 Purchased Value (   =80) 
 
Like previous reviewed intercepts, Tables 5.2 (e) and (f) demonstrates the impact of 
slope and intercept variations on the purchasing value and price by each SupplyCo. 
Since the intercept of inverse generation curve increases in both tables, SupplyCos 
prefer to buy more electricity from the bilateral trading and this can cause an 
increase in the price of electricity; however it is important to mention that by 
increasing the value of slope for each intercept, the purchasing value for each supply 
company decreases. 
 
Table 5.2 (e) Impacts of Inverse Generation Curve Intercept and Slopes on SupplyCos in Oligopsonistic Market (   =100) 
 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
SupplyCo 1 
Purchased 
value:     
     
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
Total Purchased 
Value:        
Price:    
       
100 0.1763 (10°) 296.7985 237.4388 197.8657 732.103 229.0698 
100 0.3639 (20°) 143.7911 115.0329 95.8607 354.6847 229.0698 
100 0.5773 (30°) 90.6385 72.5108 60.4256 223.5749 229.0698 
100 0.839 (40°) 62.3666 49.8933 41.5777 153.8376 229.0698 
100 1.1917 (50°) 43.9084 35.1267 29.2722 108.3073 229.0698 
100 1.732 (60°) 30.2111 24.1689 20.1407 74.5207 229.0698 
100 2.7474 (70°) 19.0455 15.2364 12.697 46.9789 229.0698 
100 5.6712 (80°) 9.2265 7.3812 6.151 22.7588 229.0698 
100 11.43 (85°) 4.5779 3.6623 3.0519 11.2922 229.0698 
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Figure 5.8:  Impact of Inverse Generation Curve Slope on SupplyCo1 Purchased Value (   =100) 
 
Based on these figures, it can be realized that when the intercepts’ values increase, 
the variation intervals in purchased electricity by the SupplyCo will decrease. 
 
 
Table 5.2 (f) Impacts of Inverse Generation Curve Intercept and Slopes on SupplyCos in Oligopsonistic Market (   =120) 
 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
SupplyCo 1 
Purchased 
value:     
     
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
Total Purchased 
Value:        
Price:    
       
120 0.1763 (10°) 257.2254 205.7803 171.4836 634.4893 231.8605 
120 0.3639 (20°) 124.619 99.6952 83.0793 307.3934 231.8605 
120 0.5773 (30°) 78.5533 62.8427 52.3689 193.7649 231.8605 
120 0.839 (40°) 54.0511 43.2408 36.034 133.3259 231.8605 
120 1.1917 (50°) 38.0539 30.4431 25.3693 93.8663 231.8605 
120 1.732 (60°) 26.1829 20.9463 17.4553 64.5846 231.8605 
120 2.7474 (70°) 16.5061 13.2049 11.0041 40.715 231.8605 
120 5.6712 (80°) 7.9963 6.3971 5.3309 19.7243 231.8605 
120 11.43 (85°) 3.9675 3.174 2.645 9.7866 231.8605 
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Figure 5.9:  Impact of Inverse Generation Curve Slope on SupplyCo1 Purchased Value (   =120) 
 
Consequently, the impact of slope on the total electricity purchased by all 
SupplyCos, assuming              has been presented in Figure 5.10. 
 
 
 Figure 5.10:  Impact of Inverse Generation Curve Slope on Total Purchased Electricity Value (   =5) 
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Additionally, according to Table 5.2 the intercept,   , influences both the buying 
price and the purchased value by each SupplyCo. The impact of intercept on 
SupplyCo 1 has been presented in Figure 5.11 for slope              
          . Based on this figure and Equation 5.15 and unlike GenCos, while the 
intercept increases the purchased value by each SupplyCo is expected to decrease. 
 
Figure 5.11:  Impact of Inverse Generation Curve Intercept on SupplyCo1 (Slope=30 ) 
 
Furthermore, based on Equation 5.4, the impact of intercept on the buying price has 
been investigated in Figure 5.12.  
 
Figure 5.12:  Impact of Inverse Generation Curve Intercept on Buying Price (Slope=30 )
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     5.4.2 Impact of Retail Price on Oligopsonistic Electricity 
Market  
Up to now, it has been assumed that the retail prices for all SupplyCos are equal in 
this chapter. However, in order to demonstrate the impact of retail price on the 
behaviors of SupplyCos in the oligopsonistic electricity market, further investigation 
has been performed by changing the retail price for a specific set of slope and 
intercept and monitoring and comparing the behaviors of each SupplyCo. 
Table 5.3:  Retail Price Impacts on Oligopolistic electricity Market 
Intercept 
      
    
Slope: 
   (£/
   ) 
Retail 
Price:   
       
SupplyCo 1 
Purchased value: 
         
SupplyCo 1 
Purchased value: 
         
SupplyCo 1 
Purchased value: 
         
Total 
Purchased 
Value: 
       
Price: 
   
   
    
50 
0.5773 
(30°) 
400 211.4897 169.1918 140.9932 521.6747 351.1628 
350 181.2769 145.0215 120.8513 447.1497 308.1395 
300 151.0641 120.8513 100.7094 372.6248 265.1163 
250 120.8513 96.681 80.5675 298.0998 222.093 
200 90.6385 72.5108 60.4256 223.5749 179.0698 
150 60.4256 48.3405 40.2838 149.0499 136.0465 
 
Based on Table 5.3, when the retail price increases the SupplyCos will have more 
incentive to buy electricity from generation side in order to make more profit; 
therefore, the purchased value by SupplyCos will increase; however, they will pay 
more for purchasing electricity for GenCos. Figure 5.13 illustrates the impact of 
retail price on SupplyCo 1 whereas Figure 5.14 represents how purchasing price in 
the oligopsonistic electricity market can be affected by the retail price variations. 
 
 Figure 5.13:  Impact of Retail Price on SupplyCo1  (Intercept=50, Slope=30 )
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Figure 5.14: Impact of Retail Price on Buying Price  (Intercept=50, Slope=30 ) 
 
It is noticeable that calculating the retail price is not within the scope of this 
research, since only the wholesale electricity market has been taken into 
consideration. However, this section illustrates the impact of retail price on the 
behaviors of both generation and supply companies in wholesale market. 
 
     5.5 Impact of      and      on Oligopolistic and 
Oligopsonistic Electricity Markets 
 
As described previously, the     ,      in the CVE method have significant impacts 
on the behaviors of each GenCo and SupplyCo in the oligopolistic and oligopsonistic 
electricity market models, respectively. In order to examine these impacts, the      
for each GenCo in the prior case study in Chapter 4 and      in the current chapter 
case study have been changed for a specific set of intercept and slope and the 
behaviors of each GenCo and SupplyCo have been monitored and investigated.  
 
5.5.1      and Oligopolistic Electricity Market 
 
Tables 5.4, 5.5 and 5.6 represent the impacts of     ,      and      variations on 
the oligopolistic electricity market, respectively. 
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Table 5.4: Impacts of      on GenCos’ Strategies 
 
 
 
 
Table 5.5: Impacts of      on GenCos’ Strategies 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
               
GenCo1 Output: 
         
GenCo2 Output: 
         
GenCo3 Output: 
         
Total Output: 
       
Price:    
       
1000 2.7474 (70°) 
-0.02 -0.5 -0.5 64.7762 119.6817 112.4021 296.86 184.4068 
-0.05 -0.5 -0.5 66.466 119.0058 111.7262 297.198 183.4783 
-0.08 -0.5 -0.5 68.2463 118.2937 111.014 297.5541 182.5 
-0.1 -0.5 -0.5 69.4872 117.7973 110.5177 297.8022 181.8182 
-0.3 -0.5 -0.5 84.9288 111.6207 104.3411 300.8905 173.3333 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.5 109.1941 101.9145 94.6349 305.7436 160 
-0.8 -0.5 -0.5 191.0898 69.1563 61.8767 322.1227 115 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
               
GenCo1 Output: 
         
GenCo2 Output: 
         
GenCo3 Output: 
         
Total Output: 
       
Price:    
       
1000 2.7474 (70°) 
-0.5 -0.02 -0.5 125.7769 60.4578 111.2176 297.4523 182.7797 
-0.5 -0.05 -0.5 125.146 62.0349 110.5868 297.7677 181.913 
-0.5 -0.08 -0.5 124.4813 63.6966 109.9221 298.1 181 
-0.5 -0.1 -0.5 124.0181 64.8547 109.4589 298.3316 180.3636 
-0.5 -0.3 -0.5 118.2532 79.2669 103.694 301.2141 172.4444 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.5 109.1941 101.9145 94.6349 305.7436 160 
-0.5 -0.8 -0.5 78.6198 178.3504 64.0606 321.0308 118 
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Table 5.6: Impacts of      on GenCos’ Strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
               
GenCo1 Output: 
         
GenCo2 Output: 
         
GenCo3 Output: 
         
Total Output: 
       
Price:    
       
1000 2.7474 (70°) 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.02 124.5924 117.3128 56.1394 298.0445 181.1525 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.05 124.0066 116.727 57.6039 298.3374 180.3478 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.08 123.3894 116.1098 59.1468 298.646 179.5 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.1 122.9592 115.6796 60.2222 298.8611 178.9091 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.3 117.6061 110.3265 73.6049 301.5376 171.5556 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.5 109.1941 101.9145 94.6349 305.7436 160 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.8 80.8037 73.5241 165.6111 319.9389 121 
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Based on Section 5.3.1 and Equation 5.20, in this research it is expected that when 
the      has lower values, the generation companies’ behaviors will shift toward 
perfect competition; therefore, the output of each GenCo will increase and they do 
not have any willingness to practice market power, consequently they provide as 
much electricity required to fulfill the market demand. On the other hand, since the 
    s have negative values; it will be a non-cooperative game and whenever one 
GenCo increases its output the other generation companies will react and decrease 
their output and whenever a GenCo decreases its output the others will participate 
more in the market to fill the gap and also make more profit. Figures 5.15, 5.16 and 
5.17 investigate the reactions of GenCos 1, 2 and 3 respectively, when the      
changes for                and                
        . Further 
investigations on GenCo2 and 3 have been attached in Appendix E. 
 
 
 
Figure 5.15:  Impact of      on GenCo1 Output   
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Figure 5.16: Impact of      on GenCo2 Output   
 
 
Figure 5.17:  Impact of      on GenCo3 Output   
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Furthermore, it has been investigated that whenever the      approaches lower 
values, the market trend will be shifted towards perfect competition; therefore the 
total generated output will increase which leads to a reduction in selling price. 
 
 
Figure 5.18:  Impact of      on Total Output   
 
 
 
Figure 5.19:  Impact of      on Selling Price   
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5.5.2      and Oligopsonistic Electricity Market 
 
Similar to the oligopolistic electricity market, Tables 5.7, 5.8 and 5.9 illustrate the 
impacts of     ,      and      variations on the oligopsonistic electricity market, 
respectively. 
As mentioned previously, in the oligopsonistic electricity market case study, 
different     s have been assigned to each SupplyCo. In this section, the impacts of 
     on the behavior of supply companies in the oligopsonistic electricity market 
have been examined. According to Section 5.3.2 and Equation 5.25, it is expected 
that once the      has lower values, the supply companies’ behaviors will be shifted 
towards more perfect competition; therefore, the purchased value by each SupplyCo 
will increase and imperfect bilateral trading will be ignored, consequently they buy 
as much electricity as required to fulfill their demand side (end-users). Since a non-
cooperative game environment has been considered in this research, the     s have 
negative values; which means whenever one SupplyCo decides to purchase more 
electricity the other supply companies will react and decrease their purchased value 
and whenever a SupplyCo changes its strategy and purchases less electricity the 
others will participate more in the market to compensate this behavior and fill in the 
gap; hence, they also make more profit and manage the participation risks. Figures 
5.20, 5.21 and 5.22 investigate the reactions of SupplyCos 1, 2 and 3 respectively, 
when the      changes for              and                
        . 
Further investigations on SupplyCo2 and 3 have been attached in Appendix E. 
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Table 5.7: Impacts of      on SupplyCos’ Strategies 
 
Table 5.8: Impacts of      on SupplyCos’ Strategies 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
               
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
Total Purchased 
Value:       
Price:    
       
50 0.5773 (30°) 
-0.02 -0.5 -0.4 62.1603 121.8343 101.5286 285.5232 214.8325 
-0.05 -0.5 -0.4 63.762 121.1478 100.9565 285.8664 215.0307 
-0.08 -0.5 -0.4 65.4484 120.4251 100.3543 286.2278 215.2393 
-0.1 -0.5 -0.4 66.6231 119.9217 99.9347 286.4795 215.3846 
-0.3 -0.5 -0.4 81.197 113.6757 94.7298 289.6025 217.1875 
-0.5 -0.5 -0.4 103.9321 103.9321 86.6101 294.4743 220 
-0.6 -0.5 -0.4 120.8513 96.681 80.5675 298.0998 222.093 
-0.8 -0.5 -0.4 179.1933 71.6773 59.7311 310.6017 229.3103 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
               
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
Total Purchased 
Value:       
Price:    
       
50 0.5773 (30°) 
-0.6 -0.02 -0.4 139.9855 57.1369 114.3215 290.4461 217.6745 
-0.6 -0.05 -0.4 139.2602 58.6359 92.8401 290.7362 217.842 
-0.6 -0.08 -0.4 138.4958 60.2156 92.3306 291.042 218.0185 
-0.6 -0.1 -0.4 137.963 61.3169 91.9753 291.2551 218.1416 
-0.6 -0.3 -0.4 131.3221 75.0412 87.5481 293.9115 219.6751 
-0.6 -0.5 -0.4 120.8513 96.681 80.5675 298.0998 222.093 
-0.6 -0.6 -0.4 112.9697 112.9697 75.3131 301.2525 223.913 
-0.6 -0.8 -0.4 85.1902 170.3805 56.7935 312.3642 230.3279 
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Table 5.9: Impacts of      on SupplyCos’ Strategies 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Intercept: 
          
Slope: 
   (£/  
 ) 
               
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
SupplyCo 1 Purchased 
value:          
Total Purchased 
Value:       
Price:    
       
50 0.5773 (30°) 
-0.6 -0.5 -0.02 132.8292 106.2634 54.216 293.3086 219.3271 
-0.6 -0.5 -0.05 132.176 105.7408 55.6531 293.5699 219.4779 
-0.6 -0.5 -0.08 131.4873 105.1898 57.1684 293.8454 219.637 
-0.6 -0.5 -0.1 131.0068 104.8055 58.2253 294.0376 219.7479 
-0.6 -0.5 -0.3 125.0042 100.0034 71.431 296.4386 221.134 
-0.6 -0.5 -0.5 115.4801 92.3841 92.3841 300.2483 223.3333 
-0.6 -0.5 -0.6 108.2626 86.6101 108.2626 303.1353 225 
-0.6 -0.5 -0.8 82.4858 65.9886 164.9716 313.446 230.9524 
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 Figure 5.20:  Impact of      on SupplyCo1  
 
 
 
 
 
 Figure 5.21:  Impact of      on SupplyCo2  
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Figure 5.22:  Impact of      on SupplyCo3 
 
Additionally, it has been examined; whenever the      approaches lower values, the 
market trend will be shifted towards perfect competition; hence the total purchased 
value will increase and based on Equation 5.4 the selling price will rise. 
 
Figure 5.23:  Impact of      on Total Purchased Value   
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Figure 5.24:  Impact of      on Buying Price   
 
 
5.6 Oligopsony in UK Electricity Market 
 
Ofgem as the UK electricity market regulator has a concern about market power and 
imperfect competition in BETTA on the supply side. According to the Ofgem annual 
report 2010-11 [95], the largest and dominant SupplyCos in the UK, called the Big 
Six (Scottish Power, npower, EDF Energy, Scottish and Southern Energy, E.ON and 
Centrica’s British Gas) dominate retail supply. In such an environment the supply 
side of the market will be suffering from oligopsony conditions. 
In an oligopsonistic market the number of SupplyCos is not high enough and these 
few dominant SupplyCos can cause an imperfect bilateral electricity market and 
limit other companies’ access to the wholesale market; consequently, modeling the 
oligopolistic electricity market is vital. 
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5.7 Summary 
 
Comparing to Chapter 4, in this chapter the other side of bilateral electricity market 
has been highlighted. The behaviors’ of supply companies in imperfect bilateral 
electricity market, oligopsonistic environment, have been examined and formulated 
using CVE method. Therefore, several factors, which have impacts on the purchased 
value by SupplyCos, have been identified. 
In the next step, by introducing an oligopsonistic case study, the impacts of inverse 
generation curve parameters on SupplyCos’ behaviors have been represented. 
Furthermore,   s specifications alongside their impacts on market participants on 
both sides of bilateral market investigated. Finally, this chapter demonstrated that the 
retail price could have strong influence on the supply companies’ strategies as well. 
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Chapter 6: Hierarchical 
Co-ordination Algorithm 
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6.1 Introduction 
 
As discussed in Chapter 4, the behavior of oligopolistic electricity markets using 
Conjectural Variation Equilibrium method has been investigated in detail. 
Furthermore, Chapter 5 looked at the other side of the market by exploring the 
impacts of applying CVE method on supply companies’ behaviors.  
According to evidences from results on Chapter 4 and 5, it can be stated that the 
slopes and intercepts of both inverse demand and generation curves have significant 
influences on the behaviors of market participants in the imperfect bilateral 
electricity market. Likewise,      and      play significant roles in determining 
market power in both markets. 
Since a bilateral electricity market, is a double-sided market; the behaviors of both 
sides of the market should be analyzed simultaneously. The aim of this chapter is to 
provide a novel algorithm in order to find the equilibrium point of the whole bilateral 
market, whilst market participants in both sides of the market are making profit.  
 
6.2 Market Equilibrium 
 
In an oligopolistic electricity market, GenCos are dominating the market by their 
behaviors and decisions; on the contrary, SupplyCos play significant roles in the 
oligopsonistic electricity market. In order to find the stable state of the bilateral 
market, it is essential to investigate the equilibrium point of the market, in which the 
aim of all market participants, which is profit maximization, can be satisfied. 
Whenever, the GenCos and SupplyCos do not have any influence on volume and 
price of traded electricity by their decisions, the electricity market will have a 
perfectly competitive environment. In realistic competitive electricity market, the 
equilibrium point of the market can be defined, when the quantity that GenCos 
provide into the market is equal to the volume of electricity SupplyCos are willing to 
purchase. Therefore, the market will be in an equilibrium state, where the resulted 
quantity and price will define a market equilibrium point.   
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Figure 6.1 illustrates the market equilibrium point. 
  Price 
   
 
              
 
   
 
                                                                                                      Quantity  
Figure 6.1: Market Equilibrium 
According to the above figure, the equilibrium point of the electricity market is 
based on inverse demand and generation curves, which their impacts on the market 
participants’ strategies in both oligopolistic and oligopsonistic electricity markets 
were discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. 
According to Figure 6.1, the market equilibrium point is a crossover point of those 
curves in which both GenCos and SupplyCos are making profit; however, according 
to Figure 6.2, whenever the price is higher than the equilibrium price, participating 
in the market has no economical justification for SupplyCos as electricity buyers; 
therefore they will not participate in the electricity trading.  In this case, the 
generation companies will reduce their generation, in order to sell electricity equal to 
the amount that SupplyCos are willing to purchase [1]. 
On the other hand, if the market price is less than equilibrium price, the number of 
GenCos who are participating in the market will be reduced, since they will not 
make profit by involving in electricity trading, which causes shortage in generated 
electricity and some amount of demand will not be met and imperfect competition 
will be introduced in the market.  Hence, finding market equilibrium point is 
essential for all the firms. According to Section 5.5, the CVE method can assist 
electricity market to be settled at the equilibrium point. 
q* 
* 
Generation Curve 
Demand Curve  
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       Price 
 
 
 
 
 
 Quantity  
 
                                                                                                                Quantity  
Figure 6.2:  Stability of the Market Equilibrium [1] 
 
     6.3 Co-ordination between Oligopolistic and 
Oligopsonistic Electricity Markets 
 
In order to find the equilibrium point of a bilateral electricity market, considering 
both sides of the market is essential. With reference to Chapter 4, the behavior of 
GenCos in an imperfect bilateral electricity market can be modeled using the CVE 
method. Furthermore, the behaviors of SupplyCos in an oligopsonistic electricity 
market have been investigated.  
An additional novelty of this research is that an algorithm has been introduced in 
order to calculate the equilibrium point of the bilateral electricity market, in which 
all market participants are making profit and have willingness to participate in 
electricity trading. 
Modeling oligopolistic and oligopsonistic bilateral markets simultaneously provides 
an opportunity to introduce an algorithm which works as a broker that tries to match 
the generation and demand [90]. Based on Chapter 4 and [86], in the CVE method 
the equilibrium point is a Nash equilibrium, since each firm participates in the 
market rationally. Therefore in long-term trading, such as bilateral electricity 
* 
2 
π1 
Demand Curve  
Generation Curve 
Excess Generation  
Unsatisfied Demand 
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markets, the market participants on both sides of the market will make decisions 
according to Equations 4.28 and 5.15, which are the outcome of CVE modeling and 
define firms’ behaviors in the electricity market. In this case, the results from 
Equations 4.28 and 5.15 will be settled and the market will reach to the equilibrium 
points on both sides of the market. The role of co-ordinations algorithm is to provide 
a framework in which the final equilibrium point of the bilateral market represents 
the strategies of all market participants on both sides of the market. 
 
 
      6.3.1 Role of Oligopolistic Electricity Market in Co-
ordination Algorithm 
 
In order to define a framework, which provides a platform for both sides of the 
bilateral electricity market, it is essential to consider the role of GenCos in this 
coordinated framework. 
In order to demonstrate the impact of GenCos behaviors and decisions on this 
framework, Equation 4.28 can be transformed into [86]: 
 
                                     
 
                                                                       
 
 
Since Equation 6.1 is for a set of GenCos, it can be formed into a matrix format, 
which gives a better perspective to the hierarchical optimization algorithm that will 
be proposed in the next section:  
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Equation 6.2 provides a better overview regarding the dependency of final GenCos’ 
strategies, matrix        to the slope and intercept of the inverse demand curve. 
 
      6.3.2 Role of Oligopsonistic Electricity Market in Co-
ordination Algorithm 
 
In order to investigate how an oligopsonistic electricity market can co-operate with 
the other side of market, the purchased value by SupplyCos can be transformed into 
a matrix format. 
Based on 5.15, the impact of SupplyCos’ behaviors and strategies on this 
coordinative framework can be transformed into: 
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Similar to the generation side, Equation 6.3 is for a set of SupplyCos, and it can be 
transformed into a matrix format, which gives a better overview to the hierarchical 
optimization algorithm that will be proposed later:  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                 
                
                 
     
                  
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
                                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
   
   
 
    
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
  
 
   
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                 
         
 
 
                      
 
 
According to Equations 6.2 and 6.4 output of each GenCo and purchased value by 
each SupplyCo can be calculated through this co-ordination algorithm which 
provides a virtual Pool structure [90] to the market and can be formed by 
introducing two matrices for these two sides of the market. 
The above matrices are linked together, Figure 6.3, through an original hierarchical 
optimization algorithm proposed in the next section. The algorithm works as a 
virtual broker and tries to match the total quantity and price in both oligopoly and 
oligopsony matrices in such a way that GenCos and SupplyCos would maximize 
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their profits. This will be applied by changing the slopes and intercepts, which are 
variables in both left and right hand sides of these matrices.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3: Co-ordination between Oligopolistic and Oligopsonistic Markets 
 
 
Based on Equations 6.2 and 6.4, several principles can be realized: 
 
 The retail price,  , plays a significant role in this co-ordination algorithm 
since the right hand side of Equation 6.4 is strongly dependent on this price. 
 The intercept value of inverse demand function,   , should be bigger than the 
maximum linear coefficient of generators’ cost function,     
 The intercept value of inverse generation function,   , should be sufficiently 
less that the retail price,  . 
 The intercept value of inverse generation curve,   , is less that the intercept 
of inverse demand curve,   . 
 Because of the demand inelasticity, the slope of inverse demand curve,   , 
should be high; therefore the equilibrium quantity is assumed to be the actual 
value for end-users [90]. 
Coordinating Algorithm  
             
       
 
         
        
Oligopolistic 
Market 
Oligopsonistic 
Market  
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6.4 Hierarchical Optimization Algorithm 
 
In this research in order to investigate the equilibrium point of a bilateral electricity 
market, a hierarchical optimization algorithm has been suggested. To perform this 
algorithm accurately further assumptions and modifications are required to obtain 
the equilibrium point of the whole market. The slopes and intercepts of initial 
conditions for the inverse demand and generation functions, 
   
      
      
      
    , can be set to any values, which satisfy the four principles, 
covered in the last section. Since the intercept of the inverse demand function 
represents market power it should be set to a higher value, also the inverse 
generation function is estimated to be a more moderate curve, thus the   
   
 should 
be lower than   
   
. These guesses would help to set the initial values within the 
scope of both oligopolistic and oligopsonistic markets and have a feasible starting 
point for iteration. 
After the initial guess, the variables of inverse demand function and inverse 
generation function, {           }, can be varied to obtain new     and    . 
Therefore, an iterative hierarchical optimization method can be proposed. This 
method is called hierarchical because it coordinates both the oligopolistic and 
oligopsonistic markets and operates in such a way to seek an overall match between 
the two CVE models in order to find the equilibrium of the market. 
There are some assumptions for this hierarchical algorithm: 
 Bilateral electricity market can be modeled as a virtual Pool with a virtual 
broker, which tends to find the market equilibrium based on the conjectural 
variations of both GenCos and SupplyCos. 
      and      for both GenCos and SupplyCos are constant. (The calculation 
of   s is outside of the scope of this research and will be discussed as a 
possibility for future work). 
 No holding is permitted for each supply company, to avoid practicing market 
power. 
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Consequently, the hierarchical optimization algorithm contains the following steps: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.4: Hierarchical Optimization Algorithm 
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Step 1) Initialize inverse demand and generation functions:  
   
      
      
      
      
 
Step 2) Define the generators’ cost function variables:          for 
oligopolistic market and retail price,    for oligopsonistic market. 
 
Step 3) Define the      and      based on historical data and technical 
characteristics of each GenCo and SupplyCo respectively. 
 
Step 4) Computing the output of each GenCo,    , and the purchased 
amount of electricity by each SupplyCo,    , using Equations 6.2 and 6.4 
 
 
Step 5) Calculating the     
 
    and     
 
   . 
 
Step 6) Computing the price values for oligopolistic and oligopsonistic 
markets,    and    respectively, using Equations 4.20, 5.4,    and   , 
based on inverse demand and inverse generation functions respectively. 
 
Step 7) Using Hierarchical Optimization method, to obtain: 
    
     
    
         
    
    
     
      
                                
 
Step 8) If the objective function is minimized, the equilibrium point 
(    
 
   
*
,    
*
) can be calculated, if not, the optimizer keeps increasing 
the number of iterations,      , and replaces the slopes and intercepts 
parameters with updated values, {  
        
        
     
,   
     
}, then 
goes to step (4). 
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Figure 6.5 illustrates the hierarchical optimization algorithm applied in this chapter. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.5:  Hierarchical Optimization Structure 
 
It should be mentioned that, in step 7, all     
    
   ,     
    
   ,   
    and   
    are 
functions of {           } and     is the number of iterations.  
 
6.4.1 Hierarchical Algorithm Optimizer 
 
Matlab has been selected in order to perform all the mentioned steps including the 
least squares optimization problem, Equation 6.5, in Step 7 (Appendix F). In order to 
boost the calculation’s processing time and reduce computational analysis, a 
derivative-free optimization method can be employed to optimize the objective 
function.  
 
  
169 
Two toolboxes for optimization have been provided in Matlab: 
 Optimization Toolbox  
 Global Optimization Toolbox.  
Most of the functions in the first toolbox are gradient-based; however there are some 
derivative-free solvers in the Global Optimization Toolbox such as Patternsearch.  
Patternsearch, which is also known as Direct Search, has a proven convergence and 
also has a user-supplied start point approach unlike Genetic Algorithm (GA) [96]. 
Furthermore, this method has less function evaluations compare to other approaches 
such as Simulated Annealing and Genetic Algorithm (GA), which makes it faster 
compare to other methods [96]. While most of the traditional optimization methods 
have been founded on exact or approximate data about the gradient, Patternsearch is 
a kind of metaheuristic optimization method, which doesn’t use gradient or Hessian 
matrix and the objective function can be continuous and non-differentiable and be 
able to be computed by a black box simulation. Therefore, it can be applied to cases 
in which the analytic derivatives are unknown or difficult to calculate [97] such as 
Equation 6.5. 
This approach starts at an initial guess in step 1 provided by the user with an initial 
pattern matrix,   , and a scalar parameter solution,   . In order to define a natural 
stopping criterion for the search,    has been introduced. The Generalized 
Patternsearch has been characterized by Exploratory Moves according to [97], and 
the algorithm finds the next step by applying exploratory moves:             . 
Whenever,                   , then             and the           will be 
updated, otherwise it will stick to the current point. 
In Figure 6.5, firstly the Patternsearch algorithm tries the step   
 .  However,     
   
       ; therefore this method tries the next step,   
  and the objective function 
can be evaluated at   
 
 =    +   
 . Since      
    <       , the   
  move can be 
accepted. 
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Figure 6.6:  Patternsearch Exploratory Moves 
 
Patternsearch tries to minimize the objective function using the feasible start points 
from step (1) and comes up with new suggested values of {           } to reduce 
Equation 6.5.  
 
6.5 Hierarchical Optimization Algorithm Case Study 
 
In order to demonstrate the validity of the above algorithm, the CVE method has 
been applied into oligopolistic and oligopsonistic electricity markets simultaneously. 
An oligopolistic market including 3 GenCos and an oligopsonistic market with 4 
SupplyCos have been taken into consideration. The specifications of market 
participants in both market environments can be found in Tables 6.1. and 6.2.  
According to the tables, the fixed coefficients of generators’ cost functions have 
been assumed to be zero to simplify the calculations and the SupplyCos fixed costs 
has also been set to zero. Unlike Chapter 5, the retail price for each SupplyCo is 
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different, which will influence the strategies and behaviours of each SupplyCo in 
participating in bilateral electricity market. 
 
Table 6.1: Oligopolistic Market Participants’ Parameters 
    (£)    (£/MW)    (£/  
 )      
GenCo 1 0 10 0.005 -0.01 
GenCo 2 0 12 0.007 -0.02 
GenCo 3 0 15 0.008 -0.03 
 
 
Table 6.2: Oligopsonistic Market Participants’ Parameters 
          (£)   (£/MW) 
SupplyCo 1 -0.09 0 280 
SupplyCo 2 -0.1 0 290 
SupplyCo 3 -0.2 0 300 
SupplyCo 3 -0.3 0 310 
 
 
In Chapter 5, the impacts of    values on the market participants’ strategies on both 
sides of the market were investigated. Now the aim of this chapter is to find the 
equilibrium point of the whole bilateral market; therefore,    values are assumed to 
be within the range described Chapter 5. In this case the      values for GenCos are 
less than those for SupplyCos, which demonstrates that GenCos have more market 
power; furthermore the number of SupplyCos, is greater comparing to number of 
GenCos participating in the market. 
This section represents how the hierarchical Direct Search algorithm can find the 
equilibrium point of bilateral oligopolistic and oligopsonistic electricity markets 
alongside profit maximization for both GenCos and SupplyCos by applying the 
Patternsearch optimizer. By applying the hierarchical optimization algorithm for the 
above system the final values for {           } can be identified in Table 6.3:  
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Table 6.3: Intercepts and Slopes Values for Both Sides of the Market 
Slopes & Intercepts Values 
   
1001.501 
   
60.125 
   
7.21 
   1.8 
 
Based on Table 6.3, the intercept of inverse demand curve,   , is much higher, 
comparing to the inverse generation curve,   , which was predictable earlier because 
of demand inelasticity and market power. Additionally, the slope of the inverse 
generation curve,   , is moderate, about       , compare to       of the inverse 
demand curve slope. It is remarkable that because of the steepness of inverse 
demand curve and inelasticity of it, this curve represents the demand value [90]. 
Also, Figure 6.7 illustrates the Matlab results for intercepts and slopes values: 
 
 
Figure 6.7: Best Points for Intercepts and Slopes of Inverse Demand and Generation Curves 
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Figure 6.8 shows the objective function, Equation 6.5, after performing the 
hierarchical optimization, which has obtained a very small value. Based on this 
figure, this function has been converged more gradually at the early iterations, 
afterwards its value drops steeply. 
 
 
Figure 6.8: Objective Function Value 
 
In Generalized Patternsearch (GPS) a pattern is a set of vectors that the Patternsearch 
algorithm uses to determine which points to search. At each step, Patternsearch 
searches a set of points, called a mesh, for a point that improves the objective 
function. After each iteration the optimizer multiply each pattern vector by a small 
scalar which is called mesh size to add it to a current point to reach to the solutions. 
Fig 6.9. demonstrates the mesh size of this algorithm after each iteration. As it is 
illustrated after several fluctuations in the value of mesh size in early iterations, its 
value would get a decreasing trend iteration by iteration, which means the 
hierarchical optimization algorithm is reaching the equilibrium point of the market. 
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Figure 6.9:  Patternseach Mesh Size Value 
According to the figure above, at the early stage, the added scalar value to reach to 
the solution is higher comparing to the later iterations; which illustrates how 
hierarchical optimization algorithm reaches the equilibrium point of the electricity 
market.  
Finally,  the  optimum  inverse  demand  function  and  inverse generation   function,  
 
Figure 6.10:  Market Equilibrium Point 
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alongside the combined market equilibrium point have been calculated and 
represented in Figure 6.10.  Where the equilibrium point of the market  
(   
      
    is: 
 
 
Table 6.4:Market Equilibrium Point 
 
 
 
 
Furthemore, it is possible to investigate the output of each GenCo and purchased 
value by each SupplyCo individually: 
 
Table 6.5: GenCos’ Market Share 
Output of GenCos Values 
    
34.4976 
    
34.5563 
    
34.4781 
 
 
Table 6.6: SupplyCos’ Market Share 
Purchased Value by SupplyCos Values 
    
13.8937 
    
19.9188 
    
29.0133 
    
40.7062 
 
 
Equilibrium Values 
   
  
256.0712 
   
  
103.5320 
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It was expected that the output of GenCo1 will be higher comparing to others based 
on their cost functions. However, accoridng to Table 6.1, the      is higher than 
other generation companies; therefore based on Chpater 5 investigations, it causes  
reduction in GenCo1’s market share. Also because the        value of SupplyCo1  is 
higher than others, its share in the market is very low comparing to SupplyCo4, 
which its share is almost three times bigger. It is important to notice that, the retail 
price has a strong influence on the strategies of SupplyCos as well. Accoridng to 
Table 6.2 the SupplyCo 1 has been offered less retail price to sell elelctricity to the 
end-users; hence, it does not have strong incentives comparing other supply 
companies to participate in the wholesale market. Equation 5.15 can validate this 
fact. 
Additionaly, it is possible to use the above market equilibrium point, resulting slopes 
and intercepts, to perform optimization in both oligopolistic and oligopsonistic 
models seperately, to find out whether both GenCos and SupplyCos are making 
profit under this condition or not. Tables 6.7 and 6.8. demonstrate the profits for 
firms on both sides of the market: 
 
Table 6.7: GenCos’ Profits 
GenCos Profit Values 
    
8488.865829 
    
8157.747209 
    
7794.505441 
 
Table 6.8: SupplyCos’ Profits 
SupplyCos Profit Values 
    
332.4595686 
    
675.8209814 
    
1274.519453 
    
2195.236519 
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Consequently, based on the tables above, all market participants are making profit 
corresponding to the equilibrium point of this specific case study. However, because 
of the demand inelasiticty, higher number of SupplyCos and also assumed retail 
prices, GenCos are making more profits. 
 
6.6 Summary 
 
This chapter focuses on calculating equilibrium point of whole bilateal elelctricity 
market consodering both oligpolistic and oligopsonistic electricity markets. In order 
to achieve this goal, it is essential to consider both sides of the market, simutanesly. 
It has been investigated that how these two models can co-ordinate with each other 
in order to find the stable point of the market. According to this coordinative idea, a 
hierarchical optimization algorithm introduced, which assists to calculate 
equilibrium point alongside the share of each firms in the elelctricity market. The 
objective function in this hierarchical algorithm has been optimized using derivative-
free optimizer. 
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7.1 Introduction 
 
In Chapter 6, the novel hierarchical optimization algorithm was introduced and by 
applying this algorithm on both sides of the bilateral electricity market, the 
equilibrium point of electricity trading was calculated and according to the proposed 
case study all market participants made profit using this coordinative algorithm. This 
chapter attempts to summarize all the achievements made through this research and 
highlight the contributions and novelties of this study, alongside suggested directions 
for future works. 
 
7.2 Achievements and Contributions 
 
The electricity sector all over the world has undergone considerable changes during 
the past decade. Main developments are the liberalization of electricity markets and 
the promotion of renewable electricity generation; therefore market players and 
policy makers must deal with new aspects like market power and appearance of 
fluctuating energy sources. A promising approach for the scientific analysis of these 
new developments is Conjectural Variation Equilibrium (CVE) method. Nowadays, 
electricity markets are an evolving system of complex interactions between physical 
structures, market rules and market participants; hence, their goals, objectives, 
beliefs and decision processes vary markedly. Such a diversity of inputs can lead to a 
rich diversity of market outcomes. From structural viewpoint the equilibrium method 
represents the overall market behaviors and particularly CVE method attempts to 
estimate market participants’ behaviors in an electricity market. 
The design of the BETTA, as a bilateral electricity market example, and its rules 
incentivize players to maximize their opportunities to trade in a free market and 
control their own generation or consumption. Therefore generation and supply 
companies are self-dispatched. Because of the absence of centralized decision-
making authority, both GenCos and SupplyCos face uncertainties in making their 
decisions and strategies; therefore, that need to rely on their own judgments about 
the market environment and decide how to participate in energy trading. The 
existence of single decision maker agents in market can cause some risks; especially 
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the exposure to the imbalance prices arises. This problem is very serious for 
intermittent generations like wind energy, which is hard to predict the output.  
From SupplyCos’ perspective, managing risks of price variations is very important. 
They purchase electricity in the wholesale market and sell it to the end-users at 
different retail prices. They can make benefit in an oligopsonistic electricity market 
and dominate the market by purchasing less electricity in order to force GenCos to 
sell their generated electricity at the lower price. Furthermore, since the elasticity of 
demand for electricity is relatively small, because of the nature of electricity as a 
commodity, they can make profit in the retail market as well. It is essential to 
mention that considering retail market is not within the scope of this research; 
however, since there is a strong linkage between wholesale trading and retail market, 
the impacts of retail prices on SupplyCos’ decisions have been investigated in both 
Chapters 5 and 6. In some circumstances, the electricity suppliers may pay more for 
buying electricity from the wholesale market than the price they charged to their 
end-users. 
On the other hand generation companies should mange the risks of participating in 
long-term bilateral electricity trading and must provide the amount of electricity they 
have agreed to avoid any imbalance settlement charges according to the structure of 
bilateral electricity markets such as BETTA as investigated in chapter 3. However, 
the cost of generation companies comprises the fuel costs, the cost of start-up and 
shut down and fuel transportation charges; therefore they may face imbalance 
conditions in the long-term. In this case they are required to buy electricity in the 
spot market or adjust their positions by participating in the balancing mechanism; 
which means they are exposed to the risk of price volatility. For instance, as a result 
of an unexpected and sudden power outage, GenCos can face very high spot and 
balancing mechanism prices especially at the peak times; therefore, they need to 
have a good knowledge about their rivals’ decisions and reactions and also be able to 
consider the other side of the market in other to prepare themselves for any possible 
market power exercises. It is worth to mention that, one of the incentives for 
investments on the generation side and intermittent energy infrastructures is the high 
electricity selling price for generation companies; therefore, it is expected that 
generation companies make more profit comparing to supply companies in the 
electricity market; as the results of case study in Chapter 6 illustrates this fact. 
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Bilateral electricity market characteristics guide us to use CVE to model the 
behaviors of parties in this market. CVE method can provide insights into pricing 
and strategic behaviors in complex new markets like bilateral electricity market and 
manage the firms’ strategies in such a way that all of them can make profit while the 
market is at the stable point according to Nash Equilibrium and they do not have any 
willingness to deviate from their strategies. 
The followings are some of the findings of this research: 
1) The bilateral market structure can improve the industry efficiency of market 
participants, since all of them are responsible for their own decisions. 
2) SupplyCos’ exposures to the risk in bilateral electricity market are greater 
than GenCos’ exposures.  
3) GenCos’ have an inherent ability to make more profit comparing SupplyCos’ 
because of the nature of demand inelasticity. 
4) The flexible power plants will be valuable in this market structure since they 
can merge their risks and make their conjectures adaptable based on their 
learning about other rivals’ behaviors using historical data. 
5) By implementation of this model the percentage of trading in BM will be 
reduced, and in an imperfect bilateral electricity market all the firms on both 
sides can maximize their profits. 
6) The retail price can have strong impacts on SupplyCos’ strategies in the 
wholesale bilateral trading, since they can have more willingness to buy more 
electricity in order to make further profit. 
7) The slope and intercept of inverse demand function clarify the strategies of 
GenCos in the bilateral electricity market, as the slope and intercept of 
inverse generation curve have strong influence on the SupplyCos strategies. 
8) The   s values can indicate the level of imperfectness of the market on both 
sides. 
9) In the CVE method not only the cost functions parameters have influence on 
the generation companies; but their conjectures about their rivals can have 
strong influence on their decisions. This fact applies to SupplyCos as well. 
10) According to the Matrix 6.4, once the inverse generation curve becomes 
elastic and gets the form of horizontal line, the price that SupplyCos are 
going to buy at, is equal to the inverse generation curve intercept, which 
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would be the retail price. 
11) According to the hierarchical algorithm, whenever high values of inverse 
demand curve intercept are selected by the optimizer, the slope of this curve 
will get high values as well by the optimizer, in order to reduce the mismatch 
between the prices of both markets. 
The main contributions and novelties of this research lies on tackling the potentially 
interesting topic of imperfect bilateral electricity market modeling based on CVE 
approach: 
1) Considering a bilateral electricity market, with large amount of electricity 
traded in long-term contracts years ahead of gate closure, such as BETTA 
structure, while as mentioned in Chapter 2, most of the studies and market 
modeling are dedicated to electricity Pool structure. 
2) Considering both sides of bilateral electricity market and splitting it into two 
sub-markets. 
3) Considering imperfect environment on generation side of the market by 
taking into consideration oligopolistic electricity market. However, in other 
studies the oligopoly environment has been considered in the Pool structure 
and oligopolistic market have been traditionally represented in electricity 
markets equilibriums, as mentioned in Chapters 2 and 4. 
4) Considering the supply side of the bilateral electricity market simultaneously, 
by investigating oligopsonistic electricity market. 
5) In most studies the monopoly competes with a monopsony in a single 
market, however, bilateral oligopoly in which oligopoly competes with 
oligopsony has not been explored in the literature. 
6) Apply Conjectural Variation Equilibrium method on both markets and 
particularly formulate the behaviors of SupplyCos through this equilibrium 
method, while the role of retail price has been investigated in this research as 
well. 
7) Dependency of residual demand curve and residual generation curve by 
applying the novel-coordinating algorithm.  
8) Introducing a novel hierarchical algorithm in order to find out the equilibrium 
point of the whole bilateral market by considering both types of the market, 
simultaneously. A new overall model of a bilateral market has been 
  
183 
presented.  This combines a Conjectural Variations Equilibrium model of an 
oligopolistic set of GenCos with a corresponding oligopsonistic equilibrium 
model of a set of supply companies.  These models each include an assumed 
demand (or generation) curve for the other side of the bilateral market.  The 
assumed curves are iteratively adjusted with the objective of obtaining a 
‘match’, in both quantity and price, between the two equilibrium models.  
This match can be found by a hierarchical optimization approach in which a 
coordination level optimization adjusts the slopes and intercepts of the supply 
and demand curves until a minimum imbalance between the two equilibrium 
models is found. The coordinated solution (which can be viewed as 
representing a virtual broker between the oligopoly and the oligopsony) 
determines the output levels of all GenCos and the purchase levels by all 
SupplyCos as it was proven by a numerical case. 
Also, it should be mentioned that in [86] the application of Conjectural Variation 
Equilibrium model for generation side (oligopolistic electricity market) has been 
compared with other equilibrium methods and improved results have been achieved. 
This can be an appropriate validation for this research. Furthermore, by working 
with one or more generation or supply companies the theory of oligopsonistic 
electricity modeling and hierarchical optimization algorithm could be evaluated 
under practical conditions. 
7.3 Directions for Future Works 
 
Although the   s’ impacts on GenCos’ and SupplyCos’ market behaviors have been 
investigated in Chapter 5, since these parameters’ values for both generation and 
supply companies during the hierarchical optimization algorithm have been treated 
static; therefore, this research then leaves open the question of how the   s values 
can be modified based historical data. Based on a long-term analysis of market 
outcome data it could be possible to estimate the values of   s, which would 
‘explain’ the dynamic behaviors of the market. 
The analysis presented in the thesis is a static equilibrium model, by allowing for 
dynamic responses of market participants; time-varying set of   s could be 
considered. 
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Appendix A 
 
%%%%%%%% Oligopolistic Electricity Market %%%%%%%%% 
%%%% Generation Companies' Behaviors Analysis %%%%% 
  
  
clc 
  
clear all 
  
% Asking Users to Provide Intercepts and Slopes of Inverse 
Demand Curve: 
% x (1,1) is the Inverse Demand Curve Intercept. 
% x (3,1) is the Inverse Demand Curve Slope. 
  
x (1,1) = input(' Please Enter the Initial Intercept of 
Inverse Demand Curve\n e1 = '); 
  
x (3,1) = input(' Please Enter the Initial Slope of Inverse 
Demand Curve\n f1 = '); 
  
% Defining the number of GenCos and SupplyCos: 
  
ngc = 3; 
  
nsc = 3; 
  
% Defining the Retail Market Price: 
  
Pr = 250; 
  
% Defining the GenCos' Cost Functions: 
  
cost_function = [0 0 0;10 20 30;0 0 0]; 
  
% Defining the CVs Values for GenCos: 
  
conjecture_variation_G = [-0.5,-0.5,-0.5]; 
  
% Applying CVE Method on Oligopolistic Electricity Market  
  
for k = 1 : ngc 
     
    v (1,k) = x(3,1) * (2 + conjecture_variation_G (1,k)) + 
cost_function (3,k) - x(3,1); 
  
end 
  
for kk = 1 : ngc 
     
    b (kk,1) = x (1,1) - cost_function (2,kk); 
  
end 
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% Calculating the Output of each GenCo 
  
y = diag (v) + diag (x (3,1)); 
  
qg = y \ b 
  
% Calculating the Total Output of All GenCos 
  
t = 0; 
  
for i = 1 : ngc 
     
    t = qg (i,1) + t; 
     
end 
  
Qg = t; 
  
z (1,1) = Qg 
  
% Computing the Price for Inverse Demand Curve 
  
Pd = x(1,1) - x(3,1) * Qg; 
  
z( 2,1) = Pd 
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Appendix B 
 
In Chapter 4, the impacts of inverse demand curve’s slope on the GenCo1 have been 
investigated based on CVE formulation for oligopolistic electricity market. In this 
section the impacts of inverse demand curve’s slope on GenCos 2 and 3 have been 
highlighted. It can be concluded that the output variations for GenCo3 is less than 
GenCo2 and GenCo1. 
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Furthermore, like GenCo1, it is possible to investigate the impacts of intercept on the 
output of other GenCos for a specific slope according to CVE formulations for 
oligopolistic electricity market. 
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Appendix C 
 
%%%%%%%% Oligopsonistic Electricity Market %%%%%%%%% 
%%%%%%% Supply Companies' Behaviors Analysis %%%%%%% 
  
clc 
  
clear all 
  
% Asking Users to Provide Intercepts and Slopes of Inverse 
Generation Curve: 
% x (2,1) is the Inverse Generation Curve Intercept. 
% x (4,1) is the Inverse Generation Curve Slope. 
  
x (2,1) = input(' Please Enter the Initial Intercept of 
Inverse Generation Curve\n e2 = '); 
  
x (4,1) = input(' Please Enter the Initial Slope of Inverse 
Generation Curve\n f2 = '); 
  
% Defining the number of GenCos and SupplyCos: 
  
ngc = 3; 
  
nsc = 3; 
  
% Defining the Retail Market Price: 
  
Pr=150; 
  
  
% Defining the CVs Values for SupplyCos: 
  
conjecture_variation_D = [-0.6,-.5,-.4]; 
  
% Applying CVE Method on Oligopsonistic Electricity Market  
  
for k = 1 : nsc 
     
    vv (1,k) = x(4,1) * (2+conjecture_variation_D (1,k)) - 
x(4,1); 
     
end 
  
for kk = 1 : nsc 
     
    bb (kk,1) = Pr - x(2,1); 
     
end 
  
% Calculating the Purchased Value by each SupplyCo 
  
yy = diag (vv) + diag (x(4,1)); 
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qd = yy \ bb 
  
% Calculating the Total Purchased Value by All SupplyCos 
  
t = 0; 
  
for i = 1 : nsc 
     
    t = qd (i,1) + t; 
     
end 
  
Qd = t; 
  
z (3,1) = Qd 
  
% Computing the Price for Inverse Generation Curve 
  
Pg = x(2,1) + x(4,1) * Qd; 
  
z (4,1) = Pg 
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Appendix D 
 
In Chapter 5, the impacts of inverse generation curve’s slope on the SupplyCo1 have 
been investigated based on CVE formulation for oligopsonistic electricity market. In 
this section the impacts of inverse generation curve’s slope on SupplyCos 2 and 3 
have been highlighted. It can be concluded that the variations in purchased value by 
SupplyCo3 is less than SupplyCo2 and SupplyCo1. 
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Additionally, the impacts of intercept on the purchased value by other SupplyCos 
have been investigated for a specific slope according to CVE formulations for 
oligopsonistic electricity market. 
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Furthermore, the impacts of retail price on SupplyCos 2 and 3 have been 
highlighted: 
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Appendix E 
 
In this section, the impacts of      and      variations on the output of GenCos 1, 
2, 3, total output and selling price have been investigated. 
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Additionally the impacts of      and      variations on the purchased value of 
SupplyCo 1, 2, 3, total purchased value and buying price have been investigated. 
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Appendix F 
 
%%%%%% Main Mfile for Electricity Market Equilibrium 
Calculations %%%%%%% 
  
clc 
  
clear all 
  
close all 
  
global www 
  
% Modifying the flat start 
  
www=0; 
  
% Asking User to Provide the Flat Start Points for Slopes and 
Intercepts of Inverse Demand and Generation Curves: 
% x (1,1) is the Inverse Demand Curve Intercept. 
% x (2,1) is the Inverse Generation Curve Intercept. 
% x (3,1) is the Inverse Demand Curve Slope. 
% x (4,1) is the Inverse Generation Curve Slope. 
  
x (1,1) = input(' Please Enter the Initial Intercept of 
Inverse Demand Curve\n e1 = '); 
  
x (2,1) = input(' Please Enter the Initial Intercept of 
Inverse Generation Curve\n e2 = '); 
  
x (3,1) = input(' Please Enter the Initial Slope of Inverse 
Demand Curve\n f1 = '); 
  
x (4,1) = input(' Please Enter the Initial Slope of Inverse 
Generation Curve\n f2 = '); 
  
% Executing PatterSearch Optimizer and Defining the Inequality 
Constraints for the Optimizer 
  
lb = [100 10 1.1917 0.0000001]; 
  
ub = [1100 250 11.43 2.7474]; 
  
Aineq = [-1 1 0 0]; 
  
bineq = [0]; 
  
options = psoptimset 
('MaxIter',10000*12,'MaxFunEvals',10000*12,'TolMesh',1.0000e-
0090,'TolX',1.0000e-0090,'TolFun',1.0000e-
0090,'PlotFcns',{@psplotbestf,@psplotbestx,@psplotmeshsize,@ps
plotfuncount},'Display','iter'); 
  
% Calling Pattern1 Mfile 
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[x f] = patternsearch 
(@pattern1,x,Aineq,bineq,[],[],lb,ub,[],options) 
  
% Plotting the Final Inverse Demand and Generation Curves 
According to the Co-ordination Algorithm and Output of 
PatterSearch Optimizer and Illustrating the Equilibrium Point 
of the Market 
  
m=0:1000; 
  
y1=x(1,1)-x(3,1)*m; 
  
y2=x(2,1)+x(4,1)*m; 
  
figure; 
  
xlabel('Q') 
  
ylabel('P') 
  
plot(m,y1,'-',m,y2,'-.') 
  
legend('Inverse Demand Curve','Inverse Generation Curve') 
  
grid on; 
 
%%%%% Pattern1 Mfile for Modifing Market Participants' 
Specifications and Applying Oligopolistic and Oligopsonistic 
Market Formulations by Calling Hierarchical Optimization 
Algorithm Mfile%%%%%%%  
  
  
function f = pattern1 (x); 
  
global www 
  
global  conjecture_variation_G 
  
global conjecture_variation_D 
  
  
% Set Constant Variables such as: Number of GenCos and 
SupplyCos, Retail Prices for Each SupplyCo and CVs Values for 
Both GenCos and SupplyCos (Can be asked from users as well) 
  
ngc = 3; 
  
nsc = 4; 
  
Pr = [280,290,300,310]; 
  
cost_function = [0 0 0 ;10 12 15 ;0.005 0.007 0.008]; 
  
    conjecture_variation_G = [-.01,-.02,-.03]; 
  
    conjecture_variation_D = [-.09,-.1,-.2,-.3]; 
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% Calling the Hierarchical Optimization Mfile 
  
[z] = Hierarchicalopt 
(ngc,nsc,Pr,conjecture_variation_G,conjecture_variation_D,cost
_function,x); 
  
% Objective Function 
  
f = (z (1,1) - z (3,1)) ^ 2 + (z (4,1) - z (2,1)) ^ 2; 
 
%%%%% Hierarchical optimization Algorithm for Both 
Oligopolistic and Oligopsonistic Electricity Markets %%%%% 
  
  
function [z] = Hierarchicalopt 
(ngc,nsc,Pr,conjecture_variation_G,conjecture_variation_D,cost
_function,x);  
  
global www 
  
% Calculating the Output of Each GenCo 
  
for k = 1 : ngc 
     
    v (1,k) = x(3,1) * (2 + conjecture_variation_G (1,k)) + 
cost_function (3,k) - x(3,1); 
     
end 
  
for kk = 1 : ngc 
     
    b (kk,1) = x (1,1) - cost_function (2,kk); 
     
end 
  
y = diag (v) + diag (x (3,1) ); 
  
qg = y \ b 
  
% Calculating the Total Output of All GenCos 
  
t = 0; 
  
for i = 1 : ngc 
     
    t = qg (i,1) + t; 
     
end 
  
Qg = t;  
  
z (1,1) = Qg 
  
% Computung the Price ofr Inverse Demand Curve 
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Pd = x(1,1) - x(3,1) * Qg; 
  
z(2,1) = Pd 
  
% Calculating the Purchased Value by Each SupplyCo 
  
for g = 1 : nsc 
     
    vv (1,g) = x(4,1) * (2+conjecture_variation_D (1,g)) - 
x(4,1); 
     
end 
  
for gg = 1 : nsc 
     
    bb (gg,1) = Pr(1,gg) - x(2,1); 
     
end 
  
yy = diag (vv) + diag (x(4,1)); 
  
qd = yy \ bb 
  
% Calculating the Total Purchased Value by All SupplyCos 
  
ttt = 0; 
  
for ii = 1 : nsc 
     
    ttt = qd (ii,1) + ttt; 
     
end 
  
Qd = ttt; 
  
z (3,1) = Qd 
  
% Computing the Price for Inverse Genration Curve 
  
Pg = x(2,1) + x(4,1) * Qd; 
  
z (4,1) = Pg 
 
 
